Extended Key Update for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol provides forward secrecy by using an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) key exchange during the initial handshake. This ensures that encrypted communication remains confidential even if an attacker later obtains a party's long-term private key, protecting against passive adversaries who record encrypted traffic for later decryption.¶

TLS 1.3 also includes a KeyUpdate mechanism that allows traffic keys to be refreshed during an established session. However, this mechanism does not provide post-compromise security, as it applies only a key derivation function to the previous application traffic secret as input. While this design is generally sufficient for short-lived connections, it may present security limitations in scenarios where sessions persist for extended periods, such as in industrial IoT or telecommunications systems, where continuous availability is critical and session renegotiation or resumption is impractical.¶

Earlier versions of TLS supported session renegotiation, which allowed peers to negotiate fresh keying material, including performing new Diffie-Hellman exchanges during the session lifetime. Due to protocol complexity and known vulnerabilities, renegotiation was first restricted by [TLS-RENEGOTIATION] and ultimately removed in TLS 1.3. While the KeyUpdate message was introduced to offer limited rekeying functionality, it does not fulfill the same cryptographic role as renegotiation and cannot refresh long-term secrets or derive new secrets from fresh DHE input.¶

Security guidance from national agencies, such as ANSSI (France [ANSSI]), recommends the periodic renewal of cryptographic keys during long-lived sessions to limit the impact of key compromise. This approach encourages designs that force an attacker to perform dynamic key exfiltration, as defined in [CONFIDENTIALITY]. Dynamic key exfiltration refers to attack scenarios where an adversary must repeatedly extract fresh keying material to maintain access to protected data, increasing operational cost and risk for the attacker. In contrast, static key exfiltration, where a long-term secret is extracted once and reused, poses a greater long-term threat, especially when session keys are not refreshed with fresh key exchange input rather than key derivation.¶

This specification defines a TLS extension that introduces an extended key update mechanism. Unlike the standard key update, this mechanism allows peers to perform a fresh Diffie-Hellman exchange within an active session using one of the groups negotiated during the initial handshake. By periodically rerunning (EC)DHE, this extension enables the derivation of new traffic secrets that are independent of prior key material. As noted in Appendix F of [TLS], this approach mitigates the risk of static key exfiltration and shifts the attacker burden toward dynamic key exfiltration.¶

The proposed extension is applicable to both TLS 1.3 [TLS] and DTLS 1.3 [DTLS]. For clarity, the term "TLS" is used throughout this document to refer to both protocols unless otherwise specified.¶

2. Terminology and Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

To distinguish the key update procedure defined in [TLS] from the key update procedure specified in this document, we use the terms "standard key update" and "extended key update", respectively.¶

In this document, we use the term post-compromise security, as defined in [CCG16]. We assume that an adversary may obtain access to the application traffic secrets but is unable to compromise the long-term secret.¶

3. Negotiating the Extended Key Update

Client and servers use the TLS flags extension [TLS-FLAGS] to indicate support for the functionality defined in this document. We call this flag "Extended_Key_Update" flag.¶

The "Extended_Key_Update" flag proposed by the client in the ClientHello (CH) MUST be acknowledged in the EncryptedExtensions (EE), if the server also supports the functionality defined in this document and is configured to use it.¶

If the "Extended_Key_Update" flag is not set, servers ignore any of the functionality specified in this document and applications that require post-compromise security will have to initiate a full handshake.¶

4. Extended Key Update Messages

If the client and server agree to use the extended key update mechanism, the standard key update MUST NOT be used. In this case, the extended key update fully replaces the standard key update functionality.¶

Implementations that receive a classic KeyUpdate message after successfully negotiating the Extended Key Update functionality MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.¶

The extended key update messages are signaled in a new handshake message named ExtendedKeyUpdate (EKU), with an internal uint8 message subtype indicating its role. This specification defines three ExtendedKeyUpdate message subtypes:¶

• key_update_request (0)¶

• key_update_response (1)¶

• new_key_update (2)¶

New ExtendedKeyUpdate message subtypes are assigned by IANA as described in Section 12.3.¶

A TLS peer which receives a ExtendedKeyUpdate with an unexpected message subtype MUST abort the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.¶

The extended key update process can be initiated by either peer after it has sent a Finished message. Implementations that receive an ExtendedKeyUpdate message prior to the sender having sent Finished MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.¶

The KeyShareEntry carried in a key_update_request and in a key_update_response MUST use the group that was negotiated by the client and server during the initial handshake. An implementation that receives an algorithm other than previously negotiated MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.¶

Figure 1 shows the interaction graphically. First, support for the functionality in this specification is negotiated in the ClientHello and the EncryptedExtensions messages. Then, the ExtendedKeyUpdate exchange is sent to update the application traffic secrets.¶

The extended key update exchange is performed between the initiator and the responder; either the TLS client or the TLS server may act as initiator.¶

       Client                                           Server

Key  ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share
     | + signature_algorithms
     v + extended_key_update   -------->
                                                  ServerHello  ^ Key
                                                  + key_share  | Exch
                                                               v
                                        {EncryptedExtensions   ^ Server
                                       + extended_key_update}  | Params
                                         {CertificateRequest}  v
                                                {Certificate}  ^
                                          {CertificateVerify}  | Auth
                                                   {Finished}  v
                               <--------
     ^ {Certificate}
Auth | {CertificateVerify}
     v {Finished}              -------->
       [Application Data]N     <------->  [Application Data]N
                                  ...
  [EKU(key_update_request)]N   -------->
                               <--------  [EKU(key_update_response)]N
      [EKU(new_key_update)]N   -------->
                               <--------  [EKU(new_key_update)]N
                                  ...
       [Application Data]N+1   <------->  [Application Data]N+1

Legend:

    +   Indicates noteworthy extensions sent in the
    previously noted message.

