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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts-04" category="info" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="NOISV">Network Overlay Impacts to Streaming Video</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts-04"/>
    <author fullname="Glenn Deen">
      <organization>Comcast-NBCUniversal</organization>
      <address>
        <email>glenn_deen@comcast.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Sanjay Mishra">
      <organization>Verizon</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sanjay.mishra@verizon.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="July" day="06"/>
    <area>Operations and Management</area>
    <workgroup>Media OPerationS</workgroup>
    <keyword>network policy</keyword>
    <keyword>video streaming</keyword>
    <keyword>streaming</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 48?>
<t>This document examines the operational impacts on streaming video applications resulting from network policy changes introduced by network overlays. Such overlays may alter IP address assignment, transport protocols, routing behavior, or DNS resolution. These changes can, in turn, affect critical aspects of content delivery, including latency, CDN cache selection, delivery path optimization, traffic classification, and content access controls.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://ietf-wg-mops.github.io/draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts/draft-ietf--mops-network-overlay-impacts.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Media OPerationS Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:mops@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mops/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mops/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-mops/draft-ietf-mops-network-overlay-impacts"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 51?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>This document explores the unintended operational impacts of network overlays, such as VPNs and MASQUE-based tunnels, on highly scalable Internet streaming applications. Because these streaming architectures are optimized for specific network environments, overlay-enforced policy changes can degrade performance. This analysis serves as a foundational exploration to guide future work regarding potential mitigations and design improvements.</t>
      <t>The authors acknowledge the inherent friction between maximizing Internet transport privacy and maintaining the operational efficiency of data-intensive applications. Integrating these competing operational requirements into architectural designs is a complex task.</t>
      <t>The purpose of this document is to establish a clear problem statement regarding these operational impacts. It documents the negative externalities observed by streaming platforms when privacy-enhancing overlays or unexpected network policy changes disrupt the delivery path. This analysis aims to provide application developers, platform architects, network operators, and protocol designers with a shared framework for understanding how overlay mechanisms impact deterministic video delivery. Accounting for these operational realities is vital for future protocol design; however, defining specific mitigations is out of scope for this document and is left to future work.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="streaming-applications-optimized-for-scaling-and-latency">
      <name>Streaming Applications: Optimized for Scaling and Latency</name>
      <t>Internet video streaming has become a global utility for billions of viewers, evolving by necessity into a highly optimized operational ecosystem. This ecosystem delivers live sports, entertainment, linear television, user-generated content (UGC), and breaking news to any Internet-connected device across heterogeneous networks, including high-bandwidth fixed lines, mobile, and Wi-Fi. Consequently, streaming dominates Internet traffic as documented in <xref target="RFC9317"/>.</t>
      <t>These sessions require sustained, data-intensive throughput. For example, a single hour of high-definition (HD) video utilizes continuous flows of 0.5–8.0 Mbps (totaling approximately 0.2–3.6 GB), while 4K video demands 4.0–20.0 Mbps (totaling approximately 1.8–9.0 GB).</t>
      <t>To support this volume, the video streaming ecosystem relies on sophisticated network and data management methodologies. This includes the IETF’s Content Delivery Network Interconnection (CDNI) frameworks for tiered CDN topologies and downstream CDN selection/orchestration. Each streaming platform carefully architects its delivery pipeline around deterministic network policies, predictable routing, and explicit path signaling. This optimization is critical to meet scaling demands regarding simultaneous viewer concurrency, aggregate data volume, and the ultra-low latency thresholds required for interactive and live sports viewing. The foundations of this application ecosystem are discussed in <xref target="RFC9317"/>, though the technology has continued to evolve significantly since its publication.</t>
      <t>Regardless of content type, the successful delivery of data at this scale requires a well-understood, end-to-end application and networking architecture. The workflow behaves predictably and consistently according to the design assumptions of the video streaming architects.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="network-overlays-privacy-enhancements-and-operational-features">
      <name>Network Overlays: Privacy Enhancements and Operational Features</name>
      <t>Enhancing Internet user privacy has been a core focus of the IETF following the publication of <xref target="RFC7258"/>, which established pervasive surveillance as a technical attack. <xref target="RFC7624"/> further detailed these technical threats and outlined high-level mitigation approaches. Since then, IETF working groups have systematically addressed these vectors, producing new standards with native privacy protections. Protocols like QUIC <xref target="RFC9000"/> exemplify this shift, embedding always-on transport encryption and wire-image obfuscation directly into the protocol design.</t>
