End-to-End Encryption and Purpose-Bound Governance for Agent-to-Agent Messaging

1.1. Problem Statement

Deployments of agent-to-agent messaging are moving from single-organisation orchestration towards interactions between agents that represent different principals: a person and a business, two businesses, or a citizen and a public body. Three properties that are routinely required in such interactions are not provided by the agent-to-agent protocols currently in use.¶

Confidentiality against intermediaries.

Current practice secures the transport hop, typically with TLS, and authenticates the caller, typically with OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, or mutual TLS. Any intermediary that terminates TLS -- a gateway, a broker, a hosting provider, or the platform operating either agent -- can read the full message content. Where the two principals are mutually independent and the message content is confidential, commercially sensitive, or personal data, transport security is insufficient.¶

Non-repudiable assertion.

A recipient frequently needs durable evidence of what the counterparty's agent asserted, and needs it to remain verifiable after the session has ended, after key rotation, and independently of any log held by an intermediary. Transport-level authentication does not produce such evidence, because it authenticates a connection rather than a statement.¶

Machine-enforceable use constraints.

When an agent discloses data to a counterparty, the disclosing principal frequently intends the disclosure to be limited: to a stated purpose, and for a bounded period. Today that intent, if expressed at all, is expressed in prose outside the protocol and is therefore not available to the receiving implementation at the moment of processing.¶

These are not hypothetical requirements. In several jurisdictions the second and third are closely related to statutory obligations; see Section 9.¶

1.2. Scope

This document specifies:¶

• a signed message envelope, the Governed Object, carrying a semantic type, a payload, a declared purpose, and an expiry (Section 5);¶

• an agent identity scheme based on Ed25519 [RFC8032] decentralised identifiers, and a mandatory cryptographic binding between that identity and the agent's MLS credential (Section 4);¶

• establishment of MLS [RFC9420] sessions between agents, including publication and retrieval of MLS KeyPackages (Section 6);¶

• encapsulation of MLS wire messages and Governed Objects as an extension to an agent-to-agent transport, with A2A [A2A] as the reference binding (Section 7);¶

• mandatory receiver-side processing rules, including signature verification, expiry rejection, replay rejection, and purpose enforcement (Section 8).¶

1.3. Non-Goals

This document does not:¶

• define a new agent-to-agent transport, discovery mechanism, or capability description format; it layers on an existing one;¶

• define agent tool invocation or local resource access, for which the Model Context Protocol [MCP] and comparable mechanisms are used;¶

• provide cryptographic enforcement of purpose limitation. The purpose field is signed, tamper-evident, and mandatory to enforce at the receiver, but a non-conforming receiver that has decrypted a message can disregard it. This is a deliberate limitation, discussed in Section 10;¶

• specify authorisation policy, business semantics, or user interface behaviour;¶

• specify how a decentralised identifier is bound to a legal or natural identity. That binding, where required, is provided by credential presentation layered above this specification and is out of scope.¶

1.4. Relationship to Existing Work

MLS [RFC9420] provides the group key establishment and message protection used here. This document does not modify MLS. It specifies a ciphersuite constraint, a credential-binding requirement, and a transport encapsulation.¶

A2A [A2A] provides agent discovery, capability description, and message transport. A2A version 1.0 supports declared protocol extensions, and this document is specified as such an extension; Section 7.1 states the version this binding targets. Nothing here requires changes to A2A itself.¶

The mechanism is transport-agnostic in principle. A2A is used as the reference binding because it is widely deployed and because its extension mechanism makes the binding expressible without protocol changes.¶

4.1. Identifier Construction

An Agent Identity is a did:key identifier [DIDKEY] encoding an Ed25519 public key. The identifier is the string did:key: followed by the multibase base58btc encoding (prefix z) of the multicodec ed25519-pub header (0xed 0x01) concatenated with the 32-byte public key.¶

Verifiers MUST derive the public key from the identifier itself. Conforming implementations MUST NOT require network resolution of the identifier in order to verify a signature. This property is required so that a Governed Object remains verifiable offline and after the issuer's service has ceased to operate.¶

Implementations MAY support additional DID methods. Implementations MUST support did:key.¶

4.2. MLS Ciphersuite

Implementations MUST support MLS ciphersuite MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519 (value 0x0001 in the MLS Ciphersuites registry established by [RFC9420]).¶

This ciphersuite is mandatory because its signature scheme is Ed25519, matching the Agent Identity key type and enabling the binding specified in Section 4.3. Implementations MAY negotiate other ciphersuites, subject to that section.¶

