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ops SIDROPS security cryptography X.509 This document specifies a Canonical Cache Representation (CCR) content type for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). CCR is a DER-encoded data interchange format which can be used to represent various aspects of the state of a validated RPKI cache at a particular point in time. The CCR profile is a compact and versatile format well-suited for applications such as audit trails, analytics pipelines, and validated payload dissemination.

Introduction Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) operators often wish to analyze Certification Authority (CA) and Relying Party (RP) behavior by inspecting validation outcomes. To this end, Canonical Cache Representation (CCR) was developed to capture and archive RPKI validation states in a standardized data representation. CCR offers a compact and versatile format well-suited for applications such as audit trails, analytics pipelines, and validated payload dissemination. A validated cache contains all RPKI objects that the RP has verified to be valid according to the rules for validation (see , , ). CCR is a data interchange format using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER, ) which can be used to represent various aspects of the state of a validated cache at a particular point in time in a reproducible manner. This document formally specifies the CCR content type for use with the RPKI and provides test vectors.

History The format was initially designed to support comparative analysis of multiple RP instances using a variety of RPKI transport protocols (, , and ).

Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The Canonical Cache Representation content type The content of a CCR file is an instance of ContentInfo. The contentType for a CCR is defined as id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation, with Object Identifier (OID) 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.54. The content field contains an instance of RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation.

The Canonical Cache Representation content The content of a Canonical Cache Representation is formally defined as follows: RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation-2025 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiCCR-2025(TBD) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS CONTENT-TYPE, Digest, DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, SubjectKeyIdentifier FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268] { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ASID, ROAIPAddressFamily FROM RPKI-ROA-2023 -- in [RFC9582] { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) } CAS, PAS FROM RPKI-ASPA-2023 -- in [draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile] { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023(TBD) } CertificateSerialNumber, SubjectPublicKeyInfo FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } AccessDescription, KeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) } ; ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType CONTENT-TYPE.&id({ContentSet}), content [0] EXPLICIT CONTENT-TYPE.&Type({ContentSet}{@contentType}) } ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation, ... } ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation CONTENT-TYPE ::= { TYPE RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation } id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) ccr(54) } RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, hashAlg DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, producedAt GeneralizedTime, mfts [1] ManifestState OPTIONAL, vrps [2] ROAPayloadState OPTIONAL, vaps [3] ASPAPayloadState OPTIONAL, tas [4] TrustAnchorState OPTIONAL, rks [5] RouterKeyState OPTIONAL, ... } -- at least one of mfts, vrps, vaps, tas, or rks MUST be present ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mfts PRESENT } | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vrps PRESENT } | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vaps PRESENT } | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., tas PRESENT } | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., rks PRESENT } ) ManifestState ::= SEQUENCE { mis SEQUENCE OF ManifestInstance, mostRecentUpdate GeneralizedTime, hash Digest } ManifestInstance ::= SEQUENCE { hash Digest, size INTEGER (1000..MAX), aki KeyIdentifier, manifestNumber INTEGER (0..MAX), thisUpdate GeneralizedTime, locations SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AccessDescription, subordinates SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL } ROAPayloadState ::= SEQUENCE { rps SEQUENCE OF ROAPayloadSet, hash Digest } ROAPayloadSet ::= SEQUENCE { asID ASID, ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily } ASPAPayloadState ::= SEQUENCE { aps SEQUENCE OF ASPAPayloadSet, hash Digest } ASPAPayloadSet ::= SEQUENCE { customerASID CAS, providers SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF PAS } TrustAnchorState ::= SEQUENCE { skis SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, hash Digest } RouterKeyState ::= SEQUENCE { rksets SEQUENCE OF RouterKeySet, hash Digest } RouterKeySet ::= SEQUENCE { asID ASID, routerKeys SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF RouterKey } RouterKey ::= SEQUENCE { ski SubjectKeyIdentifier, spki SubjectPublicKeyInfo } END

version The version field contains the format version for the RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation structure, in this version of the specification it MUST be 0.

hashAlg The hashAlg field specifies the algorithm used to construct the message digests. This profile uses SHA-256 , therefore the OID MUST be 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 and the parameters field MUST be absent ().

producedAt The producedAt field contains a GeneralizedTime and indicates the moment in time the CCR was generated. For the purposes of this section, CCR generation begins once the RP's fetching and validation operations are completed.

