-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY * NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY * NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= A VIEW FROM POLAND ON THE CREATION AND STRENGTHENING OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER WORKING GROUP ON THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER Draft Special Report Mr. Longin PASTUSIAK (Poland) Associate Rapporteur* International Secretariat October 1993 * Until this document has been approved by the Political Committee, it represents only the views of the Associate Rapporteur. INTRODUCTION 1. Security is an important issue for all East-Central European countries today. It will be even more so in the near future. All these nations are heavily preoccupied with the vital process of political, economic, and social transformation. Once far-reaching domestic reform is successful and leads to internal stability they will turn their attention to the goal of achieving more international stability. Should domestic reform fail, which might lead to internal disturbances and social unrest, the governments of these countries might resort to the standard practice of seeking domestic support by diverting the attention of the dissatisfied public to the "external threat" and the "external enemy"; as Metternich once said, every country needs at least one foreign enemy to preserve its internal cohesion. Yet, regardless of whether the countries of the region increase or decrease their domestic stability there will be increasing interest on their part in the search for security. I. STATUS QUO PERSISTS 2. Today three categories of countries exist in Europe from the security perspective: (i) secure countries - members of NATO and WEU; (ii) somewhat secure countries - members of NACC; (iii) all others. In the long run this is not a healthy situation. Unequal security status and a highly differentiated feeling of security does not contribute to stability in Europe. As long as there is one insecure European country or group of countries, it is difficult to imagine how an effective and perfect security system in Europe could function. 3. Today Poland threatens nobody and nobody threatens Poland. Poland officially declared that she has no enemies. But nobody can guarantee what is going to happen in 10 or 20 years if the present situation in Europe drifts in a rather uncontrolled way instead of moving toward establishing a new European security order. That is why the present status quo should be viewed as a temporary situation, a transitional period which, hopefully, will lead toward the establishment of an effective security system for all of Europe. Continuation of the present situation should be considered as highly undesirable and replete with potential threats. 4. Poland today finds itself in a unique situation: for the first time in modern history Poland is not part of a multilateral alliance and has no bilateral security or alliance treaty. Fortunately, Poland does not, again, feel threatened by anybody. But who knows, also again, what will happen in future. It is, therefore, in the national interest of Poland to be anchored in some kind of an effective, sub-regional, regional, or all-European security system. Before that system is established and before Poland is accepted with full security guarantees we should all do what is possible to strengthen Polish security: increase co-operation with NATO and with WEU, work for greater effectiveness of the CSCE, seek sub-regional co-operation, e.g., with Visegrad countries, Baltic nations, Central European Initiative, and with all of Poland's neighbours through security arrangements. II. NEUTRALITY 5. If a country chooses to be neutral it assumes that there are going to be political, military, ideological, or other divisions in Europe. If those divisions are going to disappear with the end of the Cold War, however, it is rather strange to proclaim neutrality - vis-a-vis what and whom? 6. Of course, a country can choose non-alignment with any multilateral, collective, or bilateral security arrangements. But, practically speaking, this can apply only to either small peripheral countries or countries with an established tradition of neutral status, such as Switzerland. It is not in the interest of the European security order if larger or middle- sized states stay away from a European security system, whatever that system may eventually entail. This is why no significant political force in Poland favours neutral security status for Poland. The overwhelming majority of Poles and Polish political parties see Polish security either within CSCE, NATO, WEU, or a combination of the three organizations plus other sub-regional arrangements. Moreover, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia signed a treaty of association with the European Communities and this would be incompatible with a status of neutrality. 7. In view of the preceding remarks, it is difficult to imagine neutrality for, e.g., Ukraine and Belarus. These two countries officially proclaimed their desire to be neutral but at the same time expressed their interest in co-operating closely with the West. Although many Poles welcome today the neutral status of Ukraine and Belarus, in the longer run all nations in Europe would feel more secure if the two republics were part of a collective security system. III.CSCE 8. Europe has an opportunity to be a unique region of the world to be the first to build an effective regional security system for the post-Cold War era. 9. The importance of the all-European security system is even greater because it includes countries extending to North America and Russia which covers a substantial part of Asia. This system can be effective because it includes countries which share similar civilized values, have experienced many conflicts in the past, possess nuclear potential, and understand that they can gain from co-operation and security but lose in conflicting and adversarial relations. 10. CSCE has another advantage: it covers almost all aspects of security - political, military, economic, social, ecological, human rights, and so forth. Within the CSCE framework the principles of inter-state as well as intra-state relations were created and many agreements were reached for arms reductions, confidence- and security-building measures, and "Open Skies". 11. The time has now come to build and strengthen the institutional and operational dimensions of the CSCE process. The end result could be the creation, for the first time in history, of a truly effective, all-European, collective security system from, as it is said, Vancouver to Vladivostok. An operationally effective security system means, of course, the creation of international mobile forces under international command. There are some signs the process of CSCE institutionalization is moving ahead, particularly over the last two years. It is, unfortunately, still moving too slowly. 