      <t>Concurrently, application-layer and transport-layer network overlays—such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and MASQUE-based tunnels—have emerged as easily deployable mechanisms to shield user traffic from network intermediaries. However, as consumer operating systems, browsers, and applications increasingly integrate these privacy-enhancing overlays, they introduce architectural changes to the underlying network behavior.</t>
      <t>These overlays frequently obfuscate client IP geolocation, alter path MTU characteristics, disrupt standard anycast routing, inject transport-layer jitter, or mask flow identifiers. Such changes directly interfere with or undermine the traffic engineering, localized edge-caching, load balancing, and low-latency optimizations that streaming platforms rely upon.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="internet-privacy-enhancements">
      <name>Internet Privacy Enhancements</name>
      <t>The IETF’s efforts to strengthen Internet privacy and mitigate
pervasive monitoring, as described in <xref target="RFC7258"/>, have driven a
series of architectural and protocol-level developments. The
initial focus was on encrypting network data flows, most commonly
through the wider adoption of Transport Layer Security (TLS). Over
time, these efforts have expanded to include changes at the policy
and design level, such as modifying routing paths, selecting
privacy-preserving DNS resolvers, and introducing encrypted
transport protocols, to better obscure and isolate user traffic
from observation within the underlying network infrastructure.</t>
      <t><xref target="RFC7258"/> identifies pervasive monitoring as an attack on
privacy, while <xref target="RFC7624"/> outlines potential technical and
operational responses to mitigate its impact. The development of
the QUIC transport protocol, defined in <xref target="RFC9000"/>, exemplifies
the application of these principles. QUIC integrates
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication into the transport
layer itself, ensuring that user data and most protocol metadata
remain encrypted by default.</t>
      <t>Collectively, these privacy-enhancing measures have reshaped how networks and applications interact. However, they also introduce new considerations for operational visibility, traffic management, and performance optimization, which are particularly relevant to streaming video applications.</t>
      <section anchor="network-overlays">
        <name>Network Overlays</name>
        <t>The IETF’s privacy-enhancement efforts in response to <xref target="RFC7258"/>
have driven a range of architectural and policy design choices,
including the adoption of “always-on” encryption, as exemplified
by QUIC <xref target="RFC9000"/>. While many such developments have minimal
impact on video streaming, some introduce new behaviors that can
be described as creating network overlays, which are logical
networks that operate on top of the underlying native network but
apply different routing, transport, or policy decisions than
either the native network or the streaming application would
independently choose.</t>
        <t>Network overlays that alter policies or paths in ways not directly
visible, selectable, or detectable by the streaming application or
platform can have significant operational effects. These overlays
may silently modify network properties, such as source IP
addresses, DNS resolver choices, or routing behavior, without the
knowledge of the streaming service or end user. Such hidden policy
changes can inadvertently disrupt the assumptions underlying
adaptive streaming architectures, content delivery path
optimization, or CDN selection mechanisms.</t>
        <t>When a network overlay modifies connection properties in ways that differ from application expectations, the result can be mismatched assumptions between the application and the actual transport environment. This disconnect may cause degraded performance, misclassification of network paths, or unexpected latency and throughput characteristics, all of which affect streaming quality and operational predictability.</t>
        <t>Protocols such as MASQUE <xref target="RFC9484"/> and services built on it such as Apple's <eref target="https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/iCloud_Private_Relay_Overview_Dec2021.PDF">iCloud Private Relay</eref> illustrate privacy-enhancing network overlays that deliberately alter connection policies relative to the open Internet. While beneficial for user privacy, such mechanisms can also obscure the visibility and control that streaming services rely on for consistent content delivery and Quality of Experience (QoE) management.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="transparency-and-connection-policy">
        <name>Transparency and Connection Policy</name>
        <t>What matters when considering network overlay impact on streaming
is not the technology or protocol used, but whether the
alternative network connection policies applied are transparent
or hidden from the connection endpoints.</t>
        <t>Prior to network overlays, connection policy changes tended to be
transparent to the application-server connection. Changes made to
the connection were visible to one or both sides, enabling the
connection endpoints to have awareness of the policies applied.</t>
        <t>The issue this document focuses on is where alternative network
connection policies are non-transparent to the connection
endpoints, particularly the application. The application is the
party architecturally designated to make decisions about network
connection properties and policies, and non-transparent overlays
remove that ability without any indication to the application that
this has occurred.</t>
        <t>This distinction means that even classic connection policy
approaches such as Layer 2 VPNs fall within this document's
problem statement if they operate non-transparently to the
connection endpoints, and particularly to the application.</t>
        <t>Network overlays also affect end-to-end connection autonomy.
When an application opens a connection, it does so based on
server-published endpoint information, obtained via DNS or direct
IP addressing. Network overlays silently intercept that connection,
rerouting or readdressing it and making new path choices without
the client being involved. Neither the application nor the server
has signaled consent to this interception, and neither endpoint
receives any indication that the path or addressing has changed.
