


# KOF Working Papers

Country or Leader?  
Political Change and UN General Assembly Voting

Axel Dreher and Nathan Jensen



# KOF

ETH Zurich  
KOF Swiss Economic Institute  
WEH D 4  
Weinbergstrasse 35  
8092 Zurich  
Switzerland

Phone +41 44 632 42 39  
Fax +41 44 632 12 18  
[www.kof.ethz.ch](http://www.kof.ethz.ch)  
[kof@kof.ethz.ch](mailto:kof@kof.ethz.ch)

# **Country or Leader?**

## **Political Change and UN General Assembly Voting**

Axel Dreher<sup>a</sup>

Nathan Jensen<sup>b</sup>

February 2009

### **Abstract:**

In this project we explore the relationship between leader change and relations between states. Voting in the United Nation's General Assembly (UNGA) is often used as a measure of political proximity between countries. We use UN voting coincidence to examine how changes in leadership affect relations. Specifically, we examine how political change affects a country's voting with the United States. In this paper we explore how leadership change affects UNGA voting. Using differences between "key" and "non-key" UN votes to the United States, we explore if political change is driven by preference change or by a changing external position. While political change has little impact on voting on non-key issues (state preferences) we find that after leadership change, countries are more likely to vote in line with the United States on key UN votes.

**Keywords:** United Nations General Assembly voting, key votes

**JEL codes:** F51, F53, D78

<sup>a</sup> Professor of Economics, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073 Goettingen, Germany, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Switzerland, IZA, and CESifo, Germany. E-mail: mail@axel-dreher.de.

<sup>b</sup> Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis. E-mail: njensen@wustl.edu.

**Acknowledgement:** We thank participants of the Conference Political Economy of International Organizations (Geneva, 2009) for helpful comments.

## 1. Introduction

Recent advances in international relation scholarship have focused on the role of leaders in shaping state behavior. Scholars have built rich theoretical models and detailed empirical tests of both what affects leadership survival and the impact of leadership survival on international relations. These works have provided important insights into how political institutions and leader-specific characteristics affect international relations.

Many of these studies have focused on how domestic politics shape the incentives facing leaders, shifting the pendulum from the international system dominating leader choices, to domestic politics having a substantial influence over foreign policy. A number of recent studies have integrated domestic and international factors that shape the policy choices of individual leaders. In this paper we complement this literature by evaluating how both domestic and international factors affect foreign policy. Specifically, we explore how leadership change influences voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

While the UNGA is generally considered a weak institution, it is a relatively unique environment where we can easily observe the relative policy positions of essentially every nation in the world in the same institutional setting.<sup>1</sup> Debates in the UN General Assembly can be the center of high politics or can also be used for politicians grandstanding, such as Chavez's infamous speech calling President Bush the devil.<sup>2</sup>

These UN General Assembly activities are more than amusing stories for academic research papers. Numerous scholars have pointed out that countries that are allied with the United States consistently vote with the United States in the General Assembly, while non-allied countries consistently find themselves at odds with the U.S. during Assembly votes.<sup>3</sup> This isn't simply a matter of similar preferences. As has been pointed out by the U.S. Department of State (1985), examining UNGA votes makes it possible "to make judgments about whose values and views are harmonious with our own, whose policies are consistently opposed to ours, and whose practices fall in between." A report from the same department in 2000 states "a country's behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State regularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors" (quoted in Andersen, Harr and Tarp 2006). A recent paper from the Heritage Foundation argues that "A country's record in General Assembly non-consensus votes is a means of measuring its support for U.S. diplomatic priorities" and goes on to discuss strategies of influencing UNGA votes (Schaefer and Kim 2008). As we

---

<sup>1</sup> See Dixon (1981).

<sup>2</sup> "Chávez Calls Bush 'the Devil' in U.N. Speech." David Stout. *New York Times* Sept 20, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> See Kilby (2008) for a critical discussion.

highlight in the next few sections, the U.S. sometimes conditions foreign aid on UNGA voting.

Our key point is that while many of the patterns in UN voting are quite clear, such as the obvious East-West divide in UN voting during the Cold War, the value of this measure is that a country's voting in the General Assembly is a comparable, cross-national measure of foreign policy alignment with the United States. In the data section of this paper we illustrate the utility of using this measure.

The UN General Assembly is an ideal environment for exploring how leadership change affects foreign policy positions. UN General Assembly voting consists of high profile votes and low profile votes. Numerous scholars have argued that the United States uses carrots (foreign aid) and sticks (threats) to influence voting on key General Assembly votes. While classifying key votes may seem subjective, we can utilize a classification from the US government. Since 1983 the U.S. State Department has classified votes as "key" votes for the United States.

Differentiating between these key and non-key votes allows for an identification of the impact of U.S. influence on a country's foreign policy. One set of votes are not subject to U.S. influence (non-key votes) while another set of votes can lead to repercussions for not voting in line with the United States.<sup>4</sup> Our expectation is that while non-key votes are sincere statements of preferences,<sup>5</sup> key-votes are the votes where we would expect countries to deviate from their own preferences in order to obtain or maintain U.S. support. Comparing movements in key and non-key votes allows us to account for changes of foreign policy preferences in both the absence and presence of U.S. pressure.

Our results point to the importance of individual leaders and international relations. We find that nations become more "friendly" with the United States in the wake of leadership change. This result provides evidence of the importance of leadership change, and is consistent with existing models of individual leader punishment strategies by McGillivray and Smith (2004).

## **2. Leaders and International Relations**

While much of international relations scholarship has focused on the nation-state as the level of analysis, there is a resurgent interest in the role of individual leaders in international relations. One rich area of research is how international conflict affects the ability of leaders

---

<sup>4</sup> Anderson, Harr, and Tarp (2006) argue that the non-key votes in the General Assembly are a measure of a country's "bliss point," or a similarity in preferences with the United States.

<sup>5</sup> Or at the very least, these are policy positions taken by politicians for domestic reasons, absent U.S. political pressure.

to survive in power. For example, Chiozza and Goemans (2004) challenge the theory that war is inefficient for states.<sup>6</sup> Chiozza and Goemans find that international conflict can actually increase leadership tenure under some conditions, making conflict a good option for leadership survival.<sup>7</sup> Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) provide a number of theoretical models of what affects leadership survival, and test how institutions that affect leadership survival affect policy decisions.<sup>8</sup>

Another area of research close to the topic of this paper is on the strategies used by leaders.<sup>9</sup> For example, McGillivray and Smith (2004) construct a model of leader specific punishment, where the leader of a country (say the United States) imposes sanctions on another country (e.g., Yugoslavia).<sup>10</sup> McGillivray and Smith argue that this punishment, while targeting a country, can be imposed until the leader is removed from power. Once a new leader emerges, sanctions are lifted. This leader-specific punishment gives citizens the incentives to replace leaders with tarnished international reputations, thus providing incentives for leaders to maintain good reputations in order to survive in office.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, a number of scholars have examined how leadership changes affect economic policy and macroeconomic outcomes. Using assassinations as a source of random leadership change, Jones and Olken (Forthcoming) find that leadership change can affect democratization and conflict. Jones and Olken (2005) estimate the impact of leader deaths on economic policy and outcomes. Leadership death is associated with shifts in growth rates and monetary policy. McGillivray and Smith (2004) find that leadership change in authoritarian regimes leads to a major decline in trade while leadership change in democratic regimes has little impact on trade.