12. Poland supports the process of institutionalizing and increasing the operational activity of the CSCE. On 11 November 1992, Poland proposed in Vienna a "CSCE Code of Conduct in the Field of Security" (see the Draft Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union by Senator Maurice Blin of France). The purpose of this proposal was to strengthen and develop political guarantees of security for European nations through consolidation of a new political-military order in Europe and to further the democratization of European relations. The CSCE Code of Conduct confirms the present principles of security and co-operation developed thus far under CSCE auspices and develops new principles, such as democratic control over the military, open access to military spending data, no military domination of any one country in the CSCE area, and so forth. 13. The CSCE Code of Conduct in the Field of Security is, in a way, a kind of security charter for the post-Cold War era. Two other proposals similar to the Polish one have been tabled. Hopefully, the three of them can constitute a good base for working out the final version. Another Polish proposal suggested that CSCE countries designate 0.5% of their annual military budget to finance CSCE operations. The intention of both proposals was, and remains, to strengthen CSCE activity. IV. EC AND WEU 14. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have signed a treaty of association with the EC but this treaty is still not in effect. The ratification process in most of the EC member countries moves too slowly and has been delayed. Realistically speaking, full EC membership of these four countries is not likely in this century. There is growing impatience, nevertheless, on the part of public opinion in Poland that the ratification process, and thus associate and subsequently full membership, is being delayed. 15. Poland is interested in quick and broad co-operation with WEU. She regards this relationship as a logical consequence of her associate and future full EC membership. Poland is interested in WEU associate membership or observer status. WEU is also interested in developing relations with Poland, but it seems to treat the prospective associate member countries of the EC - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia - on an equal footing with Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. For Poland relations with WEU are increasing her feeling of security and alleviating fears of being left on the side. Closer co-operation of Poland with WEU is perceived in Warsaw as a way to broaden the area of stability and security in Central Europe. 16. The impression in Warsaw is that WEU has not yet developed a broader and final programme of co-operation with Central Europe. There is a need for such a programme. Thus far, the contacts are limited mainly to the annual meetings of foreign and defence ministers and to the biannual consultative meetings among ambassadors. Poland would like to see these relations developing more dynamically. So far the dynamics of Poland's relations with NATO is greater than the dynamics of her relations with WEU. 17. Poland regards WEU as a European pillar of NATO and was glad to see WEU forces taking part in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN and eventually under the auspices of the CSCE. The idea of creating a Eurocorps was met with great interest in Poland as the beginning perhaps of the building of an all-European army. V. NATO 18. NATO is today the only effective military alliance in the whole of Europe, a Europe characterized by uneven stability and predictability as far as its Central and Eastern parts are concerned. 19. However, NATO is also a minority alliance and will remain a minority alliance even if several other countries will be accepted as full members. A minority alliance or an alliance which does not include all European countries will solve the security problem for its members but will not solve the problem of European security as understood by the CSCE process. 20. Various opinions are expressed in Poland as to full membership in NATO. There are politicians who urge membership as early as possible. They say that Poland meets today, or will meet within a few years at most, all the criteria qualifying her to become an integral part of the Alliance. 21. Another group cautions that full membership in NATO of Poland or other former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries would create risks because that would unnecessarily provoke Russia. It is not in the national interest of Poland to become a frontline state in relations with Russia. As long as the development of the internal situation in Russia remains unpredictable, former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty countries should avoid major decisions which would or could be perceived by Moscow as unfriendly or suspicious. Poland should avoid situations in which her policies would be interpreted in Moscow as blocking or making more difficult the development of Russian links with the West. 22. Then, of course, there is also the view that NATO in reality does not want to accept the Central and East European countries, or to extend its security guarantees to a region perceived as rather unstable. Constant knocking on the door of NATO by Poland, the argument goes, and begging for membership does not create a good impression within the Alliance and does not facilitate achieving the goal of full membership. 23. Nevertheless, most of the political forces in Poland and also the military agree that we should co-operate with NATO in all areas NATO finds suitable and advantageous to both sides. Such co-operation already exists and is developing well in many areas - the training of officers, creation of an air defence system for Poland, introducing certain NATO standards in the Polish armed forces, and conversion of the Polish arms industry. 24. In the meanwhile, it is in the interests of Poland to take advantage of membership in the NACC. Although NACC membership cannot and is not treated as a substitute for full membership in NATO, it is an instrument facilitating NACC countries' co-operation with NATO. Poland would like to see a greater operational role for NACC, participation in peacekeeping and eventually peacemaking operations. One can envisage common planning of such operations, common training, and common execution of operations by all NACC members. 25. Apart from NACC membership one can also envisage a kind of associate membership status in NATO. Such a status does not exist at present and would require revision of the Washington Treaty. But in the long run associate membership is not likely to prove satisfactory: a woman cannot be a little bit pregnant, an egg cannot be partially fresh. Theoretically a country can be partially secure, but in the long run such "partial security status" cannot be acceptable to a responsible leadership of any country. NACC or associate membership can be introduced, therefore, only as an interim solution provided there is available down the road full membership in NATO. NACC or associate membership can be viewed also as an interim stage in the process of ultimate universalization of NATO - covering all the CSCE countries.