Internet-Draft SSMTP July 2026
Hoffman & Levine Expires 21 January 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-hoflev-secure-smtp-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
P. Hoffman
ICANN
J. Levine
Standcore LLC

Secure SMTP

Abstract

SMTP [RFC5321] uses opportunistic TLS to optionally protect transport sessions. Secure SMTP uses mandatory TLS on all connections. It also provides a method for SMTP clients to locate Secure SMTP servers.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 January 2027.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

SMTP [RFC5321] has always been defined as an unencrypted protocol. The STARTTLS extension [RFC3207] allows an optional upgrade to TLS within an existing session.

Secure SMTP performs the TLS negotiation at the start of each session, so all traffic is encrypted.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Session protocol

Secure SMTP uses port TBD. To start a session, a Secure SMTP client connects to that port and negotiates a TLS connection. The client MUST use MTA-STS [RFC8461] or DANE for SMTP [RFC7672] to verify that it has connected to the intended server.

After the connection, the protocol is identical to SMTP.

3. Server discovery

Once a Secure SMTP client identifies a domain to which mail is to be delivered, it MUST do a DNS lookup to locate an MX record for the domain.

Secure SMTP servers are identified in an MX record by adding a _ssmtp prefix to the hostname of the server. The _ssmtp prefix is removed from the hostname before finding addresses associated with the secure SMTP server's address.

bigcorp.example. IN MX 10 _ssmtp.mail1.bigcorp.example.
                 IN MX 20 mail2.bigcorp.example.

In the example above, mail1.bigcorp.example is a Secure SMTP server, and mail2.bigcorp.example is a conventional SMTP server. If a server provides both conventional and Secure SMTP, two records identify the two services:

bigcorp.example. IN MX 10 _ssmtp.mail1.bigcorp.example.
                 IN MX 10 mail1.bigcorp.example.

The numerical priority is used to select a server in the same manner as conventional SMTP. If there is both a conventional and Secure SMTP server at the same priority, a client MAY prefer the Secure one, or it may do load levelling as it would for multiple conventional servers at the same priority.

Unlike conventional SMTP, there is no fallback to A or AAAA address records. A domain MUST publish an MX record with a _ssmtp prefix on the host name, to indicate that it supports Secure SMTP.

The prefix appears in the MX to identify the server but is not part of the server's hostname. Note that since hostnames cannot contain underscores, there is no conflict with conventional SMTP MX records.

4. Differences from SMTP

Secure SMTP servers MUST present a signed certificate that can be verified with MTA-STS, or a certificate that can be verified with DANE for SMTP, or preferably either way.

Secure SMTP allows all SMTP extensions except STARTTLS which is irrelevant.

When a mail server adds a Received: header field to an incoming message, it identifies the protocol as "with SSMTP" or "with SUTF8SMTP" depending on whether the session used SMTPUTF8.

5. Security considerations

Secure SMTP is functionally the same as conventional SMTP except that all sessions are encrypted with TLS and the servers' certificates are validated, which should deter interception and entity-in-the-middle attacks.

Messages are still stored in the clear on servers, so the same considerations about message encryption apply as for conventional SMTP.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate a port number for Secure SMTP.

IANA is requested to add the following entries to the Mail Transmission Types for the "Received:" Header Field Reference, in the WITH Protocol Types table:

SSMTP Secure SMTP

SUTF8SMTP Secure SMTP with SMTPUTF8

IANA is requested to add the following entry to the Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names registry.

MX _ssmtp [this document]

7. Implementation Status

Many MTAs provide secure submission on port 465. Often a configuation tweak will be enough to accept secure SMTP on a different port.

8. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5321]
Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.
[RFC7672]
Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672, DOI 10.17487/RFC7672, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7672>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8461]
Margolis, D., Risher, M., Ramakrishnan, B., Brotman, A., and J. Jones, "SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)", RFC 8461, DOI 10.17487/RFC8461, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8461>.

9. Informative References

[RFC3207]
Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, DOI 10.17487/RFC3207, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3207>.

Authors' Addresses

Paul Hoffman
ICANN
John Levine
Standcore LLC