State aspect fields Each CCR contains one or more fields representing particular aspects of the cache's state. Implementers should note the ellipsis extension marker in the RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation ASN.1 notation and anticipate future changes as new signed object types are standardized. Each state aspect generally consists of a sequence of details extracted from RPKI Objects of a specific type, along with a digest computed by hashing the aforementioned DER-encoded sequence, and optionally including some metadata.

ManifestState An instance of ManifestState represents the set of valid, current Manifests () in the cache. It contains three fields: mis, mostRecentUpdate, and hash.

ManifestInstance The mis field contains a SEQUENCE of ManifestInstance. There is one ManifestInstance for each current manifest. A manifest is nominally current until the time specified in nextUpdate, or until a manifest is issued with a greater manifestNumber (see ), or until a new manifest is issued with a new filename per the process described in section 2 of . A ManifestInstance is a structure consisting of the following fields:

hash

the hash of the represented DER-encoded manifest object

size

the size of the represented DER-encoded manifest object

aki

the manifest issuer's key identifier

manifestNumber

the manifest number contained within the manifest's eContent field

thisUpdate

the thisUpdate contained within the manifest's eContent field

locations

a sequence of AccessDescription instances from the manifest's End-Entity certificate's Subject Information Access extension

subordinates

a optional non-empty SEQUENCE of SubjectKeyIdentifier

The subordinates field represents the keypairs associated with the set of non-revoked, non-expired, validly signed, certification authority (CA) resource certificates subordinate to the manifest issuer. Each SubjectKeyIdentifier is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the resource certificate's Subject Public Key, as described in . The sequence elements of the subordinates field MUST be sorted in ascending order by interpreting each SubjectKeyIdentifier value as an unsigned 160-bit integer and MUST be unique with respect to each other. The sequence elements in the mis field MUST be sorted in ascending order by hash value contained in each instance of ManifestInstance and MUST be unique with respect to the other instances of ManifestInstance.

mostRecentUpdate The mostRecentUpdate is a metadata field which contains the most recent thisUpdate amongst all current manifests represented by the ManifestInstance structures. If the mis field contains an empty sequence, the mostRecentUpdate MUST be set to the POSIX Epoch ("19700101000000Z"). The above and the requirements in imply that mostRecentUpdate MUST precede or be equal to producedAt ().

hash The hash field contains a message digest computed using the mis value (encoded in DER format) as input message.

ROAPayloadState An instance of ROAPayloadState contains a field named rps which represents the current set of Validated ROA Payloads () encoded as a SEQUENCE of ROAPayloadSet instances ordered by ascending asID. The ROAPayloadSet structure is modeled after the RouteOriginAttestation (). The asID value in each instance of ROAPayloadSet MUST be unique with respect to other instances of ROAPayloadSet. The contents of the ipAddrBlocks field MUST appear in canonical form and ordered as defined in . The hash field contains a message digest computed using the rps value (encoded in DER format) as input message.

ASPAPayloadState An instance of ASPAPayloadState contains an aps field which represents the current set of deduplicated and merged ASPA payloads () value encoded as a SEQUENCE of ASPAPayloadSet instances ordered by ascending customerASID. The customerASID value in each instance of ASPAPayloadSet MUST be unique with respect to other instances of ASPAPayloadSet. The ASPAPayloadSet structure is modeled after the ProviderASSet (). The elements of providers MUST be ordered in ascending numerical order and MUST be unique (with respect to the other elements of providers). A PAS value of 0 can only be encoded in the providers field as a single item list, i.e., an element for AS 0 MUST NOT appear alongside any other elements. The hash field contains a message digest computed using the aps value (encoded in DER format) as input message.

TrustAnchorState An instance of TrustAnchorState represents the set of valid Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) resource certificates used by the relying party when producing the CCR. Each SubjectKeyIdentifier is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the TA's Subject Public Key, as described in . The skis field contains a sequence of Subject Key Identifiers (SKI) sorted in ascending order by interpreting the SKI value as an unsigned 160-bit integer. The hash field contains a message digest computed using the skis value (encoded in DER format) as input message.