---

<sup>6</sup> This theory claims that leaders in both states would have been better off with a negotiated agreement rather than a conflict.

<sup>7</sup> They argue that political institutions mediate the impact of international conflict on leadership survival. Chiozza and Choi (2003) argue that leaders form reputations, and these reputations affect the probability of future conflict. Wolford (2007) builds a model showing that individual leaders have private information on their level of resolve and how these leader-leader interactions affect international conflict.

<sup>8</sup> As one example, Smith and Vreeland (2003) find that IMF programs can help leaders stay in power.

<sup>9</sup> In this paper we do not focus on what individual attributes of leaders lead to differing behavior. See Horowitz et al. (2005) for a discussion of how leader age affects international conflict.

<sup>10</sup> McGillivray and Smith (2006) show that leader-specific punishment improves the credibility of threats. See also Guisinger and Smith (2002) for a model of individual reputations and international crisis.

<sup>11</sup> Even if citizens would prefer for the leader to renege on an international agreement, or violate an international law, there is no way for the citizens to credibly promise to keep the leader in power. Once the leader has tarnished his or her own reputation by reneging on an agreement, citizens have the incentive to remove that leader.

One reason for these major policy changes is that individual leaders matter for policy.<sup>12</sup> Capabilities of leaders, such as the level of education of leaders, affect policy choices.<sup>13</sup> In the literature on central banking and monetary policy, leader attributes such as education (Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007), career ambitions (Adolph 2004), and cognitive complexity (Thies 2004) have been linked to better performance. This can be expanded beyond technocratic roles to more general political leadership. For example, Besley et al. (2005), using household survey data from India, find that the education of politicians is systematically linked to performance, specifically in limiting individual opportunism. In another example, Dreher et al. (Forthcoming) find that the educational and professional background of a head of government matters for the implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. They show that former entrepreneurs are significantly more reform oriented. Entrepreneurs belonging to a left-wing party are more successful in inducing reforms than a member of a right-wing party with the same previous profession. Former professional scientists also foster reforms, the more so, the longer they stay in office. Similarly, Mikosch and Somogyi (2008) find that political leaders with education in economics generate significantly lower budget deficits than those with education in law, e.g. Evidence like this leads a World Bank (2005: v) report to conclude “that more educated politicians are better” adding to “a growing appreciation among economists that education [of politicians] may be important because of its role in inculcating civic values.”

In this paper we explain how leaders alter relations between states, focusing on how U.S. influence affects a country’s foreign policy position focusing on voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. UNGA voting is often utilized as a measure for a country’s proximity to the United States. Countries voting consistently with the U.S. in the General Assembly are considered strong allies, while countries voting against the U.S. are adversaries. In the next section we discuss using UNGA voting as a measure of political proximity, yet it is important to note that numerous influential studies have used UNGA voting before.

A number of scholars have examined the costs and benefits of voting in line with the United States in the General Assembly. Numerous studies find that foreign aid flows influence UNGA voting (Kato 1969; Kegley and Hook 1991; Sexton and Decker 1992; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008), where higher allocations of U.S. foreign aid lead to

---

<sup>12</sup> This can also be due to different leaders representing different groups in society. For example, Pande (2003) shows that the reservation of political mandates for members of disadvantaged castes and tribes in India has increased targeted transfers to these groups.

<sup>13</sup> Other attributes can also affect performance. Washington (2006) finds that congressmen with daughters are substantially more likely to vote in-line with feminist views.

voting in line with the U.S. in the General Assembly.<sup>14</sup> Another literature has explored how political relationships affect IMF and World Bank support. Thacker (1999) was the first to test the hypothesis that conclusion of IMF programs depends on countries' voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. He employs two variables – one indicating a country's political agreement with the U.S., the other reflecting movement in political alignment. According to his results for the period 1985-94, political proximity has no statistically significant impact when serial correlation is taken into account. However, a movement to the U.S. significantly increases the probability of receiving an IMF program. The results also show that the impact of a movement towards the U.S. on the probability of obtaining IMF programs does not depend on the initial position. Other scholars have found that UN General Assembly voting is a significant predictor of IMF support (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Stone 2004; Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher and Jensen 2007) and World Bank funds (Andersen, Hansen and Markussen 2006).

### 3. Theory

These existing studies of UNGA voting have yet to explore how changes in leadership affect voting. We begin our analysis as a test of two broad competing theories. Neorealist theories of international relations concentrate on how states focus on national security within an anarchic international system.<sup>15</sup> Individual leaders are largely constrained within this system, where the structure of the international system determines the behavior of states. While this literature is too vast to review in this section, the core of most Neorealist theories is that nation-states respond to changes in the structure of the international system, and individual leaders have very limited leeway to make policy.<sup>16</sup> Leadership changes, unless accompanied with changes in the structure of the international system, should have little impact on the foreign policy position of states.

*Hypothesis 1:* Leadership change will have no impact on UNGA key voting.

Finding a correlation between leadership change and UNGA key voting does not refute the importance of structural factors dominating foreign policy. One simple argument is

---

<sup>14</sup> Although another set of papers finds no relationship between UN Voting and aid (Bernstein and Alpert 1971; Rai 1972; Wittkopf 1973; Lundborg 1998; and Wang 1999).

<sup>15</sup> See Gilpin (1981).

<sup>16</sup> Voeten (2000) discusses three hypotheses derived from realist scholarship, the stability hypothesis, structuralist hypothesis, and counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis. All three theories make predictions on the behavior of UNGA voting based on international factors.



that leadership turnover can proxy for regime changes or changes in the international system. The most obvious example of this is the transitions from a bi-polar system of the U.S. and Soviet blocs during the Cold War to the period in the post-cold war. A number of former Soviet allies democratized, initiated economic reforms, and became closer political allies with the United States. Thus we might find a positive correlation between leadership change and UN voting, yet this could be driven by these important changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In our empirical analysis we test for this structural change, attempting to isolate the impact of leadership change from these other confounding factors.