This silent substitution of routing decisions is distinct from
what a traditional VPN does, where the application is aware that
its traffic is traversing an overlay and the network operator has
explicitly configured that behavior.</t>
        <t>Historically, the issues discussed in this document have not been a
major concern for typical VPN deployments, largely because VPNs
have not been a pervasive way to stream video. Many VPNs have not
offered throughput or consistency comparable to a direct Internet
path, and many video platforms block or degrade service to detected
VPN connections due to their common use in bypassing geofiltering
restrictions.</t>
        <t>Where a distinction is useful operationally, it is not the
technology or protocol used but the deployment pattern in common
use. Traditional and newer overlay deployments have tended to
differ along the following lines.</t>
        <section anchor="transparent-connection-policy-approaches">
          <name>Transparent connection policy approaches:</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>(1) are generally detectable by the application and the
network operator.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(2) typically work at the network layer of a device, so a wide
range, if not all, of the device's transports and protocols flow
through the overlay.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(3) typically provide exception options allowing traffic to be
excluded based on criteria such as application, destination IP
address, or application protocol.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="non-transparent-connection-policy-approaches">
          <name>Non-transparent connection policy approaches:</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>(1) are often undetectable by video applications or the
streaming platform while in use.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(2) often apply only to specific application transports, such as
HTTP/2 over TCP or HTTP/3 over QUIC, while leaving other
transports on the same device, such as TCP+TLS, unaffected.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(3) often apply only to HTTP connections, without support for
ICMP, non-HTTP DNS, NTP, or the other non-HTTP-based tools used
for network measurement, problem determination, and network
management.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(4) do not expose to applications any means of discovering what
policy changes the overlay applies to their network connections.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(5) do not expose mechanisms or APIs for applications to interact
with the overlay, such as getting or setting options.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>These are patterns of observed deployment behavior, not categories
defined by protocol specification. What determines whether a
connection policy mechanism falls within the scope of this document
is whether it operates non-transparently to the connection
endpoints, not the protocol or technology it uses.</t>
          <t>Even where a network overlay operates transparently to the
connection endpoints, the operational impacts described in this
document, including protocol changes, tunneling effects, and path
alterations, remain significant considerations for streaming video
deployments.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="emerging-operational-issues-with-network-overlay-policy-changes">
          <name>Emerging Operational Issues with Network Overlay Policy Changes</name>
          <t>Streaming video applications and content delivery platforms are increasingly encountering operational challenges associated with network overlays. These challenges arise when overlays introduce policy changes that are unexpected, inconsistently applied, or difficult or impossible for the streaming platform to detect or adapt to in real time. While the specific impacts vary depending on the overlay’s design and implementation, several common classes of operational issues have been observed across deployments. These include mismatches in routing and cache selection, unexpected transport-layer behavior, and inconsistencies in latency or throughput reporting that affect Quality of Experience (QoE) monitoring and optimization.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="policy-changes">
        <name>Policy Changes</name>
        <t>Changes to network policies introduced by overlays can alter the expected behavior of streaming applications in several ways.</t>
        <t>For example, an overlay that modifies encryption policies, such as
transforming HTTP URLs in manifests into HTTPS connections, can
disrupt architectures that rely on the network’s ability to
identify or classify video flows. In such cases, the visibility of
traffic used for caching, optimization, or QoS treatment may be
reduced or lost entirely.</t>
        <t>Similarly, overlays that alter routing policies can interfere with the Content Delivery Network (CDN) cache selection logic used by streaming platforms. A change in routing path may cause the application to connect to a more distant cache, resulting in higher latency, lower throughput, and degraded video quality, even when a closer cache would otherwise have been selected.</t>
        <t>An example of a routing policy change is illustrated in Figure 1, showing how a network overlay can apply a routing policy that diverges from that of the underlying base network, resulting in a modified traffic path and different delivery characteristics.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
 R  = router
                  <--- non-overlay traffic path --->
 device -- R ---- R ------------- R ------------- R ---- R -- dest-node
            \                                           /
             \                                         /
              \                                       /
               R -- R -- ingest -- egress -- R ------+
                     <--- overlay traffic path --->

 Figure 1:  Network Overlay routing selects traffic via an alternate path
]]></artwork>
        <section anchor="partitioning">
          <name>Partitioning</name>
          <t>Network Overlay policy changes often include the use of alternate routing policies, as a core element of their design involves tunneling connections through different network paths to enhance user privacy and reduce tracking.
This architectural concept, partitioning, is further discussed in
the IAB document <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-iab-privacy-partitioning/">Partitioning as an Architecture for Privacy</eref>.
