Internet-Draft | Email Modification Algebra | November 2024 |
Gondwana | Expires 7 May 2025 | [Page] |
This memo describes a method for describing the changes made to an email during common email modifications, for example those caused by mailing lists and forwarders.¶
While this is general enough to be used for any changes, it is anticipated that this method will normally be used for removing added data rather than large complex changes.¶
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Currently, when an email is sent with a DKIM signature, the message can go through multiple forwarders and still be authenticated, however if a single change is made to a header which is covered by the signature, or to the body, then the signature no longer validates - and it's impossible for the receiver to know what was changed, or even if the entire messages content was replaced by an attacker.¶
By producing a way to describe changes, the recipient can examine the sections which were changed and determine whether the change was malicious. Because each step signs its own changes in DKIM2, this also allows the recipient to identify exactly which intermediary introduced the malicious change, and adjust their reputation accordingly.¶
For headers, the format is to completely replace all headers with a particular name. For example if you replace the subject and from address in an email, then you need to include the complete old headers for each of those:¶
Header: "DKIM2-Diff-Header:"¶
Command | Input |
---|---|
i | DKIM2 matching header number |
b | replace headers with base64 octet value |
t | replace headers with raw text characters value |
Example for a message which has had Subject and From replaced, and Reply-To added.¶
From: brong@fastmailteam.com.dmarc.fail To: dkim2@lists.ietf.org Reply-To: dkim2@lists.ietf.org DKIM2-Diff-Header: i=3; t=Subject,A replacement for DKIM; b=From,YnJvbmdAZmFzdG1haWx0ZWFtLmNvbQo=; t=Reply-To¶
This difference format for the body is inspired by [RFC3284] (The VCDIFF Generic Differencing and Compression Data Format).¶
Since the transport for the differences is a 7-bit mime header, this format has been made simple and human readable. It is a simple program describing ranges of data to copy from the output to recreate the input.¶
Header: "DKIM2-Diff-Body:"¶
Command | Input |
---|---|
i | DKIM2 matching header number |
c | copy offset-length from new-message body |
b | insert octets from base64 encoded value |
t | insert raw text of value |
Example:¶
DKIM2-Diff-Body: i=2; c=0-19452; c=20312-150¶
Example - appended to some base64 content; so we need to add back the last few characters (and the mime trailer)¶
DKIM2-Diff-Body: i=2; c=0-19452; t=aX==; c=20312-150¶
Example - a URL was substituted in the content of the body (complex, but still easily doable!)¶
DKIM2-Diff-Body: i=3; c=0-3542; b=PGEgaHJlZj0iaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZXhhb XBsZS5jb20iPkV4YW1wbGU8L2E+Cg==; c=3623-84743¶
The decision whether to use 'b' or 't' is up to the system creating the diff, however 't' has a limited set of characters that are safe to use in headers.¶
Each DKIM2 signature implicitly covers all DKIM2-Diff-Body and DKIM2-Diff-Header headers
with an i=N
value for the same and lower N values as the i=
on the DKIM2 header.¶
To get back to the original message and confirm that it was unchanged, it is necessary to apply this algorith iteratively.¶
For example if you receive a message at i=7
for which there is a modification to the
headers at i=5
and a modification to both headers and body at i=3
, to recreate the
original message you would first apply the header changes from i=5
, then apply the
header and body changes for i=3
. If this doesn't create a message which validates
with the initial i=1 signature, then some hop has corrupted the message, and you can
check every single DKIM signature in reverse to find the first one where the message
no longer validates.¶
[[This section to be removed by RFC Editor]]¶