4.3. Credential Binding

An agent's MLS credential MUST be a basic credential whose identity is the UTF-8 encoding of the agent's Agent Identity.¶

Furthermore, the MLS signature_key in the agent's LeafNode MUST be the same Ed25519 public key that is encoded in that Agent Identity.¶

This requirement is the load-bearing element of this section. Without it, an attacker who can publish a KeyPackage may assert an arbitrary DID string in the credential, and a receiver has no cryptographic basis for concluding that messages from that MLS member originate from the holder of the corresponding DID. With it, MLS membership and Governed Object authorship are bound to a single key.¶

On receiving a KeyPackage or LeafNode, an implementation MUST verify that the credential identity parses as a did:key Ed25519 identifier and that the public key so derived is octet-for-octet equal to the LeafNode signature_key. If the check fails, the implementation MUST reject the KeyPackage and MUST NOT add the member to a group.¶

Where a ciphersuite whose signature scheme is not Ed25519 is negotiated, the binding of Section 4.3 cannot be expressed by key equality. In that case implementations MUST instead require the credential identity to be accompanied by a proof of possession: a signature, made with the Agent Identity key, over the MLS signature_key. Definition of that proof's encoding is deferred to a future revision of this document; until it is specified, implementations that require the binding MUST use ciphersuite 0x0001.¶

5.1. Structure

A Governed Object is a JSON object [RFC8259] with the following members. All listed members are mandatory unless stated otherwise.¶

The semantic member has a mandatory schema member containing an absolute URI identifying the payload type, and OPTIONAL version and embeddingHint members.¶

The id member MUST be unique per issuer and SHOULD be a UUID or other value with negligible collision probability. Receivers rely on this for replay rejection (Section 8.2).¶

5.2. Governance

The governance member carries:¶

If both ttlSeconds and expiresAt are present, the earlier resulting instant is the effective expiry. If neither is present, the object does not expire, and receivers SHOULD apply a locally configured maximum lifetime.¶

Purpose strings are lowercase, colon-delimited, and hierarchical, for example comms:message or coordination:proposal. Purpose values are application domain vocabulary; this document does not define a registry, but see Section 11 for a discussion of whether one is warranted.¶

5.3. Canonical Serialisation

The signature is computed over a canonical serialisation of the object's content, excluding signatureAlgorithm and signature.¶

The input to canonicalisation is the JSON object [RFC8259] consisting of exactly the members version, id, issuerDid, issuedAt, semantic, payload, and governance. Members that are not present in that abstract JSON object are omitted. The JSON value null is retained where present. JSON has no undefined value; implementations in languages that expose an undefined or missing-property concept MUST treat such properties as absent members (omit them) before canonicalisation, and MUST NOT emit a distinct undefined token.¶

Interoperable implementations SHOULD produce the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) serialisation of that object as specified in [RFC8785].¶

Absent a dedicated JCS library, an implementation MUST still:¶

• omit absent members (and language-level undefined / missing properties);¶

• retain JSON null where present;¶

• order object member names lexicographically by UTF-16 code unit sequence;¶

• emit no insignificant whitespace; and¶

• MUST NOT invent a parallel key-order or whitespace rule set for the same abstract object that would diverge from [RFC8785] for those constraints.¶

The Atom reference implementation currently uses a deterministic key-sorted JSON profile that satisfies these MUST constraints for the published vector suite; it does not yet invoke a dedicated [RFC8785] library. See Section 12.¶

Payload authors SHOULD avoid floating-point numbers, because canonical serialisation of floating-point values is a known source of cross-language interoperability failure (including under full JCS). Where numeric precision matters, payloads SHOULD encode values as strings or as integers in a stated minor unit.¶

5.4. Signing

The signature is Ed25519(privateKey, UTF8(canonicalForm)) as specified in [RFC8032], encoded per [RFC4648] Section 4 (base64 with padding).¶

5.5. Verification

A verifier MUST:¶

1. confirm version equals 1;¶

2. confirm signatureAlgorithm equals "ed25519";¶

3. derive the Ed25519 public key from issuerDid per Section 4;¶

4. recompute the canonical form per Section 5.3;¶

5. verify the signature.¶

Verification failure MUST cause the object to be rejected.¶

6.1. KeyPackage Publication

An agent that accepts incoming sessions publishes MLS KeyPackages. Where the A2A binding of Section 7 is used, the agent SHOULD expose them at the path /mls/key-package relative to its A2A service endpoint, returning a JSON object with members did (the Agent Identity) and wire (the base64-encoded MLS KeyPackage).¶