By isolating traffic and obscuring its correlation with the
underlying native network, partitioning helps defend against
pervasive monitoring and traffic analysis.</t>
          <t>While effective for privacy protection, these routing partitions can also alter network visibility and path selection in ways that affect streaming video performance, such as cache selection accuracy, latency, and adaptive bitrate (ABR) responsiveness.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="protocol-policy-changes">
          <name>Protocol Policy Changes</name>
          <t>Network overlays have been observed to alter application and
transport protocols from those originally selected by the
streaming application. In some cases, privacy-enhancing or
optimization mechanisms automatically translate connections, for
example converting HTTP/2 over TCP into HTTP/3 over QUIC, or
upgrading HTTP/2 sessions to HTTPS with TLS encryption. Such
conversions are typically performed to enforce stronger privacy,
security, or efficiency policies, but they may occur without
visibility or control by the streaming application.</t>
          <t>A key operational impact arises when protocol substitution changes
the network characteristics perceived by the video application. A
video application may perform a preliminary fetch to measure
network conditions before selecting an appropriate bitrate for
content delivery. If the application’s test probe uses HTTP/2 over
TCP but the subsequent content request is silently converted by
the overlay to HTTP/3 over QUIC, the measured results no longer
reflect the actual transport path. This mismatch can lead to
inaccurate bandwidth estimation, causing the adaptive bitrate
(ABR) algorithm to select non-optimal streaming parameters and
degrade user experience.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="encryption-policy">
          <name>Encryption Policy</name>
          <t>Changes to the encryption policy applied to video streams, whether
by adding encryption where it was not originally used or by
removing or terminating encryption where it was expected, can
introduce significant operational challenges for streaming
applications and delivery networks.</t>
          <t>In some cases, network overlays or privacy-enhancing systems may automatically enforce encryption, converting plaintext HTTP video traffic into HTTPS or encapsulating transport flows within encrypted tunnels. While this improves confidentiality, it can also obscure traffic classification and disable optimizations that rely on visibility into flow metadata, such as CDN cache selection, adaptive bitrate tuning, or Quality-of-Service (QoS) marking.</t>
          <t>Conversely, if encryption is removed or terminated prematurely, such as through a proxy that decrypts and re-encrypts video traffic, it can violate end-to-end security assumptions made by the application or CDN, potentially exposing content or user data to unauthorized inspection.</t>
          <t>In both cases, mismatched encryption policies between the streaming application, CDN, and the underlying network can lead to reduced performance, incorrect cache usage, or inconsistent delivery behavior.</t>
          <section anchor="forced-encryption-upgrade">
            <name>Forced Encryption Upgrade</name>
            <t>Enforcing encryption upgrades, for example converting unencrypted
HTTP/2 traffic into HTTP/2 over TLS (HTTPS), can disrupt streaming
workflows that rely on the network’s ability to inspect or classify
content as part of the delivery process. When network visibility into streaming flows is removed, content-aware optimizations such as CDN cache selection, multicast distribution, or traffic prioritization may fail to function as designed. As a result, video traffic may be misclassified as generic encrypted data, leading to incorrect policy enforcement or suboptimal delivery behavior.</t>
            <t>This issue is particularly significant in mobile and multicast-based environments, where network-assisted detection of video streams is often required to achieve efficient bandwidth utilization and maintain quality of experience. In such cases, forced encryption upgrades may prevent the network from applying appropriate delivery optimizations, resulting in degraded performance or increased operational complexity.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="forced-encryption-downgrade">
            <name>Forced Encryption Downgrade</name>
            <t>Conversely, removal or termination of encryption originally
applied by a streaming platform can introduce serious operational
and security concerns. In many streaming architectures,
transport-level encryption, such as HTTPS or QUIC, is not only
used to ensure confidentiality but also forms an integral part of
the content protection and integrity assurance mechanisms.</t>
            <t>When an intermediate network overlay or proxy terminates TLS sessions or otherwise downgrades an encrypted connection to plaintext, it can invalidate end-to-end trust assumptions between the client, CDN, and content provider. Such behavior may expose sensitive metadata, enable unauthorized content inspection or modification, and violate Digital Rights Management (DRM).</t>
            <t>In effect, a forced encryption downgrade undermines both security and operational reliability, leading to potential playback failures, content delivery errors, or loss of user trust.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="address-policy-changes">
          <name>Address Policy Changes</name>
          <t>Network overlays that modify IP addressing policies, such as
converting IPv4 to IPv6, IPv6 to IPv4, or reassigning source IP
addresses, can introduce a range of operational challenges for
streaming platforms, particularly when these changes occur
unexpectedly or are invisible to the application. Such address
changes can disrupt routing decisions, CDN cache selection, and
traffic localization processes that depend on stable endpoint
addresses. They also complicate diagnostic and troubleshooting
efforts, as engineers analyzing logs, performing test probes, or
correlating session data may inadvertently use incorrect or
outdated IP information.</t>
          <t>A related issue arises when the source IP address observed by the
streaming platform differs from that seen by the client
application or device. Because many streaming architectures use
IP-based session binding, such as platform authentication gateways
that associate user or device authorization with a specific IP
address, unannounced address translation can result in service
access failures, login rejections, or denied content delivery. For