RouterKeyState An instance of RouterKeyState contains an rksets field which represents the current set of valid BGPsec Router Keys encoded as a SEQUENCE of RouterKeySet instances. The asID value in each instance of RouterKeySet MUST be unique with respect to other instances of RouterKeySet. Instances of RouterKeySet are sorted by ascending value of asID. Instances of RouterKey are sorted by ascending value of ski by interpreting the SKI value as an unsigned 160-bit integer. The hash field contains a message digest computed using the rks value (encoded in DER format) as input message.

Use Cases This section describes a number of applications for the CCR format across different contexts.

Constructing Consistent Views on Distributed Data This section describes a use case for CCRs in the context of distributed systems. Assuming CAs issue Manifests in accordance with , a ManifestInstance can be considered a state-based Conflict-free Replicated Data Type (), meaning that ManifestInstance sets contain sufficient information to form a monotonic semilattice. The implication is that ManifestState instances from multiple CCRs produced by multiple different RPs at different times can safely be merged in order to construct an internally consistent view of the RPKI distributed database. The reconciled merge result can be useful, for example, as a backend for Erik Synchronization relays () which execute separate validation processes for different Trust Anchors and varying maximum certificate chain depths.

Data Collection Operators have an interest in determining how the global RPKI is viewed from the perspectives of several different locations around the Internet. As CCR allows for point-in-time capture and later reconstruction and analysis, it found use in multi-perspective collector methods such as described RPKISPOOL. An example of a large-scale CCR-based RPKI data archival project is .

Operational Considerations This section covers operational considerations.

CCR file integrity The integrity of a CCR file can be checked by confirming whether the hash value embedded inside each state aspect matches the computed hash value of the respective state aspect payload structure. Readers MUST verify the integrity of CCR files and stop further processing on failure.

Timing analysis The producedAt timestamp is not necessarily the current time used by the RP for the purposes of validating the RPKI content. In practice, most RPs interleave fetching and validation operations, with validation occurring with respect to whatever the time happens to be at that point (i.e., wall clock time). This means that it is possible for a CCR to include information that would have been excluded if validated at the time indicated by the producedAt timestamp. If the CCR is produced right after all relevant repository content was received and validated by an RP, then comparing the ManifestState mostRecentUpdate timestamp () value with the CCR producedAt timestamp () might help offer insight into the timing and propagation delays of the RPKI ecosystem.

Storage efficiency CCRs compress very well due to its data layout characteristics: the content contains repetitive sequences, does not contain high entropy data such as public keys, and is consistently ordered. Readers and writers of CCR data are RECOMMENDED to support data compression using Gzip () in context of durable storage.

Security Considerations The CCR format utilizes a structure that can store information about the state of a given RPKI cache at a particular moment in time. The fields defined in this specification are of a descriptive nature and provide information that is useful to facilitate the analysis of RPKI data. As such, these fields do not in themselves create additional security risks, since the fields are not used to induce any particular behavior by the recipient application. Readers MUST check contextual bounds on all fields appropriately and stop further processing on failure. E.g., the maxLength element in a ROAIPAddress cannot contain an integer smaller than the length of the accompanying prefix, the manifestNumber field is cannot be longer than 20 octets, etc. The CCR format contains no executable code, and it does not define any extensible areas that could be used to store such code. CCRs are not signed objects. RPKI information is normally public and does not call for confidentiality protection. Ascertaining the provenance (and thus authenticity) of any given CCR is out-of-scope for this document.

IANA Considerations

SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) IANA has allocated the following in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:

Decimal	Description	References
54	id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation	draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr

RPKI Repository Name Schemes IANA is requested to add the Canonical Cache Representation file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry as follows:

Filename Extension	RPKI Object	Reference
.ccr	Canonical Cache Representation	draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr

SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) IANA is requested to allocate the following in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:

Decimal	Description	References
TBD	id-mod-rpkiCCR-2025	draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr

Media Types IANA is requested to register the media types "application/rpki-ccr" and "application/rpki-ccr+gzip" in the "Media Types" registry as follows:

Canonical Cache Representation Media Type

Type name:

application

Subtype name:

rpki-ccr

Required parameters:

N/A

Optional parameters:

N/A

Encoding considerations:

binary

Security considerations:

This media type contains no active content.