Even after we account for this structural change, there are other theoretical reasons why we should expect leaders affecting foreign policy positions. The most obvious explanation is that individual leaders are selected based on the policy preferences of a selectorate, and these preferences can change over time. As argued by Anderson, Harr, and Tarp (2006), voting on UNGA non-keys is a statement of country preferences that are not influenced by the United States.

*Hypothesis 2: Leadership change will impact UNGA non-key voting.*

These first two hypotheses are not inconsistent with each other. States could be largely constrained in the foreign policy positions, and the U.S. uses carrots and sticks to maintain international support in the UNGA. Thus, individual leaders have little ability to influence UNGA key votes. Yet, if leadership change is a reflection of changing preferences of the citizenry (or some subgroup of the citizenry that selects leaders) we would expect changes in the policy positions on the non-key UNGA votes.

While we find these two hypotheses plausible, the core contribution of this paper is to theorize how leadership change can affect foreign policy. We argue that leadership changes can have a major impact on the highly salient key votes in the UNGA. This is because the key votes are central to leadership survival.

As outlined above, according to McGillivray and Smith (2004, 2008), individual leaders develop reputations, where the United States (or other countries) can play leader-specific punishment strategies. Their theory posits that the United States will play a cooperative strategy with a leader until the leader defects. After defection, the United States will punish the leader.

Thus, leadership change is related to the reputation of a leader. Leaders can choose to defect from agreements, renege on contracts, or otherwise take actions that will tarnish the

reputation of the leader. McGillivray and Smith argue that a country, say the United States, can enact a strategy of punishing a country until this leader is removed from office. Leaders will be wary of harming their own reputations, limiting their activities, and forcing their removal from office if their reputation becomes tarnished.

McGillivray and Smith's theory provides a number of provocative insights into international relations. They find that individual leaders, even when facing popular pressures in society, will often choose to uphold international agreements. For example, a populist leader may choose to nationalize an investment, even though this nationalization breaks a bilateral investment treaty. By engaging in this popular nationalization, the leader balances the domestic benefits of this nationalization against the reputation costs of reneging on an international agreement. While a popular nationalization is a way to boost domestic popularity, the leader also understands that the citizenry has the incentive to replace leaders with tarnished international reputations.<sup>17</sup> Thus the leader pays some personal costs for developing a bad reputation, which can lead to leaders shunning popular policies that will have a reputation cost. As stated by McGillivray and Smith (2008, 11), "It is interesting to note that the leader, as agent of the citizens, can commit to cooperate under conditions that the principals themselves could not commit to cooperate under."

McGillivray and Smith's empirical work then focuses on how institutional features that affect leader replacement (such as some components of democratic institutions) affect international cooperation. While we find both the theory and empirics compelling, what is missing is a focus on actual leadership change, rather than the conditions that affect leadership change.

Our key insight is that this leader-specific framework can be applied to UNGA voting. If the U.S. does indeed wield carrots and sticks and conditions these on a foreign policy position, we should expect UNGA voting as a country's foreign policy positions that is subject to the influence of the United States. As cited above, there is considerable evidence that UNGA voting does in fact affect U.S. foreign aid and allocations from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The key insight from a leader-specific framework is that leaders who do not vote in line with the U.S. receive lower levels of aid and less favorable treatment in the international financial institutions, affecting the domestic economy. According to McGillivray and Smith (2004, 2008) the U.S. plays a leader-specific punishment strategy, where the country is punished until the leader is removed from office. While the mechanisms for removing leaders

---

<sup>17</sup> See Jensen (2006, 2008) for more detail on this theory as applied to investment nationalizations.

from office vary dramatically across countries and over time, citizens, wanting new foreign aid, have the incentive to replace leaders that have voted against the U.S. in the UNGA.

While McGillivray and Smith (2008) examine the determinants of leader survival, few works have examined the behavior of new leaders after leader removal. One observable implication of this theory, one that to the best of our knowledge has remained untested, is that the leaders with tarnished reputation should be replaced by leaders more closely aligned with the U.S. The logic is as follows. Leaders that are removed from office are likely to have voted against U.S. interests. New leaders have the incentives to protect their own reputations, in our context by cultivating a positive relationship with the United States, to survive in office. Thus we predict that successors are more likely to vote in line with the United States. The key observable implication is that we hypothesize an increase in voting coincidence with the United States after leadership change.

*Hypothesis 3:* New leaders are more likely to vote in line with the U.S. on UNGA key votes as compared to leaders removed from office.

Before discussing our data and research design strategy, it is important to make one clarification on the incentives of leaders to vote in line with the U.S. on key votes. There are clearly examples of leaders that take popular positions against the U.S., or leaders that are punished for the support of U.S. foreign policy. More generally, the existing literature on the “rally around the flag” effect explores how international conflict can increase the popularity of domestic leaders (Mueller 1973).<sup>18</sup> We have two responses to this potential criticism.

First, as outline above in the discussion of McGillivray and Smith (2004, 2008), the key point isn’t whether voting against the U.S. is popular or unpopular, rather the question is if citizens have incentives to replace leaders that have poor relationships with the United States. Leaders may run on popular platforms against the U.S., but after winning office, politicians have incentives to moderate these positions. Thus, even if taking a stance against the U.S. is ex ante popular, if the actions of the politician lead to declines in foreign aid or access for foreign capital, citizens have incentives to select new leaders. Thus, even with foreign policy positions that are ex ante popular, citizens have the inability to credibly commit to not eventually removing the leader to renew relations with the United States.

---

<sup>18</sup> The majority of this literature focuses on how international conflict affects U.S. Presidential popularity. See Baum (2002) for a review and analysis. Gassebner et al. (2007, 2008) show that the “rally around the flag” effect does not seem to hold internationally with respect to terrorism.

Second, we believe that the final adjudication of this matter is an empirical one. If leaders are rewarded for voting against the U.S. in the UNGA, or if there are confounding effects, we should be able to observe this in the data. Our prediction is that new leaders will consistently vote in line with the U.S., which is empirically differentiable from alternative theories.

#### 4. Data

In this paper we explore how leadership change affects voting in the United Nations General Assembly. In analyzing this question, we face several problems. First, we need to establish how to measure voting coincidence in the UNGA. There are several possibilities. Thacker (1999), among others, codes votes in agreement with the U.S. as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5.<sup>19</sup> Wittkopf (1973), Sexton and Decker (1992) and Barro and Lee (2005) employed the fraction of times a country votes the same as the country of interest (either both voting yes, both voting no, both voting abstentions, or both being absent); Kegley and Hooch (1991) simply discarded abstentions or absences.<sup>20</sup> In any case, the resulting numbers are then divided by the total number of votes in each year. We concentrate on the method proposed by Thacker (1999) for both theoretical and statistical reasons. The difference between the three approaches lies in the way they weigh abstentions or absences, giving it a weight of 0, 0.5 or 1 in case the reference country does vote. Of course, any of these weights is arbitrary, but we prefer not opting for a corner solution and hence stick to the definition of Thacker (1999) in which a weight of 0.5 is used. Furthermore, from a statistical point of view this produces a dependent variable with a nicely bell-shaped distribution (as opposed to the other two definitions where the tails of the distribution do become rather fat). Hence, it is less likely that our results will be driven by extreme observations.