example, when an overlay reassigns or masks the client’s IP
address, the streaming platform may interpret this as a new or
unauthorized connection, even though the client session remains
active. This mismatch can lead to intermittent playback
interruptions, degraded user experience, or increased operational
complexity for both service providers and network operators.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="dns-policy-changes">
          <name>DNS Policy Changes</name>
          <t>Network overlays that modify DNS resolver settings or redirect DNS queries can have significant implications for Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) that rely on DNS-based load balancing for cache selection and traffic localization.</t>
          <t>Many CDN architectures determine the best cache for a client by
observing the source IP address of the DNS resolver making the
request. When an overlay substitutes or masks the resolver, either
intentionally or as part of privacy-enhancing policies, the CDN
may incorrectly infer the client’s location, resulting in
non-optimal cache selection, increased latency, or reduced video
quality.</t>
          <section anchor="edns0">
            <name>EDNS0</name>
            <t>The EDNS(0) (Extension Mechanisms for DNS, <xref target="RFC6891"/>) extension was introduced to allow resolvers to include additional client subnet information in DNS queries, improving CDN cache selection accuracy. If a network overlay redirects DNS queries to a resolver that does not support EDNS(0) or deliberately strips this information, the CDN loses critical context for determining the most appropriate edge cache. This can lead to the selection of a distant or overloaded cache, negatively impacting video startup time, buffering, and overall user experience.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="log-data-changes">
          <name>Log Data Changes</name>
          <t>Accurate and consistent logging is essential for diagnosing
streaming performance and operational issues. Network overlays
that alter connection properties, such as DNS resolvers, IP
addresses, or transport protocols, can cause log entries to differ
between the client device and the streaming platform. When such
discrepancies occur, engineers attempting to correlate logs for
troubleshooting may misinterpret session behavior or fail to
identify the true source of a problem. Unexpected or misleading
log data therefore undermines both problem determination and
root-cause analysis, complicating operational monitoring and
incident response workflows.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="geo-location-identification">
          <name>Geo Location &amp; Identification</name>
          <t>Network overlays that alter the apparent source location of user devices can interfere with streaming platforms’ ability to accurately determine geospatial attributes such as country, region, or network domain.</t>
          <t>Many CDNs and content providers rely on IP address based
geolocation to enforce regional content licensing, apply local
regulations, or select nearby caches for optimal performance.
When an overlay substitutes or masks the client’s IP address,
presenting it as originating from a different region or outside of
known geolocation mappings, the platform may be unable to
correctly associate the user with their actual location.</t>
          <t>This can result in users being denied access to region-restricted content that they would otherwise be authorized to view, or being directed to distant CDN caches, causing degraded video quality and higher latency.</t>
          <t>In addition, such location ambiguity complicates analytics, fraud detection, and rights management processes that depend on consistent geographic identifiers.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cdn-interconnection-troubleshooting">
          <name>CDN Interconnection Troubleshooting</name>
          <t>In CDN interconnection scenarios, when two CDN domains collaborate
to localize a point of failure, they typically begin by
identifying the delivery path and selecting observation points
along that path to take diagnostic measurements. Through iterative
testing, they narrow down the problem domain to isolate the
failure’s location.</t>
          <t>However, when network overlays alter routing behavior, this
process becomes unreliable. CDNs depend on their request routing
information to determine where along the delivery path
measurements should be taken. The presence of an overlay that
reroutes or tunnels traffic means that the expected observation
point no longer lies on the actual traffic path. As a result, the
flow cannot be observed where the CDN expects it to be, making
fault localization and coordination between interconnecting CDNs
significantly more difficult.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="routing-changes">
          <name>Routing Changes</name>
          <t>Routing changes introduced by network overlays can alter the
expected path between video applications and the infrastructure
services they rely on. Such changes may cause a wide range of
operational problems, including degraded performance, inconsistent
latency, or failures in CDN cache selection and session
persistence.</t>
          <t>When routing behavior differs from what the video platform or application expects, content delivery optimizations such as proximity-based cache selection, adaptive bitrate decisions, and transport-layer congestion management can become ineffective. These effects can be difficult to detect, as the overlay’s routing policy is often not visible to the streaming application or operators monitoring network performance.</t>
          <section anchor="end-to-end-problem-discovery">
            <name>End to End Problem Discovery</name>
            <t>A common issue in video delivery is locating where along the
delivery path the video transport is encountering problems. Such
problems are often more complex than a connection not working at
all and instead involve identifying bottlenecks, lost packets, and
congestion issues. When routing changes from what is expected or
visible to support tools, it becomes an operational trouble spot
for users and platform support to locate and determine the source
of the problems.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="cdn-edge-cache-selection-due-to-routing">
            <name>CDN Edge Cache Selection due to Routing</name>
            <t>A significant and often overlooked problem is the addition of
network latency compared to edge CDN caches or access network
peering connections. Routing changes that cause traffic to bypass
edge CDN caches and instead reach less optimal caches are