Publishing endpoints MUST rate-limit KeyPackage retrieval. KeyPackages are single-use in MLS; unbounded retrieval permits exhaustion of an agent's pre-published supply.¶

Retrievers MUST perform the credential binding check of Section 4.3 on the retrieved KeyPackage before use.¶

6.2. Establishing a Pair Session

The initiating agent creates an MLS group containing itself, then commits an Add proposal for the responding agent using the retrieved KeyPackage, and delivers the resulting Welcome message and ratchet tree to the responder using the handshake encapsulation of Section 7.6.¶

Where the responder's identity was learned from an out-of-band invitation that asserted a specific Agent Identity, the initiator MUST verify that the retrieved KeyPackage's credential identity equals the asserted identity, and MUST abort establishment on mismatch. Absent this check, an attacker who controls the endpoint named in an invitation can substitute their own identity.¶

6.3. Group Sessions

Sessions with more than two members follow MLS [RFC9420] group semantics. Implementations MUST apply the credential binding check of Section 4.3 to every joining member.¶

6.4. Session Persistence

Implementations that persist MLS group state across process restarts MUST protect that state at rest under the same deployment controls used for the agent's long-term private key material (for example, filesystem permissions on a dedicated agent data directory). This document does not require application-layer encryption of on-disk group state beyond those controls.¶

Implementations SHOULD persist group state using an encoding that separates the ratchet tree from the remaining group secrets, storing the tree alongside the truncated state, and MAY accept a legacy encoding that embeds the tree when migrating older stores.¶

On restore failure (corrupt, truncated, or undecodable state), implementations MUST fail closed: discard the unusable session, and require re-establishment (re-join or re-handshake). Implementations MUST NOT continue with a partially hydrated group session.¶

7.1. Protocol Version

This binding is specified against A2A version 1.0. Two properties of that version are relied upon: a message part carries a mediaType member of its own, and a message may enumerate the extensions it depends upon.¶

A2A version 0.3 provided neither. Implementations MAY interoperate with peers speaking version 0.3 by applying Section 7.8, and the reference implementation does so, but a conforming implementation of this document transmits version 1.0.¶

Throughout this section, part and message members are named as they appear in the JSON serialisation on the wire. An implementation generated from the A2A protocol buffer schema will present the part content as a language-level tagged union; that representation is an artefact of code generation and is not observable by a peer.¶

7.2. Extension Declaration

An agent supporting the Governed Object profile defined in this document MUST declare the extension URI https://atom.qwixl.dev/a2a/data-object/v1 in the capabilities.extensions member of its Agent Card, with required set to false.¶

A message carrying one or more Governed Object parts SHOULD list that URI in the message's extensions member. A message that carries only MLS wire or MLS handshake parts MUST NOT stamp the Governed Object URI in extensions (the GO claim stays narrow; MLS MAY later ship under its own extension URI). A receiver MUST NOT require the extensions member to be present, since a peer speaking A2A version 0.3 has no such member to populate, and MUST NOT rely upon it to identify a part: the media type is authoritative.¶

The A2A extension specification for the Governed Object profile alone (without MLS) is published under spec/extensions/data-object-v1/ in the reference implementation repository. This Internet-Draft remains the broader provenance document covering Governed Objects together with MLS session mechanics.¶

Editor's note: this URI reflects the deployed reference implementation. Should this document be adopted by a standards body, the URI is expected to be reassigned under that body's namespace. Implementations SHOULD treat the URI as an opaque identifier.¶

7.3. Media Type Placement

Each part specified below is identified by one of the media types in Section 11. A sender MUST set the media type in the part's mediaType member, and SHOULD also set a mediaType member within the part's data object with the identical value.¶

A receiver MUST determine the media type from the part's mediaType member when that member is present and non-empty, and MUST fall back to the mediaType member within the data object otherwise. Where both are present and they disagree, the receiver MUST reject the part.¶

The duplication exists because version 0.3 of A2A had no mediaType member on a part, obliging deployments written against A2A version 0.3 to carry the media type inside the payload. A receiver that reads only the inner member therefore continues to interoperate. A sender MAY omit the inner member once no such receiver remains reachable; this document retains it as a SHOULD rather than a MUST for that reason.¶

7.4. Governed Object Part

A Governed Object MAY be carried unencrypted in an A2A message part whose data member is a JSON object with members mediaType, set to application/vnd.atom.data-object+json;version=1 per Section 7.3, and object, set to the Governed Object.¶

