

DNSSEC

Key Management

Part 1 of 3 – Key Storage



About the participants



- Alan Clegg
 - ISC Training and Support Engineer
 - e-mail - aclegg@isc.org
 - [twitter](#) - @knobee

- Larissa Shapiro
 - ISC Product Manager
 - e-mail - larissas@isc.org
 - [twitter](#) - @ISCdotORG

Part One? What's this?

- Other presentations on DNSSEC Key Management will follow, including:
 - Key Rollover Policies
 - Key Rollover Tools and Practices
- But for now, let's talk storage.

What are keys for anyway?

- Zone Signing Key
 - Creates the signatures on the resource record sets in the zone
- Key Signing Key
 - Creates a signature on the DNSKEY resource record set
 - Provides the "Secure Entry Point" into this zone from the parent

How do I create them?

- BIND distribution provides the application `dnssec-keygen`
- Generates both ZSK and KSK
 - Type of keys depends on flag option
 - `-f ksk`
- Each run of `dnssec-keygen` creates two different files...

Two files?

- DNSSEC uses Public Key encryption
 - Private and Public portion for each key
 - Private portion must remain secret
 - Public portion is published in zone data

KSK and ZSK into the zone!

- To allow remote validation of the zone data, the public portions of the KSK and ZSK must be included in the zone before signing:

`$INCLUDE` or cut-and-paste

- Automation in BIND 9.7

How does signing happen?

- Prior to BIND 9.7
 - Zones manually signed using `"dnssec-signzone"`
- Since 9.7
 - Manual signing is enhanced
 - Automatic (online) re-signing available

Manual Signing

- Entire signing process is done from the command line
 - Operator must have access to both public (included) and private (signing) portions of the key
 - Unsigned zone is completely signed
 - Already signed zone is re-signed (as needed)

Dynamic Signing

- BIND deals with signing the zone "on the fly"
 - Human is no-longer in the loop
 - BIND needs access to the keys



Where do we store keys?

- Two current options:
 - In the filesystem
 - Hardware Security Module (HSM)



Filesystem – Good enough?

- Prior to 9.7, keep the keys with the zone data was the best choice..

Pro:

Simple to tell which keys are available for each zone

Con:

Intermingles "private" and "public" data

So, 9.7 makes this better?

- With 9.7, DNSSEC tools gained a "-K" option
 - Specifies location of key directory
 - For signing, read key from there
 - For generating, write key to there

Keys go where?

- In addition, `named` has a matching option

`key-directory`

- Configured per-zone or at global scope

A CRYPTO NERD'S
IMAGINATION:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
LET'S BUILD A MILLION-DOLLAR
CLUSTER TO CRACK IT.



WHAT WOULD
ACTUALLY HAPPEN:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
DRUG HIM AND HIT HIM WITH
THIS \$5 WRENCH UNTIL
HE TELLS US THE PASSWORD.



<http://www.xkcd.com/538/>

I'd like to not be beaten..

- KSK private key files can be kept off-line until needed
 - Since the KSK only signs the DNSKEY resource record set, it is only needed during changes of that RRset
 - KSK or ZSK rollovers

Don't the RRSIGs expire?

- The signature on the DNSKEY RRSET can be artificially extended so that it is not re-created every 30 days.
 - This makes the key more vulnerable to replay attacks (the reason for signature expiration)

If I need more security...

- The filesystem is always vulnerable to local "attacks" by privileged users
 - "high value" zones need better protection
 - Mandates are sometimes motivation for better protection (FIPS 140-2)

Hardware Security Module

- Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) provide non-extractable private keys
- Public key portion is still in the filesystem
 - Needed for "inclusion" into the zone

Ok, how does it work?

- Signing application must have access to hardware device
 - named `or dnssec-signzone`
 - Access through a modified OpenSSL library

Signing...

- The signing of zone data takes place in the Hardware Security Module
 - The KSK private data is never exposed to a potential attacker
 - RRs signed/second depends more on the HSM

Modified OpenSSL?

- Patches are included in BIND distributions
 - Adds "key by reference" and PIN management
 - Does NOT replace system version of OpenSSL

So, does it play nicely?

- Key creation with an HSM uses "pkcs11-keygen" instead of "dnssec-keygen"
- Automatic re-signing (via `named`) is able to be automated
 - PIN must be stored in the filesystem...

Where do I get one?

- Keyper devices are available individually and as a bundled consulting/install product from ISC
- Contact your ISC account manager for more information

Questions or comments?