What do patterns of UN voting look like across countries and over time? Rai (1972) and, more recently, Dreher and Sturm (2006) report of generally low coincidence between U.S. and African as well as Middle Eastern or South Asian votes; coincidence between U.S. and Latin American votes is much higher. Russett (1967), employing factor analysis, shows that regional clusters are most important for voting alignment. According to Kim and Russett

---


<sup>19</sup> Similarly, Gartzke and Jo (2002) and Morey and Lai (2003) code voting coincidence between -1 and 1, with abstentions being in between compliance and non-compliance. Russett (1967) and Rai (1972) code each country either 2 (yes), 1 (abstain or absent), or 0 (negative). Focusing on abstentions might be important as donors might bribe governments not only to comply, but also to avoid non-compliance (Zimmermann 1993, Palmer et al. 2002).

<sup>20</sup> Yet an alternative method has been suggested by Brams and O'Leary (1970) and employed, e.g., by Wittkopf (1973). They subtract the expected agreement from actual agreement and divide by the former. Expected agreement is based on the actual distribution of votes on each General Assembly roll call vote.

(1996), today the North-South divide explains a huge share of variation in voting behavior, while it had been the East-West divide during the Cold War.<sup>21</sup>

These regional variations mask both important differences across countries, and more importantly, fail to capture the stability or change in UN Voting over time.<sup>22</sup> In the next set of figures we present data on UN voting for key and non-key votes and compare this to the average votes of the n-1 other countries. What is especially striking is that although our measure of voting with the U.S. varies within a country over time, most countries stay either consistently above or below the world average.

**Figure 1: Average Voting with the U.S. on Key and Non-Key UNGA Votes**



In Figure 1 we present world averages on voting with the United States on key votes and non-key votes. While there is considerable volatility over time, it is interesting to note that countries are on average more likely to vote with the U.S. on key votes than non-key votes. This could be evidence for coercion or simply that issues important to the United States are more likely to have shared positions across countries.


In the next set of figures we present a few representative countries to illustrate the usefulness of examining changes in UN voting. The first set of figures presents a representative former Warsaw Pact country, Bulgaria. The left panel of figure 2 presents the

<sup>21</sup> To the contrary, Voeten (2000) finds that the position of countries still corresponds more closely to their Cold War East-West dimension than to the North-South dimension.

<sup>22</sup> Voeten (2000) finds that post 1996 the United States became increasingly isolated in the UNGA over time.

world average of UNGA voting coincidence on key votes with the U.S. (excluding Bulgaria), and Bulgaria's coincidence with the U.S. As one might expect, Bulgaria consistently voted against the U.S. on key votes prior to the end of the Cold War, and then flipped into one of the strongest supporters of U.S. interests in the UNGA. This is the typical pattern for many of the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, while the countries of the Former Soviet Union display a much more complex pattern.


**Figure 2: UNGA Voting with the U.S., Bulgaria vs. World Average**



The right panel of figure 2 presents a similar graph focusing on non-key votes. While Bulgaria has shifted in both key and non-key votes, it is clear that the difference between these positions has changed markedly since the Cold War.

The countries that are less susceptible to U.S. influence, yet share many of the same preferences are the countries in Western Europe. One clear example is that of France. In Figure 3 we present France's UN voting pattern on key and, respectively, non-key issues relative to the world average.


**Figure 3: UNGA Voting with the U.S., France vs. World Average**



As evidenced in Figure 3, while voting coincidence with the U.S. has declined over time, France remains a close ally of the U.S., consistently voting with the U.S. on key issues more than the world average. France's position on non-key issues is generally more supportive than the world average either, although the levels of support are below that of voting on key issues.

In the final figure we present Egypt's UNGA voting (Figure 4). Egypt presents an interesting case, where post Camp David Accord Egypt has become a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid in exchange for foreign policy concessions, specifically on Israel. While Egypt is only slightly below the world average on UNGA voting coincidence with the U.S. on key votes, voting clearly differs from the U.S. on non-key votes. This is an illustrative example of how U.S. pressure can affect a country's foreign policy position.

**Figure 4: UNGA Voting with the U.S., Egypt vs. World Average**



These graphs illustrate how the UNGA tracks foreign policy positions of countries. The next section tests our hypotheses. Specifically, we address whether leadership change affects UNGA voting.

## 5. Analysis

One of the main challenges in empirical analysis when there is no established benchmark is coming up with a reliable model. We therefore opted to follow the robustness analysis in Dreher and Sturm (2006). Dreher and Sturm test for the influence of a substantial number of variables broadly related to four dimensions of influence on UNGA voting: (1) Cultural and political proximity between donor and recipient country, (2) foreign support, (3) trade flows and foreign direct investment (FDI), and (4) foreign aid. As they argue, cultural and political proximity likely increases voting coincidence, while countries depending on foreign support should be more likely to vote in line with the G7 countries. Trade flows and FDI might either increase or decrease the probability that a country votes in line with its partner country, as these flows might represent economic links, on the positive side, or be perceived as foreign intrusion, on the negative side. Bilateral foreign aid, or changes in aid, arguably increases the probability that a recipient country votes in line with the donor.

Dreher and Sturm (2006) test for the robustness of these variables employing various methods, including Extreme Bounds Analysis. According to their results, UN General



Assembly voting in line with the U.S. is higher, when the respective country's government has the same political color (i.e., both left or both right), at the one percent level of significance. Voting coincidence decreases with corruption, national capability, GDP per capita, GDP growth and higher imports from the U.S. to the respective country (in percent of recipient GDP), all at the one percent level of significance. We do omit the indicator of national capability, as it reduces our sample by more than two thirds.<sup>23</sup> All variables used here together with their sources are listed in Appendix A. Appendix B reports descriptive statistics.

The resulting regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis (with yearly data). The analysis covers the time period 1983-2005 and extends to a maximum of 189 countries, limited by the availability of data on key votes. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. The hausman test clearly rejects a random effects specification, thus we include a dummy for each country. We estimated all models with robust standard errors and country cluster. We also add the lagged dependent variable (which is highly significant in all regressions).