illustrated in the figure below.</t>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
 R  = router
           <--- non-overlay traffic path --->
 device -- R ---- R ---- Edge CDN Cache
            \
             \
              \
               R --- R -- ingest -- R --- R -- egress -- R ------R ---- Less Optimal CDN Cache
                     <--- overlay traffic path --->

 Figure:  Routing Changes altering CDN Cache selection
]]></artwork>
          </section>
          <section anchor="performance-and-problem-determination">
            <name>Performance and Problem Determination</name>
            <t>Network overlays often interfere with the tools used in
performance and problem determination. This is due to either the
tools and protocols not being able to traverse the alternative
route tunnel, impacting a service's ability to diagnose connection
and performance problems, or the network overlay itself not
supporting or carrying the tool's functions.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="impact-of-changing-network-routing-and-other-policies">
            <name>Impact of Changing Network Routing and Other Policies</name>
            <t>The problem for streaming applications occurs when the underlying
network properties and policies change from what the streaming
application expects, especially when such changes are hidden or
not visible to the application.</t>
            <t>While the open Internet is a dynamic environment, changes to basic
network behavior and policies that deviate unexpectedly from what
the streaming application expects disrupt the optimized streaming
delivery architecture for the end-user device. Changes to network
policies such as routing, source IP address assignment, and DNS
resolver choice influence this behavior.</t>
            <t>Having a reliable understanding of the delivery path is essential
for streaming operators. The introduction of network overlays,
particularly those designed to be undetectable by the applications
using them, has introduced new technical challenges for streaming
operators, network operators, and their viewers.</t>
            <t>The core problem occurs when changes to network policies are made
without notification or visibility to applications and without
clear methods for probing or testing the changed behaviors. The
affected behaviors include increased latency, changes to the IP
address seen by either the application or the streaming service,
changes to DNS resolvers and the results they return, and changes
to application transports such as adding or removing encryption.
All of these have been observed in production streaming platforms.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="unintended-content-blocking">
          <name>Unintended Content Blocking</name>
          <t>A strongly undesirable side-effect of network policy changes is
the blocking of content to the viewer. This may affect primary
content URLs, or possibly advertising fetched from a second URL
alongside the main video content. Such blocking can be due to
policy changes altering device IP addresses, or routing changes
that conflict with enforced traffic routing policies.</t>
          <t>Such blocking may be connected to restrictions built upon data
feeds used for geofiltering and georestrictions, for example
restrictions that block delivery to networks identified as
commercial data centers or CDN service network addresses.
Essentially, this is running afoul of configurations used to
combat security threats that expect streaming viewers to be on
home or mobile networks, not in commercial data centers or CDN
content networks. This is more likely to occur in network overlays
that shift egress traffic to commercial or CDN address blocks.</t>
          <t>This is a particularly difficult problem to diagnose as it may
appear inconsistently from one streaming session to another.
Small changes in URLs in manifests from one session to another are
especially problematic on streaming platforms that use multi-CDN
delivery, where different delivery and security protection
policies from different CDN operators may be encountered.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="policy-changes-hidden-from-applications">
      <name>Policy Changes Hidden from Applications</name>
      <t>One of the central recurring issues with streaming applications
running on devices or networks with changed policies due to
network overlays is that the changes are often hidden from the
applications.</t>
      <t>Applications often find it difficult or even impossible to detect
when network policy changes will be active and what they are
changing. For example, a device may have a designated default DNS
resolver but a different resolver may be selected depending on how
the streaming application queries DNS.</t>
      <t>Likewise, a streaming application might find that one application
transport protocol such as HTTP has one set of routing policies
applied to it while a different transport such as HTTPS has a
different set of routing policies applied.</t>
      <t>Streaming applications that cannot determine the expected behavior
are prevented from making good content source decisions and from
providing reliable feedback and logs when problems are
encountered.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="making-it-easy-for-users-by-working-under-the-covers">
      <name>Making It Easy (for Users) by Working Under the Covers</name>
      <t>Historically, incorporating privacy features into consumer-facing
products has been complex. This challenge arises from the need to
address a wide range of use cases while also offering users easy
access to advanced privacy frameworks and taxonomies. Many
attempts have been made and very few have found success with end
users.</t>
      <t>Perhaps learning from the lessons of offering too many options,
the recent trend in privacy enhancements has steered toward either
a very simple "Privacy On or Off" switch or in other cases
automatically enabling or upgrading to enhance privacy. Apple's
iCloud Private Relay can be easily turned on with a single
settings switch, while privacy features such as Encrypted DNS over
HTTP and upgrades from HTTP to HTTPS connections have seen several
deployments that automatically enable them for users when
possible.</t>
      <t>Keeping with the motto of "Keep It Simple", users are generally
not provided with granular Network Overlay controls permitting
them to select what applications or network connections the
Network Overlay policies apply to.</t>
      <t>Adhering to the "Keep It Simple" approach, the application itself
has very little connection to privacy-enhancing Network Overlays.
