-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY - DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE - REPORT -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BOSNIA, RUSSIA AND THE HUNGARIAN CASE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO Draft Special Report Mr. Tamas WACHSLER (Hungary) Special Rapporteur* International Secretariat October 1993 * Until this document has been approved by the Defence and Security Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. "Democracy is the worst form of government - except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." 1. The above comment by Sir Winston Churchill was, of course, right on the mark. Yet even Sir Winston could not have foreseen what would transpire in Yugoslavia, where the democratic world again missed all opportunities to prevent the deaths of tens of thousands of innocent people. The world - and principally the rest of Europe - insisted on maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial integrity in 1991, failed to recognize, in time, the independence of the new states, especially of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and sustained the arms embargo against Muslims while they were threatened with extermination. Returning again to Sir Winston Churchill, one might ask what would have happened in 1939 if President Franklin Roosevelt had argued in the same vein as the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, that arms deliveries to the victims of aggression would only stir up additional violence and intensify the war in the face of British requests for assistance. (It is as well to point out here that all leading Bosnian Muslim leaders have made clear that, if it is a question of maintaining the - mainly French and British - UN humanitarian presence in Bosnia or lifting the arms embargo, they would unquestionably root for the latter.) Now, certain European leaders seem to acknowledge, appreciate and in many ways try to satisfy war criminals as peacemakers merely because they, the war criminals, recognize that the limits of tolerance on the part of the West have been reached. 2. Churchill was also right when he commented on the Munich agreement by saying: Britain had the choice between shame and war. She has chosen shame and will get war. The same has happened in Yugoslavia: "We already have both the shame and the war and we must be careful to ensure that the pax europenne does not bring further shame on us". 3. Let us be frank about this. These European "mistakes" (in diplomatic language), cannot be corrected. The damage caused by prevarication cannot be repaired. Tens of thousands of innocent victims have been wantonly executed. The destroyed Muslim cultural heritage of Bosnia - the last such in Europe - stares us in the face. As recently as 8 May, two 16th century mosques in the Serbian occupied town of Banja Luka in Northern Bosnia were destroyed - the Arnudija and the Ferhad Pasha, considered among the finest examples of Ottoman religious architecture in the Balkans. It will take a long time - if ever - for the credibility of the West to be restored. Lost opportunities will never return. The best we can do - and that we must do - is to draw some conclusions for the future, in order to prevent similar grotesque scenarios from being played out elsewhere. 4. The West must demonstrably prove that Desert Storm did not come about merely for oil. The West must illustrate that democracy is more than words and slogans about "common and shared values" and that the concept of "indivisibility of security" has some real substance. It is our responsibility not merely for the dead but for all those alive in other parts of the world. Furthermore, we have a responsibility to ourselves, to our values and to our principles, for it is an illusion to believe that the "civilized world" can be as equally indifferent to future conflicts. 5. But how can this be done? This is the question. How do we prove that those desperately trying to draw parallels - as this Rapporteur did at the outset with the help of Sir Winston Churchill and the example of the late 1930s - are wrong, and the world will not necessarily drift towards a new Armageddon engulfing the planet. We should recall that one party to the Yugoslavian conflict launched serious threats against many countries in Europe and indeed the world. How do we prevent future threats along these lines from paralyzing the West? Moreover, how do we convince parliaments and public opinion that wars in remote parts of the world - even in remote parts of Europe - threaten us as well? How do we build a true Common European House and not one that involves us reordering the furniture in its Western part while the Eastern part is burning? 6. We need new approaches and new solutions to these problems. A genuinely "new European security architecture" is called for. But what sort of new security system should it be and how do we bring it about? 7. I believe that NATO went a considerable way to pointing us in the right direction at the Rome summit last year when it introduced the concept of "interlocking institutions". Indeed, the only solution is to replace the "interblocking institutions" by "interlocking" ones, assuming governments will subscribe to them not only in verbal terms but in concrete actions as well. Many colleagues have spent long hours trying to outline the main features of such an architecture. I will not dwell on this point although the temptation is high for some to suggest solutions from outside. Instead I wish to concentrate on one aspect only: the enlargement of NATO and especially the enlargement of NATO with the admittance of Hungary. 8. As a Hungarian I am convinced that there is no need to dwell extensively on the evident reasons as to why Hungary needs NATO membership. There are, however, a few facts worth mentioning in this context. 