#### Insert Table 1

Column 1 of Table 1 replicates the results of Dreher and Sturm (2006), including the lagged dependent variable, and focusing on key votes. As can be seen, UN General Assembly voting with the U.S. rises with the absence of corruption and lower GDP per capita, in line with Dreher and Sturm. However, the government's political color, GDP growth and U.S. imports have no significant effect on General Assembly voting. As Dreher and Sturm focus on all votes rather than key votes, the difference in results is not surprising.

When including a dummy for leadership changes to this regression, positive and negative effects following those changes might cancel themselves out, leading to an insignificant effect. Even if one effect dominates, and the coefficient thus turns significant, the results can only give us the net effect. As our first test of hypothesis 1, we therefore

---

<sup>23</sup> GDP per capita and GDP growth are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2007); political leaning is taken from Beck et al. (2001); the index of corruption is provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); US imports are derived from the OECD's Statistical Compendium. The composite indicator of national capability employed in Dreher and Sturm (2006) is a measure of power based upon six indicators (based on Singer et al. 1972): military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. Note that the indicator is not significant at conventional levels when included to our regressions.

propose a method introduced by Fisher (1932), combining independent hypotheses into a single test statistic. According to Fisher, -2 times the log of a p-value follows the  $\chi^2$  distribution, where the sum of  $\chi^2$  distributed variables follows the same distribution.

Under the null hypothesis  $-2\sum_{i=1}^N \ln p_i$  is distributed as  $\chi^2_{2N}$ , with  $p_i$  being the p-values of the individual tests, and N being the number of events.

We therefore add dummies for individual leader changes (taken from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions) one at the time to the regression shown in column 1.<sup>24</sup> According to the Fisher test – aggregating the p-values of the test statistics for the individual events – both voting on key votes is indeed affected by leader changes, at the one percent level of significance.

In what follows, we test our hypotheses focusing on the net effect of leader changes. Column 2 of Table 1 therefore adds a dummy variable for leadership changes to the basic regression. Our findings suggest that leadership change is indeed associated with an increase in voting with the United States on key UN votes. This result, along with the Fisher Test, leads us to reject Hypothesis 1. The result is, however, well in line with Hypothesis 3. While the Fisher test shows that leader replacements significantly affect UN key voting, the regression results of Column 2 show that these changes are systematically in favor of the U.S.

Column 3 tests for the robustness of this result to the exclusion of variables that are not significant at the ten percent level at least. While the t-statistic of the coefficient of leader changes declines somewhat (and the number of observations increases by more than 200), it is still significant at the ten percent level.

In Figure 2 we showed the changing pattern in Bulgaria's UNGA voting after the Cold War. Are our results being driven by this major change in the structure of the international system? In column 4 we restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period. Our empirical results are similar. UNGA voting in line with the U.S. remains significantly more likely

---

<sup>24</sup> As Keefer (2002: 6) points out, "some decision rule is needed to deal with partial years." The Database of Political Institutions uses the following to count the number of years the leader has been in office: "years are counted in which the executive was in power as of January 1 or was elected but hadn't taken office as of January 1. Thus, a "1" is recorded in the year following his/her election. Example: Bush was president as of January 1, 1992, so although he lost the election in November 1992, this variable is recorded as a 4 in 1992, marking Bush's fourth year in office. Although Clinton was elected in November of 1992 and took office in January 1993, since he was president-elect on January 1 1993, this variable is recorded as "1" for 1993." We take values of one to be the years of leader changes.

following leader changes in the post-Cold War period, at the five percent level of significance.

A potential problem with these results is that the within groups estimator is biased and inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable in a short panel (Nickell 1981). In column 5 we take account of this potential bias and employ the system GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The dynamic panel GMM estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent data. Results are based on the two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2005) in Stata, including Windmeijer's (2005) finite sample correction. We apply the Sargan-Hansen test on the validity of the instruments used (amounting to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates) and the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation, which must be absent from the data in order for the estimator to be consistent. We follow Roodman (2006) and include time dummies in the regression. In order to minimize the number of instruments we do not use lags beyond lag length four.<sup>25</sup>

Column 5 shows that our results are not affected by the choice of estimator. While the Sargan-Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test do clearly not reject the specification at conventional levels of significance, the impact of leader changes remains significant at the ten percent level, with a positive coefficient. Surprisingly, voting coincidence becomes more, rather than less likely with higher per capita GDP, according to the GMM specification.

#### Insert Table 2

These empirical results lead us to firmly reject Hypothesis 1, that leadership change has no impact on UNGA voting. To the contrary, we can not reject Hypothesis 3, claiming that new leaders will on average be more likely to vote in line with the U.S. on key votes. What accounts for this pattern in voting? Our second hypothesis points to changing domestic preferences as one mechanism. For this theory to hold, we should observe a similar shift in the voting on non-key UNGA voting.

In Table 2 we present the same set of regressions, yet this time we focus only on non-key votes. As outlined in the introduction, we expect UNGA voting on non-key votes to reflect domestic policy preferences. While these might arguably shift with leadership changes, such shifts will not be related to the punishment mechanism outlined above. As a first test, we again included dummies for each individual leader change to the specification shown in

---

<sup>25</sup> It is necessary to limit the number of instruments because the power of the Sargan-Hansen test is low when many instruments are used (see Bowsher 2002).

column 1, relating the variables of the baseline model to voting on non-key votes. In line with the results for key votes, we do find that leadership matters, at the one percent level of significance. As such, we can reject Hypothesis 2. However, is this change in voting patterns systematically in favor of the U.S., as for key votes above? Column 2 addresses this question by adding *eth* dummy for leadership changes to the base model of column 1.

As is evident from the table, while our models are good predictors of non-key votes, leadership change has no systematic impact on voting with the United States on non-key votes. The table also shows that this holds according to any of the specifications replicating Table 1 above. Apparently, contrasting this result with those of the Fisher Test, positive and negative changes in the wake of leader changes cancel themselves out, rendering the overall result not significant at conventional levels. While policies do change, these changes are not systematically positive or negative with respect to the U.S. position.

### Insert Table 3

In our third set of regressions we examine the robustness of leadership change on UN voting on key-votes, and combine some of the elements of Tables 1 and 2, focusing on the consistent GMM estimator. In column 1 we include the average UN voting for the  $n-1$  other countries. While the average level of voting for the U.S. influences an individual country's UN voting, leadership changes still increase a country's voting with the U.S. We also tested this average UN voting in the OLS models from Table 1, again finding strong evidence that UNGA voting on key votes is affected by leadership change.

In column 2 we include a country's voting on non-key issues as an independent variable, thus proxying for a country's preferences. We omit the lagged dependent variable from this specification, in order to avoid the complex dynamics associated with past correlations between these variables. The dummy for leadership change is significant at the one percent level according to these estimates. Thus, while voting on non-key UN votes is a significant predictor of voting on key UNGA votes, leadership change is still associated with a changing pattern of key votes. Note, however, that the Arellano-Bond test rejects the hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation, casting doubts on the reliability of the estimates.