Applications generally do not have a means to detect when
networking policy changes are active. Applications generally do
not have a means to access policy change settings or to interact
to change them.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="streaming-video">
      <name>Streaming Video</name>
      <t>Streaming Video, while just one of the many different Internet
applications, stands out from other uses in several significant
ways that merit consideration when understanding and addressing
the impacts caused by particular privacy-enhancing design and
service offering choices.</t>
      <t>Streaming video operates at a scale that is hard to imagine.
Streaming is served globally to more than 2 billion users daily
and continues to grow.</t>
      <t>The content types delivered through streaming have evolved from
pre-recorded low-resolution, low-bitrate, latency-tolerant
video-on-demand movies, live or pre-recorded TV shows, and user
generated videos delivered by pioneering streaming platforms to
now including low-latency 4K and 8K live sports events, while
also evolving pre-recorded content to high-bitrate 4K and 8K
cinema quality and High Dynamic Range (HDR) lighting.</t>
      <t>The expectations of streaming video viewers have also
significantly evolved from the days of watching a movie in a PC
browser. Viewers expect to watch on any device they want, ranging
from low-end streaming sticks that plug into a USB port to 4K and
HDR capable laptops, 4K and 8K HDR TV screens, gaming consoles,
and smartphones. Viewers also expect the same great viewing
experience whether at home on high-speed wired Internet,
high-speed WiFi, mobile cellular 5G, or even satellite Internet
connections.</t>
      <t>To meet the growth to billions of users, expanded content types
and quality expectations, and any-device anywhere over any
network expectations, the streaming video technology
infrastructure has had to evolve significantly. This work is
being done in the IETF and in the
<eref target="https://www.svta.org/">Streaming Video Technology Alliance (SVTA)</eref>,
and in a number of other technical and industry groups.</t>
      <t>The growth of streaming video has contributed enormously to the
growth of the Internet. Internet connections at hundreds of
megabits and gigabit speeds today exist because of the needs of
video streaming, and the ongoing work on low-latency networking
and ultra-low-latency video delivery are both driven by streaming
video.</t>
      <section anchor="advances-in-streaming-video-architecture">
        <name>Advances in Streaming Video Architecture</name>
        <t>Internet streaming has greatly matured and diversified from its
early days of viewers watching pre-recorded standard definition
480p movies on wired PCs connected via high-latency, low-bandwidth
DSL or early DOCSIS modems.</t>
        <t>Streaming has grown to the extent that it has become a daily video
source for billions of viewers worldwide and has expanded from
pre-recorded movies to encompass every type of video content
imaginable. This growth to billions of viewers and the addition of
latency-sensitive content and new connectivity options including
WiFi, cellular, and satellite, in addition to high-speed DOCSIS
and fiber, defines the world streaming platforms now serve.</t>
        <t>With this large user base and its usage patterns, streaming
platforms face significant technical challenges in meeting viewer
expectations:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>(1) Delivery scales that commonly range from hundreds of
thousands to many millions of simultaneous viewers, with
billions of daily global views.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(2) Low latency demands from live sports, live events, and live
streamed content.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(3) Content resolutions that have jumped from SD 480p to 4K
(3840x2160) and 8K (7680x4320), with bitrate requirements of
10-24+ Mbps for 4K and 40 Mbps under extreme compression or
150-300 Mbps for high quality cinema-grade 8K.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(4) Devices with very diverse capabilities, from low-cost
streaming sticks to Smart TVs, tablets, phones, and game
consoles.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(5) A broad range of connectivity choices including WiFi,
gigabit-speed low-latency DOCSIS, fiber, satellite, and 5G
cellular networks.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(6) Application transport protocols including MPEG DASH, HLS,
HTTP/2 over TCP, HTTP/3 over QUIC, WebRTC, Media over QUIC
(MoQ), and specialty transports such as SRT and HESP.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>To meet these challenges, streaming platforms have significantly
invested in developing delivery architectures built on detailed
understanding of each element in the content delivery pathway,
from content capture all the way through to the viewer's screen.</t>
        <t>Streaming applications are part of an end-to-end architecture
optimized around achieving the best experience including low
latency video delivery to viewing devices. The open Internet can
be unpredictable with temporary issues like packet loss,
congestion, and other conditions. However, streaming architecture
is designed to handle these momentary problems as effectively as
possible, often through dynamic adaptive approaches designed into
streaming protocols and platform components.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="middleboxes-and-learning-from-the-past">
      <name>Middleboxes and Learning from the Past</name>
      <t>The IETF has discussed this situation in the past. More than
20 years ago, in 2002, Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues
<xref target="RFC3234"/> was published, capturing the issues with middleboxes
in the network and the effects of hidden changes occurring on the
network between the sender and receiver.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>TODO Security</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
      <name>Normative References</name>
      <reference anchor="RFC9317">
        <front>
          <title>Operational Considerations for Streaming Media</title>
          <author fullname="J. Holland" initials="J." surname="Holland"/>
          <author fullname="A. Begen" initials="A." surname="Begen"/>
          <author fullname="S. Dawkins" initials="S." surname="Dawkins"/>
          <date month="October" year="2022"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document provides an overview of operational networking and transport protocol issues that pertain to the quality of experience (QoE) when streaming video and other high-bitrate media over the Internet.</t>
            <t>This document explains the characteristics of streaming media delivery that have surprised network designers or transport experts who lack specific media expertise, since streaming media highlights key differences between common assumptions in existing networking practices and observations of media delivery issues encountered when streaming media over those existing networks.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9317"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9317"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7258">