Interoperability considerations:

N/A

Published specification:

draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr

Applications that use this media type:

RPKI operators

Fragment identifier considerations:

N/A

Additional information:

Content:

This media type is a RPKI Canonical Cache Representation object, as defined in draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr.

Magic number(s):

N/A

File extension(s):

.ccr

Macintosh file type code(s):

N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:

Job Snijders (job@bsd.nl)

Intended usage:

COMMON

Restrictions on usage:

N/A

Author:

Job Snijders (job@bsd.nl)

Change controller:

IETF

Type name:

application

Subtype name:

rpki-ccr+gzip

Content:

This media type is a Gzip compressed RPKI Canonical Cache Representation object, as defined in draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr.

Magic number(s):

N/A

File extension(s):

.ccr.gz

References:

RFC1952, RFC6713

Encoding considerations:

gzip is a binary encoding

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document describes the conventions for using the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) message digest algorithms (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). It also describes the conventions for using these algorithms with the CMS and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), and Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) signature algorithms. Further, it provides SMIMECapabilities attribute values for each algorithm. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard encapsulation format. [STANDARDS-TRACK] To help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis- announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security requirements is the ability to validate the origination Autonomous System (AS) of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A manifest is a signed object (file) that contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority responsible for publishing in the repository. For each certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed objects issued by the authority that are published at this repository publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content. Manifests are intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of attacks against a repository. Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can detect replay attacks, and unauthorized in-flight modification or deletion of signed objects. This document obsoletes RFC 6486. This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482. BSD Software Development Yandex JetLend Internet Initiative Japan Vigil Security, LLC Workonline This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected content type for Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its transit providers. When validated, an ASPA's eContent can be used for detection and mitigation of route leaks. National Institute of Standards and Technology ITU-T Informative References BSD Software Development Deutsche Telekom This document describes a format and data storage approach for materialization of RPKI data in order to support a range of use cases such as auditing Certification Authorities and analytical research. The rpkispool format can be used for high-latency replication of raw RPKI data and associated validation outcomes as efficiently compressed durable objects. The method uses widely available standardized tooling and is designed to support long-term preservation of RPKI data in a cost-effective way. BSD Software Development RIPE NCC APNIC JPNIC This document specifies the Erik Synchronization Protocol for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). Erik Synchronization can be characterized as a data replication system using Merkle trees, a content-addressable naming scheme, concurrency control using monotonically increasing sequence numbers, and HTTP transport. Relying Parties can combine information retrieved via Erik Synchronization with other RPKI transport protocols. The protocol's design is intended to be efficient, fast, easy to implement, and robust in the face of partitions or faults in the network. This specification defines a lossless compressed data format that is compatible with the widely used GZIP utility. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. This document specifies the rsync Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Certificate Authorities (CAs) publish certificates, including end-entity certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and RPKI signed objects to repositories. Relying Parties retrieve the published information from those repositories. This document specifies a new RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) for this purpose. RRDP was specifically designed for scaling. It relies on an Update Notification File which lists the current Snapshot and Delta Files that can be retrieved using HTTPS (HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS)), and it enables the use of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) or other caching infrastructures for the retrieval of these files. This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of Autonomous Systems (ASes) through which a BGP UPDATE message passes. BGPsec is implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that carries digital signatures produced by each AS that propagates the UPDATE message. The digital signatures provide confidence that every AS on the path of ASes listed in the UPDATE message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route.

Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank , , , and for their generous feedback on this specification.