In columns 3 and 4 we test for changes in the partisanship and the level of democracy. Partisanship is coded from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions where changes from right or center executives to leftist executives is coded as a 1, changes from left government to right or center government as -1, and all other changes (or lack of leader changes) as zero. Changes in democracy are measured with the one year change in the Polity

regime score. Liberal scholarship focuses on the role of domestic politics on international relations. One specific contribution is the democratic peace literature where the form of government, specifically democracy, can lead to higher levels of cooperation across governments through the absence of war or increased commerce.<sup>26</sup> Whether this is due to democracies having similar interests, or institutional features that affect state behavior, we hypothesize that democratic regimes are more likely to vote in line with the U.S.

The results also show that leftist regimes are associated with decreases in voting with the U.S. on key UN votes and that increases in democracy are associated with increases in voting with the United States. In both cases, our overall measure of leadership change is again associated with increases in voting with the U.S.

The final column of Table 3 replaces the dummy for leadership with the number of years a country's chief executive has been in power in a particular year, again taken from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions. As we argue above, we expect leaders with tarnished reputations will be replaced by new leaders with untarnished reputations. We expect that leaders that have already reneged (voted against the U.S.) have little incentive to vote in line with the U.S., while new leaders have the incentive to vote in line with the U.S.. Thus while some "old" leaders may continue to cooperate with the United States, all new leaders have the incentive to protect their reputation. Our results show that UNGA voting coincidence decreases with the number of years a politician stays in office, at the one percent level of significance.

These empirical results point to not only the importance of leadership change in affecting UNGA voting, they also consistently find a positive relationship. New leaders are associated with an increase in voting in line with the U.S. on key votes. The fact that we do not observe a similar pattern in the non-key votes leads us to reject the idea that leadership change simply reflects policy change.

In the theory section we outlined our hypothesis, related to the work of McGillivray and Smith (2004, 2008) where individual leaders that consistently vote against the U.S. are replaced with new leaders. While a test of leadership survival is out of the scope of this paper, one direct test of this is that leaders that vote against the U.S. on key UNGA votes are more likely to be removed from office than other leaders. We leave this to future research.

Insert Table 4

Thus far our empirical analysis has shown that leadership change leads to increasing coincidence of voting with the U.S. in the UNGA. We interpret this as evidence for how

---

<sup>26</sup> See Oneal and Russett (1999) for an examination of democracy and peace. See Gartzke (2000) for an overview and an alternative explanation for the democratic peace that focuses on shared preferences.

endogenous leadership change causes leaders with lower levels of UNGA voting coincide with the U.S. to be replaced with leaders that vote in line with the U.S. in the UNGA. One possible alternative theory also consistent with this result is that there is some other factor that leads “new” leaders to vote in line with the U.S. Our final empirical test examines the impact of exogenous leadership changes on UNGA voting by exploiting data on accidental leadership deaths by Jones and Olken (2005). The results are shown in Table 4, replicating the regressions shown in Table 1 above. Using accidental leader deaths as the variable for “leader change” we find no statistically significant relationship between exogenous leader change and UNGA voting. This provides further evidence for how endogenous leadership change affects relations with the United States.

## **6. Conclusion**

In this paper we examine the relationship between leadership changes and voting in the UN General Assembly. Our empirical analysis focuses on how voting with the United States on key issues is influenced by changes in individual leaders. We find that a host of factors influence UN voting, yet we find that new leaders vote more consistently with the United States than existing leaders. These findings have important implications for how individual leaders affect relations between states.

Our results build on recent work on the role of leaders in international relations. Individual leaders, attempting to survive in office, have incentives to cater to domestic interest groups and to protect their own international reputations. While all leaders share these incentives, we argue that leadership change is likely to lead to closer alignment with the United States. We use voting in the United Nations General Assembly on key votes as a proxy for this relationship, but we believe that these are generalizable to other arenas.

In future work we will address the mechanisms that influence UNGA voting, most prominently foreign aid. While the existing literature has found a strong relationship between UNGA voting coincidence with the U.S. and U.S. foreign aid, we believe that by bringing in leader specific theories and empirics we can contribute to this literature. Specifically, we expect that U.S. foreign aid allocations will be conditioned on the reputation of the individual leaders. Thus leaders that deviate from the U.S. in the UNGA will be punished by the U.S. until the leader is replaced. New leaders then will receive generous allocations of foreign aid until the leader deviates from the U.S. UNGA position. Thus rather than U.S. aid being conditional on a *country's* voting record in the UNGA, we believe that U.S. aid should be conditional on a *leader's* voting record in the UNGA. We leave this for future research.

## References

- Adolph, Christopher A. 2004. The Dilemma of Discretion: Career Ambitions and the Politics of Central Banking, PhD Thesis, Harvard University.
- Andersen, Thomas B., Henrik Hansen and Thomas Markussen. 2006. US politics and World Bank IDA-lending. *Journal of Development Studies* 42, 5: 772-794.
- Anderson, Thomas B., Thomas Harr and Finn Tarp. 2006. On US politics and IMF lending. *European Economic Review* 50: 1843-1862.
- Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond. 1991. Some Tests for Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. *Review of Economic Studies* 58(2): 277-297.
- Arellano, Manuel and Olympia Bover. 1995. Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-components Models. *Journal of Econometrics* 68(1): 29-51.
- Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. 2005. IMF-Programs: Who Is Chosen and What are the Effects? *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52: 1245-1269.
- Baum, Matthew A. 2002. The Constituency Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon. *International Studies Quarterly* 46: 263-298.
- Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. *World Bank Economic Review* 15, 1: 165-176.
- Bernstein, Samuel J. and Eugene J. Alpert. 1971. Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in the United Nations: The Admission of Communist China. *Orbis* 15, 3: 963-977.
- Besley, Timothy, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao. 2005. Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India, CEPR Discussion Paper 5201.
- Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond. 1998. Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models, *Journal of Econometrics* 87(1): 115-143.
- Bowsher, Clive G. 2002. On Testing Overidentifying Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models. *Economics Letters* 77(2): 211-220.
- Brams, Steven J. and Michael K. O'Leary. 1970. An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies. *American Political Science Review* 64: 449-470.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Chiozza, Giacomo and Ajin Choi. 2003. Guess Who Did What: Political Leaders and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47 (3): 251-78.
- Chiozza, Giacomo and H.E. Goemans. 2004. International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient? *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 604-619.
- Dixon, Willam J. 1981. The Emerging Image of U.N. Politics. *World Politics* 34 (1): 47-61.
- Dreher, Axel and Nathan M. Jensen. 2007. Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions, *Journal of Law and Economics* 50, 1: 105-124.