9. First, we hear frequently from international colleagues that Hungary "exaggerates threats" to its security, especially in the military field. This may be true but it should come as no surprise. Hungary has not been permitted for decades to make its own threat assessments: they were ready-made and Hungary had no opportunity to doubt them. This still occupies Hungarian minds: the picture seems to be black-and-white, although we do know that colour photos reflect the world much better. This is not a Hungarian speciality: all those who spent their lives under totalitarian regimes - and were educated by them - became infected with this disease. There is a cure for this disease: Germany's example is the living evidence. But lest we forget, the cure had a prescription in Germany: democracy and collective defence provided by a democratic alliance. The same would - and indeed should - apply to other countries as well. We have created the first prescription: democracy; but we alone cannot create the next. 10. Second, we acknowledge that there are a few problems to be resolved to qualify for NATO membership. The reform of Hungarian defence must be speeded up and intensified; the most decisive steps lie ahead in this respect. 11. Third, we have to acknowledge the scope of security problems which can be resolved and the scope of problems which cannot be resolved by NATO membership. This second group of problems must be attacked from a different angle. We have to begin to understand that NATO would prefer not to inherit some of the problems we have - or seem to have - with our neighbours and we must therefore find acceptable solutions to these problems ourselves. 12. Fourth, we have to dispel some concerns that our membership would complicate the security situation in Europe and to convince our partners that NATO also would benefit from Hungarian membership. We cannot expect other states just to do us a favour and guarantee our security on the basis of noble ideas. Let me elaborate on some of these problems. 13. Let us start with the "Russian question", since many colleagues argue that NATO's expansion would provoke the Russians. It is important that we acknowledge that Russia is a security concern for us all and will remain so as a result of her mere size, strength and mentality. We know that there have been some thirteen attempts to modernize Russia since Peter the Great. All have failed to integrate Russia into Europe. We all hope that the present one will succeed but this will take time and the result will surely be different from the pluralistic democracy we know in Europe. It would be a mistake to attempt to impose a social structure on a country with different dimensions and traditions. This does not mean that basic values of democracy and market economy would not apply in Russia. But we have to understand that in the Russian culture solutions to the same problems might be different, since they must reflect certain objective realities and be acceptable for the people as a whole. 14. Here the paradox is that there can be no lasting security in Europe without - let alone against - Russia, but the state of affairs in that country is such that there can be no integration of Russia, in NATO without threatening NATO's mere existence either. This is the real justification for those who claim that the expansion of NATO would provoke Russia, and this concern must be taken into account. It should not, however, serve as a pretext to delay the decision: not the "if" but the "when" and "how" should be examined and resolved. 15. In my view there must be a "dual-track" approach to this problem. On the one hand some of the security concerns of Central and Eastern European countries are legitimate and NATO should not, and cannot, ignore them. It is also in NATO's interest to give serious thought to this problem: NATO in its present form, and within its present boundaries, cannot survive, since the rationale of NATO's existence - the Soviet threat - has disappeared. On the other hand, Russia should also find a place in the future security system of Europe - one short of membership, since Russia's membership would bring in a continental superpower and NATO would not be able to digest it. 16. The solutions to these problems should be dealt with in parallel. While elaborating, offering and implementing concrete criteria for membership of the former Warsaw Pact countries, Russia's link to this new emerging NATO should also be clearly defined: one short of membership but offering the widest possible co-operation between NATO and its member states and Russia. This co-operation should go well beyond the present loose structures of NACC and offer real support for Russia's legitimate security interest. It cannot, however, be a serious Russian demand that NATO offer security guarantees to Russia. Nor could Russia seriously claim that Hungary's or other countries' NATO membership would threaten Russia's security - provided Russia defines her security interest in line with our European norms and not along the lines of old imperialistic thinking. 17. One could suggest these decisions are not urgent. Quite the contrary. For a variety of reasons these decisions should be taken now. One of the reasons has precisely to do with Russia. At present Russia's possibilities would not permit her to react too negatively to NATO's expansion. This might change in the coming years. It is a false assumption to claim that such a decision would necessarily provoke Russia and support those who wish to return to earlier imperialist policies. In the view of the Rapporteur, NATO's firm policy of extension linked with all the benefits the West can offer to Russia for her co-operation would much more support the case of those democratic forces in Russia who understand that a return to expansionist Russian policy would undermine their internal process of democratization. Russian imperialism and totalitarianism are closely linked: one cannot exist without the other. Setting clear limits to Russian expansionism strongly supports internal democratization. Giving the impression that Russian imperialism has a chance in Europe, on the contrary, also shows support for the brown-red coalition. 18. It is a difficult task to support Russia; not only because it implies a great deal of money. It is even more difficult to offer meaningful support without conveying the impression of giving sympathetic help; being helped is often understood in Russia as implying inferiority and the reaction to this is often an aggressive one. Russian policy scarcely ever operated on the basis of allies: enemies or clients were the most frequent relationship for Russia. Today's Russia is quite different from earlier traditions. The West must help to sustain and strengthen this difference by offering not a formal alliance to Russia, but a real alliance relationship. This would truly support democracy and those like Yeltsin and Kozirev, who would like to change Russia and gradually integrate her into the democratic community of nations. 