{
  "data": {
    "mediaType": "application/vnd.atom.data-object+json;version=1",
    "object": { ... Governed Object ... }
  },
  "mediaType": "application/vnd.atom.data-object+json;version=1"
}

Unencrypted carriage provides authenticity and governance metadata but not confidentiality. Implementations MUST NOT use unencrypted carriage for personal data or otherwise confidential payloads where an MLS session can be established. Implementations SHOULD default to encrypted carriage.¶

7.5. MLS Wire Part

MLS wire messages -- including application PrivateMessages and public Commit messages used for Section 6.3.2 -- are carried in an A2A message part whose data member is a JSON object with members mediaType, set to application/vnd.atom.mls-wire+cbor;version=1 per Section 7.3, and wire, set to the base64 encoding [RFC4648] of the MLSMessage as serialised per [RFC9420]. For room or other multi-recipient fan-out, the object MAY also carry a senderDid member naming the Agent Identity of the sender; receivers under the designated committer profile of Section 6.3 MUST reject Commits whose claimed senderDid is not the designated committer, and SHOULD bind that claim to MLS authentication of the Commit where available.¶

{
  "data": {
    "mediaType": "application/vnd.atom.mls-wire+cbor;version=1",
    "wire": "<base64 MLSMessage>"
  },
  "mediaType": "application/vnd.atom.mls-wire+cbor;version=1"
}

The decrypted application message plaintext is the UTF-8 encoding of a JSON object with a member object containing a Governed Object. Implementations MAY define additional members; receivers MUST ignore members they do not recognise.¶

7.6. Handshake Part

MLS Welcome messages and the accompanying ratchet tree are carried in an A2A message part whose data member is a JSON object with member mediaType set to application/vnd.atom.mls-handshake+json;version=1 per Section 7.3, and members conveying:¶

• initiatorDid -- the Agent Identity of the party that created the Welcome (or, for commit-oriented handshake objects, the designated committer);¶

• welcome -- base64-encoded Welcome (required when admitting a new member; MAY be omitted for commit-only objects that are not the normative fan-out path);¶

• ratchetTree -- base64-encoded ratchet tree accompanying Welcome (REQUIRED when welcome is present; OPTIONAL when welcome is absent);¶

• commit -- optional base64-encoded public Commit. Existing members MUST still receive Commits per Section 6.3.2 on the MLS wire; a handshake commit member alone is not sufficient for N-member correctness;¶

• memberDids -- optional hint listing Agent Identities after the membership change. Authoritative membership is the MLS ratchet tree after Welcome or Commit processing.¶

Where both Welcome and ratchetTree are supplied, the joiner MUST abort if MLS join fails to accept the tree with the Welcome (inconsistent or substituted tree).¶

7.7. Agent Card

An agent's endpoints are declared in the supportedInterfaces member of its Agent Card, an ordered list in which the first entry is the sender's preferred interface and each entry states the A2A protocol version that interface speaks. A2A version 0.3 instead declared a single endpoint in a top-level url member; an implementation reading a card MUST NOT depend on that member.¶

An agent MAY declare more than one interface at the same URL in order to serve more than one protocol version, and the reference implementation does so.¶

An Agent Card MAY carry one or more JWS signatures in its signatures member. Where an agent's identity is a did:key as specified in Section 4, the signature's kid header parameter SHOULD be that identifier, because the verifying key is then recoverable from the identifier itself and card verification requires no key distribution mechanism and no further network retrieval.¶

A relying party that verifies a card signature MUST treat the identifier in kid as the identity that produced the card, and MUST NOT infer from a valid signature that the card's contents are endorsed by any other identity named within it. Transport security establishes control of the origin serving a card; it establishes nothing about the agent the card describes. An unsigned card therefore permits any party controlling an origin to publish a card asserting any agent identity, and a relying party that acts on such an assertion -- for instance, to associate a domain with an agent -- SHOULD require a signature whose kid matches the asserted identity.¶

7.8. Version Compatibility

An implementation MAY accept and originate A2A version 0.3 messages in addition to version 1.0. Where it does:¶

• The version of a received message is determined by the A2A-Version header field. Its absence denotes version 0.3.¶

• The version to use towards a given peer is determined by that peer's Agent Card, per Section 7.7.¶

• A part received from a version 0.3 peer carries the media type only within the data object, which Section 7.3 accommodates.¶