- Dreher, Axel and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2006. Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly? KOF Working Paper 137, ETH Zurich.
- Dreher, Axel, Rainer Thiele and Peter Nunnenkamp. 2008. Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis, *Public Choice* 136 (1): 139-164.
- Dreher, Axel, Michael J. Lamla, Sarah M. Lein and Frank Somogyi. Forthcoming. The Impact of Political Leaders' Profession and Education on Reforms. *Journal of Comparative Economics*.
- Fisher, R.A. 1932. *Statistical Methods for Research Workers*. Oliver and Boyd: Edinburgh.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2000. Preferences and the Democratic Peace. *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2): 191-212.
- Gartzke, Erik and Dong-Joon Jo. 2002. United Nations General Assembly Voting, 1946-1996, version 3.0. <http://www.columbia.edu/~eg589/datasets>.
- Gassebner, Martin, Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jochen Mierau. 2007. Terrorism and Cabinet Duration: An Empirical Analysis. KOF Working Paper 181, ETH Zurich.
- Gassebner, Martin, Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jochen Mierau. 2008. Terrorism and Electoral Accountability: One Strike, You're Out! *Economics Letters* 100 (1): 126-129.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Göhlmann, Silja and Roland Vaubel. 2007. The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation – An Empirical Analysis, *European Economic Review* 51, 4: 925-42.
- Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith. 2002. Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2): 175-200.
- Horowitz, Michael, Rose McDermott and Allan C. Stam. 2005. Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (5): 661-85.
- Jensen, Nathan M. 2006. *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. Princeton University Press.
- Jensen, Nathan M. 2008. Political Regimes and Political Risk: Democratic Institutions and Expropriation Risk for Multinational Investors. *Journal of Politics* 70 (4): 1040-1052.
- Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken. 2005. Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120 (3): 835-864.
- Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken. Forthcoming. Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*.
- Kato, Masakatsu. 1969. A Model of US Foreign Aid Allocation: An Application of a Rational Decision-Making Scheme. In: John E. Mueller (ed.), *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations*, Appleton Century Croft, New York.
- Keefer, Philip. 2002. DPI2000 Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
- Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Steven W. Hook. 1991. U.S. Foreign Aid and U.N. Voting: Did Reagan's Linkage Strategy Buy Defence or Defiance? *International Studies Quarterly* 35, 3: 295-312.



- Kilby, Christopher. 2008. Donor influence in International Financial Institutions: Deciphering what alignment measures measure, Paper presented at the Second Conference International Political Economy of International Organizations, January 2009, Geneva.
- Kim, Soo Yeon and Bruce Russett. 1996. The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization* 50 (4): 629-652.
- Lundborg, Per. 1998. Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange, *Economics & Politics* 10, 2: 127-142.
- Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jagers. 2003. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2004. The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Among States. *International Organization* 58 (3): 567-600.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2006. Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility. *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 248-58.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2008. *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mikosch, Heiner F. and Frank Somogyi. 2008. Personality and Policy: The Impact of Political Leaders' Education and Profession on Public Finance, ETH Zurich, mimeo.
- Morey, Daniel and Brian Lai. 2003. Liberalism, Realism, and United Nations Voting: An Empirical Test of Contending Theories, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, mimeo.
- Mueller, John E. 1973. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Nickell, S. J. 1981. Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. *Econometrica*, 49, 1417-1426.
- Oatley, Thomas and Jason Yackee. 2004. American Interests and IMF Lending. *International Politics* 41, 3: 415-429.
- Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. 1999. The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992. *World Politics* 52 (1): 1-37.
- Palmer, Glenn, Scott Wohlander and T. Clifton Morgan. 2002. Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability. *Journal of Peace Research* 39: 5-26.
- Pande, Rohini. 2003. Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India. *American Economic Review* 93, 4: 1132-1151.
- Rai, Kul B. 1972. Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly. *International Organization* 26, 3: 589-594.
- Roodman, David. 2005. xtabond2: Stata Module to Extend xtabond Dynamic Panel Data Estimator. Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C. <http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s435901.htm>.
- Roodman, David. 2006. How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to "Difference" and "System" GMM in Stata, Center for Global Development Working Paper 103.
- Russett, Bruce M. 1967. *International Regions and the International System*, Rand McNally & Company, Chicago.

- Schaefer, Brett D. and Anthony B. Kim. 2008. How Do U.S. Foreign Aid Recipients Vote at the U.N.? Against the U.S. *Backgrounders* No. 2171.
- Sexton, Edwin A. and Terence N. Decker. 1992. U.S. Foreign Aid: Is It for Friends, Development or Politics, *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 17, 3 & 4: 303-315.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey. 1972. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965. In: Bruce Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills, Sage: 19-48.
- Smith, Alastair and James R. Vreeland. 2003. The Survival of Political Leaders and IMF Programs: Testing the Scapegoat Hypothesis. In: G. Ranis, J. R. Vreeland and S. Kosack, eds., *Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the IMF and the World Bank* (Routledge, New York) 263-289.
- Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98, 4: 577-592.
- Thacker, Strom C. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. *World Politics* 52: 38-75.
- Thies, Cameron G. 2004. Individuals, Institutions, and Inflation: Conceptual Complexity, Central Bank Independence, and the Asian Crisis. *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (3): 579-602.
- U.S. Department of State. 1985. Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations, Washington, D.C.
- U.S. Department of State. Various years. Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations, Washington, D.C.
- Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the Assembly. *International Organization* 54, 2: 185-215.
- Voeten, Erik. 2004. Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly, Political Science and International Affairs, The George Washington University.
- Wang, T.Y. 1999. US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues, *International Studies Quarterly* 43, 1: 199-210.
- Washington, Ebonya. 2006. Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers' Voting on Women's Issues, NBER Working Paper No. 11924.
- Windmeijer, Frank. 2005. A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient Two-step GMM Estimators. *Journal of Econometrics* 126, 1: 25-51.
- Wittkopf, Eugene. 1973. Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study. *American Political Science Review* 67, 3: 868-888.
- Wolford, Scott. 2007. The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (4): 772-788.
- World Bank. 2005. The Political Economy of Gram Panchayats in South India: Results and Policy Conclusions From a Research Project, Washington DC.
- World Bank. 2007. World Development Indicators, CD-Rom. Washington, DC.
- Zimmermann, Robert. 1993. *Dollars, Diplomacy and Dependency – Dilemmas of U.S. Economic Aid*, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., Colorado.