        <front>
          <title>Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack</title>
          <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
          <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
          <date month="May" year="2014"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>Pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols, where possible.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="188"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7258"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7258"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7624">
        <front>
          <title>Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat Model and Problem Statement</title>
          <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
          <author fullname="B. Schneier" initials="B." surname="Schneier"/>
          <author fullname="C. Jennings" initials="C." surname="Jennings"/>
          <author fullname="T. Hardie" initials="T." surname="Hardie"/>
          <author fullname="B. Trammell" initials="B." surname="Trammell"/>
          <author fullname="C. Huitema" initials="C." surname="Huitema"/>
          <author fullname="D. Borkmann" initials="D." surname="Borkmann"/>
          <date month="August" year="2015"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>Since the initial revelations of pervasive surveillance in 2013, several classes of attacks on Internet communications have been discovered. In this document, we develop a threat model that describes these attacks on Internet confidentiality. We assume an attacker that is interested in undetected, indiscriminate eavesdropping. The threat model is based on published, verified attacks.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7624"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7624"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9000">
        <front>
          <title>QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport</title>
          <author fullname="J. Iyengar" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Iyengar"/>
          <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Thomson"/>
          <date month="May" year="2021"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. QUIC provides applications with flow-controlled streams for structured communication, low-latency connection establishment, and network path migration. QUIC includes security measures that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a range of deployment circumstances. Accompanying documents describe the integration of TLS for key negotiation, loss detection, and an exemplary congestion control algorithm.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9000"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9000"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9484">
        <front>
          <title>Proxying IP in HTTP</title>
          <author fullname="T. Pauly" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Pauly"/>
          <author fullname="D. Schinazi" initials="D." surname="Schinazi"/>
          <author fullname="A. Chernyakhovsky" initials="A." surname="Chernyakhovsky"/>
          <author fullname="M. Kühlewind" initials="M." surname="Kühlewind"/>
          <author fullname="M. Westerlund" initials="M." surname="Westerlund"/>
          <date month="October" year="2023"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes how to proxy IP packets in HTTP. This protocol is similar to UDP proxying in HTTP but allows transmitting arbitrary IP packets. More specifically, this document defines a protocol that allows an HTTP client to create an IP tunnel through an HTTP server that acts as an IP proxy. This document updates RFC 9298.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9484"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9484"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6891">
        <front>
          <title>Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0))</title>
          <author fullname="J. Damas" initials="J." surname="Damas"/>
          <author fullname="M. Graff" initials="M." surname="Graff"/>
          <author fullname="P. Vixie" initials="P." surname="Vixie"/>
          <date month="April" year="2013"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>The Domain Name System's wire protocol includes a number of fixed fields whose range has been or soon will be exhausted and does not allow requestors to advertise their capabilities to responders. This document describes backward-compatible mechanisms for allowing the protocol to grow.</t>
            <t>This document updates the Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0)) specification (and obsoletes RFC 2671) based on feedback from deployment experience in several implementations. It also obsoletes RFC 2673 ("Binary Labels in the Domain Name System") and adds considerations on the use of extended labels in the DNS.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="STD" value="75"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6891"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6891"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC3234">
        <front>
          <title>Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues</title>
          <author fullname="B. Carpenter" initials="B." surname="Carpenter"/>
          <author fullname="S. Brim" initials="S." surname="Brim"/>
          <date month="February" year="2002"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document is intended as part of an IETF discussion about "middleboxes" - defined as any intermediary box performing functions apart from normal, standard functions of an IP router on the data path between a source host and destination host. This document establishes a catalogue or taxonomy of middleboxes, cites previous and current IETF work concerning middleboxes, and attempts to identify some preliminary conclusions. It does not, however, claim to be definitive. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3234"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3234"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC2119">
        <front>
          <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
          <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
          <date month="March" year="1997"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8174">
        <front>
          <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
          <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
          <date month="May" year="2017"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
      </reference>
    </references>
    <?line 709?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from the
Streaming Video Technology Alliance (SVTA) based on their work
studying the impacts of network overlays on streaming platforms.
The contributions from Brian Paxton on observed overlay behavior
and comments from Jay Robertson have been very helpful. The
authors are also grateful to Leonard Giuliano, Emile Stephan,
and Kyle Rose for their reviews and contributions to this
document.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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