Deployment order is not symmetric, and this has operational consequence. A receiver that accepts both versions is compatible with senders of either, but a sender that has begun transmitting version 1.0 is not compatible with a receiver that accepts only version 0.3. In a network upgraded incrementally, every receiver MUST therefore be capable of the newer version before any sender originates it.¶

7.9. Transport Authentication

The transport carrying these parts MUST authenticate the calling party using a mechanism defined by the underlying protocol, such as those enumerated in [A2A].¶

An unauthenticated transport endpoint permits an unbounded set of parties to consume the receiver's resources, to enqueue messages, and to attempt session establishment. End-to-end encryption does not mitigate this: MLS protects content, not availability. Implementations MUST NOT expose an unauthenticated message-submission endpoint in production.¶

8.1. Mandatory Ordered Checks

On receiving a Governed Object, whether from a decrypted MLS application message or from unencrypted carriage, a Relying Receiver MUST perform the following checks, and MUST perform them in this order:¶

1. Structural validation against Section 5. Reject on failure.¶

2. Signature verification per Section 5. Reject on failure.¶

3. Where the object arrived inside an MLS session, confirm that issuerDid equals the Agent Identity in the credential of the MLS member that sent the message. Reject on mismatch.¶

4. Expiry evaluation per Section 5.2. Reject if expired.¶

5. Replay rejection per Section 8.2. Reject if already seen.¶

6. Purpose enforcement per Section 8.3. Reject if not permitted.¶

Only after all six checks succeed may the receiver act upon payload.¶

Check 3 is essential and is easily omitted. Without it, any member of a group can emit an object bearing another member's issuerDid; the signature check alone does not detect this, because the signature is valid -- it is simply not made by the party that sent it. Implementations MUST NOT treat a valid signature as evidence of who transmitted the message.¶

8.2. Replay Rejection

A Relying Receiver MUST reject a Governed Object whose id it has previously accepted from the same issuerDid.¶

Receivers MUST retain accepted (issuerDid, id) pairs for at least the maximum object lifetime they will accept. Where a receiver applies a maximum accepted lifetime, retention for that period is sufficient, because an older object is rejected by check 4 regardless.¶

Absent this requirement, a passive observer of unencrypted carriage, or any member of an MLS group, can re-present a previously valid object. Where objects convey instructions with side effects -- a payment authorisation, a booking confirmation, a consent grant -- replay is directly exploitable.¶

8.3. Purpose Enforcement

A Relying Receiver MUST maintain, per processing context, a set of permitted purpose values, and MUST reject an object whose governance.purpose is not in that set.¶

The set MUST be determined by the receiver's own configuration for the context in which the object is being processed. It MUST NOT be derived from the object itself, nor from any value under the sender's control.¶

Receivers MUST NOT use a payload for a purpose other than the one declared, and MUST NOT retain it beyond its expiry, save where an independent legal obligation requires retention.¶

8.4. Rejection Behaviour

A receiver rejecting an object SHOULD emit a diagnostic distinguishable by cause, for operator use. A receiver SHOULD NOT return to the sender information that distinguishes between rejection causes beyond what is necessary for interoperability, because fine-grained rejection reasons assist an attacker in probing receiver configuration -- in particular in enumerating the permitted purpose set.¶

10.1. What This Specification Provides

Within an MLS session, message content is confidential from the transport and from any intermediary, with the forward secrecy and post-compromise security properties of [RFC9420]. Governed Objects are authenticated and integrity protected by Ed25519 signatures that remain verifiable independently of the session and after it ends, providing durable evidence of authorship. The credential binding of Section 4.3 ties MLS membership to the same key, so that transmission and authorship cannot be separated.¶

10.2. What It Does Not Provide

Purpose limitation is not cryptographically enforced. A receiver that has decrypted a message is in possession of the plaintext and can disregard the declared purpose and expiry. The mechanism provides a signed, non-repudiable record of the constraint under which disclosure was made, which converts an undetectable breach into an attributable one. It does not prevent the breach. Constructions that would provide stronger enforcement, such as purpose-bound decryption keys or confidential computing attestation, are out of scope.¶

A DID is not an identity. It denotes control of a key. Binding a DID to a legal or natural person requires a credential presentation layer above this specification.¶

Compromise of an agent's Ed25519 private key compromises both its MLS membership and its ability to sign Governed Objects, precisely because Section 4.3 unifies them. Implementations MUST protect this key accordingly, and SHOULD use non-exportable key storage where the platform provides it. The unification is a deliberate trade: it eliminates a class of impersonation attack at the cost of concentrating key-compromise impact.¶