**Table 1: Leadership Change and UN Key Votes, 1984-2005**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UN vote (t-1)	0.317 (10.91)***	-0.034 (10.97)***	0.304 (10.81)***	-0.188 (5.73)***	0.674 (24.02)***
Political color inline	0.005 (0.69)	0.005 (0.70)			
Absence of Corruption	0.008 (3.21)***	0.008 (3.23)***	0.014 (5.32)***	0.003 (0.32)	0.005 (2.41)**
GDP p.c. (t-1)	-0.035 (1.93)*	0.316 (1.84)*	-0.095 (3.59)***	-0.092 (1.10)	0.012 (3.36)***
GDP growth	-0.000 (0.66)	-0.000 (0.60)			
US imports	0.060 (0.70)	0.059 (0.69)			
Leader Change		0.015 (1.93)*	0.014 (1.70)*	0.043 (2.16)**	0.009 (1.73)*
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM
Sample	all	all	all	>1989	all
Number of countries	126	126	131	111	131
Number of observations	2291	2291	2536	718	2536
R-squared	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.03	
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)					0.25
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)					0.99

Note: Columns (1)-(4) include dummies for each country; column (5) includes dummies for each year; robust (clustered) t statistics in parentheses; \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

**Table 2: Leadership Change and UN Non-Key Votes, 1984-2005**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UN vote (t-1)	0.700 (33.17)***	-0.037 (6.15)***	0.679 (4.81)***	0.082 (2.61)**	0.946 (29.78)***
Political color inline	0.006 (1.92)*	0.006 (1.92)*			
Absence of Corruption	0.005 (6.63)***	0.005 (6.63)***	0.005 (6.53)***	0.004 (1.16)	0.000 (0.13)
GDP p.c. (t-1)	-0.037 (6.14)***	0.700 (33.12)***	-0.024 (36.83)***	-0.048 (0.95)	-0.000 (0.03)
GDP growth	-0.001 (3.83)***	-0.001 (3.84)***			
US imports	0.012 (0.66)	0.012 (0.66)			
Leader Change		-0.000 (0.13)	-0.001 (0.31)	0.005 (0.89)	-0.003 (1.02)
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM
Sample	all	all	all	>1989	all
Number of countries	126	126	131	111	131
Number of observations	2301	2301	2547	718	2547
R-squared	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.03	
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)					0.04
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)					0.99

Note: Columns (1)-(4) include dummies for each country; column (5) includes dummies for each year; \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

**Table 3: Leadership Change and UN Key Votes, tests for robustness, 1984-2005, GMM**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
UN vote (t-1)	0.631 (22.07)***		0.672 (21.48)***	0.708 (20.75)***	0.650 (18.45)***
Absence of Corruption	0.007 (3.06)***	0.007 (1.87)*	0.006 (2.85)***	0.002 (1.17)	0.004 (1.83)*
GDP p.c. (t-1)	0.013 (3.29)***	0.018 (4.36)***	0.012 (3.43)***	0.013 (3.84)***	0.014 (3.93)***
Leader Change	0.010 (1.81)*	0.012 (2.79)***	0.009 (1.76)*	0.011 (1.75)*	
Years in Office					-0.002 (3.10)***
Average UN vote	-0.040 (0.84)				
Non-Key Voting		0.782 (10.40)***			
Change to left government			-0.003 (0.39)		
Polity Change				0.002 (1.32)	
Number of countries	131	131	131	123	130
Number of observations	2536	2548	2536	2350	2526
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)	0.31	0.00	0.25	0.11	0.28
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)	1.00	0.99	0.98	1.00	0.99

Note: Dummy for each year included; t statistics in parentheses; \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

**Table 4: Leadership Death and UN Non-Key Votes, 1984-2005**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UN vote (t-1)	0.317 (10.92)***	0.305 (10.78)***	-0.188 (5.76)***	0.012 (21.54)***
Political color inline	0.005 (0.70)			
Absence of Corruption	0.008 (3.21)***	0.014 (5.31)***	0.003 (0.30)	0.005 (2.37)**
GDP p.c. (t-1)	-0.035 (1.92)*	-0.096 (3.68)***	-0.088 (1.10)	0.682 (3.37)***
GDP growth	-0.000 (0.63)			
US imports	0.060 (0.70)			
Leader Death	0.011 (0.40)	0.007 (0.24)	-0.059 (1.11)	0.016 (0.61)
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM
Sample	all	all	>1989	all
Number of countries	126	131	111	131
Number of observations	2284	2536	718	2536
R-squared	0.13	0.13	0.03	
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)				0.22
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)				0.97

Note: Columns (1)-(3) include dummies for each country; column (4) includes dummies for each year; \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

## Appendix A: Sources and Definitions

Variable	Definition	Source
UN key vote	Votes in agreement with the U.S. are coded as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are divided by the total number of votes in each year. Key votes are votes deemed to be important by the U.S. Department of State.	Voeten (2004), U.S. Department of State (various years)
UN non-key vote	Votes in agreement with the U.S. are coded as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are divided by the total number of votes in each year. Non-key votes are votes not deemed to be important by the U.S. Department of State.	Voeten (2004), U.S. Department of State (various years)
Leader Change	Dummy for years in which the head of government is replaced.	Beck et al. (2001)
Leader Death	Dummy for years in which leaders died accidentally.	Jones and Olken (2005)
Years in Office	Counts the number of years the head of government has been in office in a particular country and year.	Beck et al. (2001)
Political color inline	Dummy indicating that a particular country's government has the same political color as the U.S. government (i.e., both left or both right).	Beck et al. (2001)
Absence of Corruption	Measures corruption in the political system as a threat to foreign investment based on the analysis of a worldwide network of experts, on a scale of 0-14.	ICRG
GDP p.c.	GDP per capita in constant 2000 US\$.	World Bank (2007)
GDP growth	Yearly GDP growth rate in percent.	World Bank (2007)
US imports	Imports of U.S. (as % recipient GDP).	OECD Stat. Compendium
Average UN vote	Average of all other countries' UNGA voting in a particular year.	Voeten (2004)
Change to left government	Dummy indicating a shift in the chief government party to the left.	Beck et al. (2001)
Polity Change	First difference in the Polity IV indicator of democracy.	Marshall and Jaggers (2003)

## Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
UN key vote	0.50	0.19	0.00	1.00
UN non-key vote	0.33	0.12	0.10	0.84
Leader Change	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Leader Death	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
Years in Office	7.31	7.95	1.00	46.00
Political color inline	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Absence of Corruption	6.39	2.58	0.17	12.33
GDP p.c.	7.63	1.57	4.03	10.83
GDP growth	3.40	5.26	-42.45	106.28
US imports	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.60
Average UN vote	0.47	0.16	0.00	0.65
Change to left government	0.00	0.22	-1.00	1.00
Polity Change	0.23	1.81	-15.00	16.00