19. Hungary's relationship to NATO to a large extent is dependent on the outcome of the internal discussion on the future of the Alliance. As an "outsider" I would venture some comments and opinions. I continue to be surprised by the intensity of the discussion on "out-of-area" involvement. Frankly speaking, I have difficulty in understanding it. First, since it should be the elementary concern of every country to keep conflicts out of its territory. Secondly, I can see no other NATO involvement than "out-of-area". NATO countries have been fortunate enough not to have had a single case in the history of the Alliance which required NATO involvement within the area defined in the Washington Treaty. Future threats come exclusively from the outside. This also means that if NATO wishes to play a significant role in the future it must take up challenges emerging from outside. And there is nobody here present, I am sure, who would question my thesis that NATO must remain a crucial player in the future as well. 20. To reinforce NATO's capabilities to prevent and manage crises in Europe the question of extension is unavoidable. But how should this be done? Should we suggest that NATO immediately offers security guarantees to us (without defining at this stage who the "us" is) without setting criteria and requiring some benefits for NATO also? Or should we concentrate on the criteria and say: all who match the criteria would be eligible for some kind of membership? The answer is simple: criteria for membership and some transitory solutions could be the best way to satisfy the needs of "newcomers" and at the same time ensuring the necessary time for transition for both NATO and Russia. 21. Let me start with the criteria. It goes without saying - but must be said - that only democratic European countries with a functioning market economy qualify for membership. Democratic criteria include full implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with present requirements, i.e. including those rights relating to national, ethnic, religious and other minorities in order to avoid "importing" ethnic conflicts into NATO. Further, the defence structures of new members must be compatible with those of NATO countries, including military doctrine, legislation, training, operational concepts, C3I, technology, etc. An essential aspect of compatibility should be effective political and civilian control over the military as well as the appropriate implementation of human rights in the armed forces. 22. All these criteria cannot be met at once. And one should not demand that all these criteria be met fully before membership. Some of these criteria, however, must be prerequisites for membership. No country can seriously think of NATO membership unless it has an established genuine democratic regime, implements fully basic human rights, including those of minorities, is able to manage its possible conflicts with neighbours in accordance with European norms and within European political conflict management structures and ensures full political and civilian control of the military. 23. Nobody could seriously suggest that the readiness for integration is the same in the case of some Central-Asian former Soviet republics and Hungary or certain others. This also suggests that the NACC-concept, which was understandable and sustainable a year ago, has already been overtaken by events. In addition to this kind of co-operation there is a need for differentiation as well. 24. Those who already meet these above-mentioned first set of criteria do not yet necessarily qualify for immediate membership: for example they might lack resources to ensure full compatibility of their armed forces. They need, however, a different treatment, partly because they have already proved their genuine desire and readiness to qualify for membership, partly because their security has become more and more linked to the security of NATO members. For these countries a realistic perspective should also be offered. These guarantees and the perspective could be best ensured by a transitory solution of "associate membership". 25. Associate membership would certainly not require full integration of the military forces defences. Nor would it necessarily include Article V type guarantees. It certainly would provide for close co-operation, including Article IV-type guarantees as well as an ongoing process of integration and co-operation, in security and increasingly defence matters. 26. Associate membership would also enhance security by increasing the feeling of security in these countries. Since we all know that the perception of security is no less important that real security and perceived threats generate real ones, this could also contribute to real security and stability in our region. 27. Associate membership would be a breakthrough without threatening the cohesion of the Alliance. It would also stimulate others who still do not qualify by demontrating that there are realistic and clear perspectives for those who make sustained efforts to match these criteria. This would also demonstrate that slogans are not empty words and those who claim that integration in the West is only a dream are only pursuing their own views and interests. 28. While encouraging our friends in NATO to give serious thought to expansion, we do not want to force them to take sides in conflicts in Cetnral and Eastern Europe. All we want them to do is to support stability in the region, offer some meaningful contribution to it and, in so doing, support those who are genuinely interested and do their best to this end. 29. The question to be decided by our friends in NATO, is the following: Is it in the interest of NATO countries that the "other" part of Europe also becomes stable and secure? Is it in their interest to invest some political credibility and efforts in this? Or, should another "iron curtain" emerge, a frontier of welfare and security which would doom our countries to a long period of turbulence, violence and insecurity? 30. This dilemma is not a real question to me. I belong to that majority in Hungary who still think it cannot be a real dilemma for the rest of the world either. We cannot, however, build our security on beliefs. We need more: real measures and real offers.