MLS provides no protection against traffic analysis, and this specification adds none. Endpoints, message sizes, and timing are visible to the transport.¶

10.3. Availability

An unauthenticated message-submission endpoint is a denial-of-service vector regardless of encryption; see Section 7. KeyPackage exhaustion is a related vector; see Section 6.¶

Implementations that queue messages for offline recipients MUST bound queue size and MUST apply the checks of Section 8 on dequeue rather than only on enqueue. Deferring validation to dequeue without bounding the queue permits an attacker to cause unbounded storage consumption with unvalidated input.¶

10.4. Group Session Threats

The following threats are specific to N-member sessions and motivate Section 6.3 and Section 6.4:¶

• Epoch skew after Add (T1).

  Mitigated by Section 6.3.2. Partial delivery after the committer has already advanced remains a deployment recovery problem; this revision does not specify compensating fan-out.¶

• Peer-injected Commit (T2).

  Mitigated under the designated committer profile by rejecting Commits whose claimed sender is not the committer. Binding that claim to MLS-authenticated Commit authorship is RECOMMENDED; envelope-only checks are weaker against a compromised or spoofed transport path.¶

• Half-restored group secrets (T3).

  Mitigated by MUST fail-closed restore in Section 6.4.¶

• Spec ahead of code (T4).

  This revision limits normative group behaviour to surfaces proven in the reference implementation's three-agent loopback suite.¶

• Folding offline delivery into MLS (T5).

  Offline / asleep-queue behaviour is specified separately and MUST NOT be inferred from this document's MLS sections.¶

• Roster versus MLS membership desync.

  Application rosters that diverge from MLS leaves (for example, host self-leave without a Remove Commit) are out of scope for this revision; deployments MUST treat MLS membership as authoritative for decryption.¶

• Handshake ratchet-tree substitution.

  Joiners MUST abort when Welcome does not accept the supplied ratchet tree.¶

• Stale Commit replay.

  MLS processing rejects Commits already applied to local state; deployments SHOULD retain that failure mode rather than inventing a separate application-layer Commit replay cache.¶

11.1. Media Types

This document uses three media types, currently registered in neither the standards nor the vendor tree. The deployed reference implementation uses vendor-tree names.¶

If this document advances, the author requests registration of the following in the standards tree, with the vendor-tree names retained as deprecated aliases:¶

Complete registration templates will be supplied in a subsequent revision.¶

11.2. Purpose Value Registry

This document requests the creation of a new IANA registry entitled Governed Object Purpose Values.¶

Each entry has: Value (string), Prefix, Description, Payload schema (HTTPS URI), Reference, Status (provisional, permanent, or obsolete), and Change Controller.¶

Registration procedures: Expert Review for provisional and obsolete entries; Standards Action for permanent entries ([RFC8126]). Provisional entries MUST be revised, promoted, or obsoleted within 24 months of last substantive change.¶

IANA registration of a purpose MUST NOT be interpreted as (i) permission to process, (ii) default allowlist membership, or (iii) authorisation for side effects. Receivers that move money, mutate durable external state, or disclose secrets MUST apply separate confirmation and policy controls; purpose alone is insufficient. Registered purposes remain subject to receiver-configured allowlists; an empty or absent allowlist is a deployment profile that does not grant cross-implementation purpose alignment (see also the Atom Governed Object A2A extension deployment-profile note).¶

Purpose values identify the kind of Governed Object. Strings such as action:reserve, room:receipt, and room:checkpoint may appear in implementations but are not part of the initial IANA contents; they remain implementation-defined until proposed with a stable payload contract. action:qualify is intentionally omitted from the initial contents.¶

Initial provisional contents (payment rail cluster):¶

Additional application-specific purposes (for example product UI verbs under vendor or product prefixes) are implementation-defined and MUST NOT be claimed as registered solely because they appear in a particular deployment.¶

16.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

[RFC4648]

Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.

[RFC8032]

Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.

[RFC8126]

Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

[RFC8174]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

[RFC8259]

Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.

[RFC8785]

Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.

[RFC9420]

Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J., Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420, July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420>.

16.2. Informative References

[A2A]

A2A Project (Linux Foundation), "Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol Specification, Version 1.0", 2026, <https://a2a-protocol.org/>.

[DIDKEY]

W3C Credentials Community Group, "The did:key Method", n.d., <https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-key/>.

[GDPR]

European Union, "Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation)", 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj>.

[MCP]

Anthropic, "Model Context Protocol", n.d., <https://modelcontextprotocol.io/>.

[RFC7942]

Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.