The below is a Base64-encoded example CCR object. For a more elaborate example based on the global RPKI, see the URL in . MIIF9AYLKoZIhvcNAQkQATagggXjMIIF3zALBglghkgBZQMEAgEYDzIwMjYwNTE1MDAwM DEwWqGCAtUwggLRMIICmjCBmAQgKF60zgHHRNmQSUXcsAcAPB2cB7kvToWUF60GADJuG5 ECAgPpBBSi3wQv6LAAYxHolIUawRQRMHtgQwICEyEYDzIwMjYwNTE1MDAwMDA5WjBFMEM GCCsGAQUFBzALhjdyc3luYzovL2V4YW1wbGUubmV0L2NhNC9Ra3NiUVpNQzdZV3NOclJF dDRsNGRXQVExc0UubWZ0MIGYBCA8fzi045g3wS16tiKY4MxriwOP0eQx7JM3IKzL/1D/j wICB/gEFPrL0CykfjvZZm/L2COzfe3QvO4AAgICAxgPMjAyNjA1MTUwMDAwMDdaMEUwQw YIKwYBBQUHMAuGN3JzeW5jOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvY2EyL3owbnpWUzdTT0JfOXk2dGF wSGs3LVl1S2ttOC5tZnQwgZgEIL3nuZvothSocx8JXZLAtiF9FpVXBx1btwfKgDJ5Pv16 AgIPmwQU5zFepRXXwgU4aBJJ0+MNZ3cWJYUCAgUIGA8yMDI2MDUxNTAwMDAwOFowRTBDB ggrBgEFBQcwC4Y3cnN5bmM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9jYTMvc2JoRnp6NHdUcXNGbzJOVl JNOG1XZnNQQktRLm1mdDCBxgQg48JkKNPGfzSWjkALB4rFbaktXGSFaAV5qj0gj7zCCFY CAgbBBBQl+Mz878BG2NzQD8DkROCqe3kPlgICAQEYDzIwMjYwNTE1MDAwMDA2WjBFMEMG CCsGAQUFBzALhjdyc3luYzovL2V4YW1wbGUubmV0L2NhMS9PYVZVT0lEU2FMelViZWl6N lZQb2dYeHNLNW8ubWZ0MCwEFKLfBC/osABjEeiUhRrBFBEwe2BDBBTnMV6lFdfCBThoEk nT4w1ndxYlhRgPMjAyNjA1MTUwMDAwMDlaBCBjjUCOSmIWv8DNHb9zxwi1k6YgLC4hpk4 aph0pqidsEqKBoTCBnjB6MBUCAQAwEDAOBAIAATAIMAYDBADAAAIwLQIDAQAAMCYwEQQC AAEwCzAJAwQAxjNkAgEcMBEEAgACMAswCQMHACABDQgAADAYAgMBAA4wETAPBAIAAjAJM AcDBQA//wAAMBgCAwEADzARMA8EAgACMAkwBwMFAD//AAAEIJgOVAZ7JE7OekW9qMlKUN jkGdzgod7Fcobph5AfXVkCo1MwUTAtMAwCAwD7/zAFAgMA+/AwEQIDAQAAMAoCAwEABAI DAQAIMAoCAwEADjADAgEABCAnN98QySyKCzUlPnxJJT5iGrRQCLLbvCDdt4esCyUUU6RS MFAwLAQUJfjM/O/ARtjc0A/A5ETgqnt5D5YEFPrL0CykfjvZZm/L2COzfe3QvO4ABCAO5 kLEyVH4bH17eMAESlf9gYYe1a99AfW+q44/jdcDEaWCAZcwggGTMIIBbTCB7gIDAP5jMI HmMHEEFIjF3ilaMnbWnpu3RpvUbvly3jKsMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgA E64mxtNmdKd1bxIjgWrGJutr11LDeA56L8cc1NLL/WW9RZ+rbi+G4rFSvfrEjxzRPt6tc NWpgEINq7tOR7J5dAjBxBBS+FudOEPS98/jCYYsCSpRX37+J+jBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGC CqGSM49AwEHA0IABCo6kzaMUiyt1JyzDY9gHTf+bJOUiE52FiuXvyXmypSTxRcZgazl1k Moo0UARRbrOxrSyyGQWIKeCv7vKNvw+IowegIDAQAPMHMwcQQURgK2IbAXaB5h7h9KXvw dAsO0bywwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAThe3r51EOGOYfRBWZeVQ+d0l5f LOUxyxyjpaSuMF/o2hfqBhqERKAKbrvGQErhnGG8JlEVYvGofxyBP8+C+X3jBCCfSt7Zy MVIWZ18hjoqeDkmVGKSbWfe4VJZrVgJs5v/FA== It decodes as follows: =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ File: example.ccr Hash identifier: 8mdCrklrbLHKzDVr5fFbsGK4fyJsArmsGeLShZhRyio= CCR produced at: Fri 15 May 2026 00:00:10 +0000 Manifest state hash: Y41AjkpiFr/AzR2/c8cItZOmICwuIaZOGqYdKaonbBI= Manifest last update: Fri 15 May 2026 00:00:09 +0000 Manifest instances: hash:48JkKNPGfzSWjkALB4rFbaktXGSFaAV5qj0gj7z\ CCFY= size:1729 