Internet-Draft PSI-05 Financial Disclosure Integrity August 2026
Singh Expires 10 February 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-singh-apex-psi-05-02
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
K. Singh
Apex Intelligence Empire

PSI-05: Financial Disclosure Integrity

Abstract

PSI-05 defines a cryptographic attestation framework for financial disclosures, enabling third parties to recompute and verify company filings against their published figures. It establishes a public ledger of sealed financial statements, a verification protocol using RFC 8785 canonicalization with Ed25519 (classical) and ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum) signatures, and an API for querying reconciliation results. The framework supports ASX, NYSE, NSE, LSE, and Euronext filings.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 February 2027.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Public companies publish financial disclosures (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F, annual reports) that are legally binding but rarely independently verified. PSI-05 establishes a cryptographic framework where:

This creates a trust layer for financial data that is independent of the filing entity and quantum-resistant by design.

2. Terminology

Sealed Disclosure:
A financial document hashed with SHA-256 and signed with Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 hybrid scheme, recorded in the PSI public ledger.
Recomputation:
Independent calculation of disclosed figures from source data using the PSI reconciliation engine.
Variance:
Difference between published and recomputed figures, expressed as a percentage.
Ledger Entry:
A PSI-04 attestation recording the dual seal hash, timestamp, and source citation.
Hybrid Signature:
A cryptographic envelope containing both an Ed25519 signature (classical) and an ML-DSA-65 signature (post-quantum) over the same canonicalized document.

3. Cryptographic Framework

3.1. Canonicalization

All financial disclosures MUST be canonicalized using [RFC8785] (JSON Canonicalization Scheme) before hashing.

3.2. Hashing

The canonicalized document MUST be hashed with SHA-256.

3.3. Signing

The hash MUST be signed using a hybrid dual-signature scheme:

  1. Classical signature: Ed25519 [RFC8032]
  2. Post-quantum signature: ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204)

Both signatures MUST be included in the attestation bundle. Verifiers MUST validate at least one signature. Verifiers SHOULD validate both for maximum assurance.

The classical Ed25519 signature provides backwards compatibility with existing tooling. The ML-DSA-65 signature provides quantum resistance. The hybrid scheme ensures security against both classical and quantum adversaries.

Implementations SHOULD transition to ML-DSA-65 as the primary signature by 1 January 2028. Ed25519 alone is NOT quantum- resistant and SHOULD NOT be used without a post-quantum counterpart.

3.4. Ledger Recording

The dual signature, hash, timestamp, and source URL MUST be recorded in the PSI public ledger as a PSI-04 attestation [PSI04].

4. Verification Protocol

4.1. Recomputation Request

A verifier requests a company's financial disclosure via the PSI API:

GET /api/v1/companies/{ticker}/filings/{year}/{type}

Response includes the sealed document hash, dual signatures, and source citation.

4.2. Independent Recomputation

The verifier recomputes the disclosed figures from the source data and compares against the published figures.

4.3. Variance Detection

If variance exceeds a threshold (default: 0.1%), the verifier flags the discrepancy in the PSI ledger.

4.4. Public Verification Endpoint

Any party may verify a sealed disclosure via:

GET /api/v1/verify/{hash}

Response includes:

  • match: true/false
  • sealed_at: ISO 8601 timestamp
  • source: URL of original filing
  • recomputed_figures: JSON object
  • signatures: { ed25519: valid/invalid, ml_dsa_65: valid/invalid }

5. Ledger Structure

The PSI ledger maintains a registry of sealed disclosures:

{
  "company_id": "UBER",
  "filing_type": "10-K",
  "fiscal_year": 2025,
  "sealed_at": "2026-03-15T10:30:00Z",
  "hash": "a3f2e8...",
  "source": "https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/...",
  "signatures": {
    "ed25519": "base64-encoded-ed25519-signature",
    "ml_dsa_65": "base64-encoded-ml-dsa-65-signature"
  },
  "recomputed_at": "2026-08-09T20:40:00Z",
  "variance": 0.0003,
  "status": "verified"
}

6. API Endpoints

Five REST API endpoints are defined for the PSI ledger:

GET  /api/v1/companies                 List all companies with sealed disclosures
GET  /api/v1/companies/{ticker}/filings  Get all sealed filings for a company
GET  /api/v1/verify/{hash}               Verify a sealed disclosure hash
GET  /api/v1/ledger/stats                Total seals, companies, daily activity
POST /api/v1/seal                        Submit a new financial disclosure for sealing

The POST /api/v1/seal endpoint accepts a JSON body with company_id, filing_type, fiscal_year, document, and source_url. It returns the seal hash and both signatures (Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65).

7. Commercial Reuse

The PSI ledger is free to read and cite. Commercial reuse above 1,000 rows per year requires a royalty agreement with Rockyfilms888 Pty Ltd (ABN 71672237795). Royalty tiers:

Table 1
Tier Annual Row Threshold Per-Row Fee (AUD)
A <= 1,000 Free
B 1,001 - 100,000 $0.001
C > 100,000 $0.0001 (negotiable)

Exemptions: Personal research, academic citation, journalism, public-interest reporting, and regulatory compliance audits.

8. Security Considerations

9. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

10. References

[FIPS204]
NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", , <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final>.
[PSI04]
Singh, K., "PSI-04: Evidentiary Document Integrity", , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-singh-apex-psi-04/>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8554]
McGrew, D., Curcio, M., and S. Fluhrer, "Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures", RFC 8554, DOI 10.17487/RFC8554, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8554>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.

Author's Address

Kawaljeet Singh
Apex Intelligence Empire
Balaclava, Victoria
Australia