aki:25F8CCFCEFC046D8DCD00FC0E444E0AA7B790F96 seqnum:\ 0101 thisupdate:1778803206 sia:rsync://example.net/ca1/OaVUOIDSaLzUb\ eiz6VPogXxsK5o.mft subordinates:A2DF042FE8B0006311E894851AC11411307B\ 6043,E7315EA515D7C20538681249D3E30D6777162585 hash:KF60zgHHRNmQSUXcsAcAPB2cB7kvToWUF60GADJ\ uG5E= size:1001 aki:A2DF042FE8B0006311E894851AC11411307B6043 seqnum:\ 1321 thisupdate:1778803209 sia:rsync://example.net/ca4/QksbQZMC7YWsN\ rREt4l4dWAQ1sE.mft hash:vee5m+i2FKhzHwldksC2IX0WlVcHHVu3B8qAMnk\ +/Xo= size:3995 aki:E7315EA515D7C20538681249D3E30D6777162585 seqnum:\ 0508 thisupdate:1778803208 sia:rsync://example.net/ca3/sbhFzz4wTqsFo\ 2NVRM8mWfsPBKQ.mft hash:PH84tOOYN8EterYimODMa4sDj9HkMeyTNyCsy/9\ Q/48= size:2040 aki:FACBD02CA47E3BD9666FCBD823B37DEDD0BCEE00 seqnum:\ 0203 thisupdate:1778803207 sia:rsync://example.net/ca2/z0nzVS7SOB_9y\ 6tapHk7-YuKkm8.mft ROA payload state hash: mA5UBnskTs56Rb2oyUpQ2OQZ3OCh3sVyhumHkB9dWQI= ROA payload entries: 192.0.2.0/24 AS 0 198.51.100.0/24-28 AS 65536 2001:d08::/48 AS 65536 3fff::/32 AS 65550 3fff::/32 AS 65551 ASPA payload state hash:JzffEMksigs1JT58SSU+Yhq0UAiy27wg3beHrAslFFM= ASPA payload entries: customer: 64511 providers: 64496 customer: 65536 providers: 65540, 65544 customer: 65550 providers: 0 Trust anchor state hash:DuZCxMlR+Gx9e3jABEpX/YGGHtWvfQH1vquOP43XAxE= Trust anchor keyids: 25F8CCFCEFC046D8DCD00FC0E444E0AA7B790F96, FA\ CBD02CA47E3BD9666FCBD823B37DEDD0BCEE00 Router key state hash: n0re2cjFSFmdfIY6Kng5JlRikm1n3uFSWa1YCbOb/xQ= Router keys: asid:65123 ski:88C5DE295A3276D69E9BB7469BD46\ EF972DE32AC pubkey:MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE64mxtNmdKd1bx\ IjgWrGJutr11LDeA56L8cc1NLL/WW9RZ+rbi+G4rFSvfrEjxzRPt6tcNWpgEINq7tOR7\ J5dAg== asid:65123 ski:BE16E74E10F4BDF3F8C2618B024A9\ 457DFBF89FA pubkey:MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEKjqTNoxSLK3Un\ LMNj2AdN/5sk5SITnYWK5e/JebKlJPFFxmBrOXWQyijRQBFFus7GtLLIZBYgp4K/u8o2\ /D4ig== asid:65551 ski:4602B621B017681E61EE1F4A5EFC1\ D02C3B46F2C pubkey:MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE4Xt6+dRDhjmH0\ QVmXlUPndJeXyzlMcsco6WkrjBf6NoX6gYahESgCm67xkBK4ZxhvCZRFWLxqH8cgT/Pg\ vl94w== Validation: N/A

Implementation status This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist. According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

• Example .ccr files were created by Job Snijders. A current example CCR (regenerated every few minutes) is available here:
• A CCR serializer and deserializer implementation based on was provided by Job Snijders and Theo Buehler.
• Another CCR serializer, deserializer, and CRDT effector implementation based on was provided by Job Snijders.
• A CCR encoding and decoding implementation in Java library was provided by RIPE NCC.