    -   Indicates optional or situation-dependent
    messages/extensions that are not always sent.

    () Indicates messages protected using keys
    derived from a client_early_traffic_secret.

    {} Indicates messages protected using keys
    derived from a [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret.

    []N Indicates messages protected using keys
    derived from [sender]_application_traffic_secret_N.

The ExtendedKeyUpdate wire format is:¶

enum {
   key_update_request(0),
   key_update_response(1),
   new_key_update(2),
   (255)
} ExtendedKeyUpdateType;

struct {
   ExtendedKeyUpdateType eku_type;
   select (eku_type) {
      case key_update_request: {
          KeyShareEntry key_share;
      }
      case key_update_response: {
          KeyShareEntry key_share;
      }
      case new_key_update: {
          /* empty */
      }
   };
} ExtendedKeyUpdate;

Fields:¶

• eku_type: the subtype of the ExtendedKeyUpdate message.¶

• key_share: key share information. The contents of this field is determined by the specified group and its corresponding definition (see Section 4.2.8 of [TLS]).¶

5. TLS 1.3 Considerations

The following steps are taken by a TLS 1.3 implementation; the steps executed with DTLS 1.3 differ slightly.¶

1. The initiator sends ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_request) carrying a KeyShareEntry. While an extended key update is in progress, the initiator MUST NOT initiate another key update.¶

2. Upon receipt, the responder sends its own KeyShareEntry in a ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_response) message. While an extended key update is in progress, the responder MUST NOT initiate another key update. The responder MAY defer sending a response if system load or resource constraints prevent immediate processing. In such cases, the response MUST be sent once sufficient resources become available.¶

3. Upon receipt of an ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_response) the initiator derives the new secrets from the exchanged key shares. The initiator then sends an empty ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) message to trigger the switch to the new keys.¶

4. After the initiator sends ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) it MUST update its send keys. Upon receipt of this message, the responder MUST update its receive keys and then send ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update), after which it MUST update its send keys.¶

5. After receiving the responder’s ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update), the initiator MUST update its receive keys.¶

Both sender and receiver MUST encrypt their ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) messages with the old keys. Both sides MUST ensure that the new_key_update encrypted with the old key is received before accepting any messages encrypted with the new key.¶

If TLS peers independently initiate the extended key update and the requests cross in flight, the ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_request) with the lower lexicographic order of the key_exchange value in KeyShareEntry MUST be ignored. This prevents each side from advancing keys by two generations. If the tie-break comparison yields equality (an event that should be impossible for genuine asymmetric key pairs), the endpoint MUST treat this as a protocol violation, send an "unexpected_message" alert, and close the connection.¶

The handshake framing uses a single HandshakeType for this message (see Figure 2).¶

      struct {
          HandshakeType msg_type;    /* handshake type */
          uint24 length;             /* bytes in message */
          select (Handshake.msg_type) {
              case client_hello:          ClientHello;
              case server_hello:          ServerHello;
              case end_of_early_data:     EndOfEarlyData;
              case encrypted_extensions:  EncryptedExtensions;
              case certificate_request:   CertificateRequest;
              case certificate:           Certificate;
              case certificate_verify:    CertificateVerify;
              case finished:              Finished;
              case new_session_ticket:    NewSessionTicket;
              case key_update:            KeyUpdate;
              case extended_key_update:   ExtendedKeyUpdate;
          };
      } Handshake;

       Client                                           Server

Key  ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share
     | + signature_algorithms
     v + extended_key_update
                             -------->
                                                  ServerHello  ^ Key
                                                  + key_share  | Exch
                                                               v
                                        {EncryptedExtensions   ^ Server
                                       + extended_key_update}  | Params
                                         {CertificateRequest}  v
                                                {Certificate}  ^
                                          {CertificateVerify}  | Auth
                                                   {Finished}  v
                               <--------
     ^ {Certificate}
Auth | {CertificateVerify}
     v {Finished}              -------->
                                  ...
                              some time later
                                  ...
 [EKU(key_update_request       -------->
       (with key_share))]
                               <-------- [EKU(key_update_response
                                           (with key_share))]
                                        # Server derives new secrets
# Client derives new secrets
        [EKU(new_key_update)]  -------->
# Client updates SEND keys here
                                    # Server updates RECEIVE keys here
                               <--------  [EKU(new_key_update)]
                                    # Server updates SEND keys here

# Client updates RECEIVE keys here

6. DTLS 1.3 Considerations

Unlike TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3 implementations must take into account that handshake messages are not transmitted over a reliable transport protocol.¶

Due to the possibility of an ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) message being lost and thereby preventing the sender of that message from updating its keying material, receivers MUST retain the pre-update keying material until receipt and successful decryption of a message using the new keys.¶

Due to packet loss and/or reordering, DTLS 1.3 peers MAY receive records from an earlier epoch. If the necessary keys are available, implementations SHOULD attempt to process such records; however, they MAY choose to discard them.The exchange has the following steps:¶

1. The initiator sends an ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_request) message, which contains a key share. While an extended key update is in progress, the initiator MUST NOT initiate further key updates. This message is subject to DTLS handshake retransmission, but delivery is only confirmed when the initiator either receives the corresponding ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_response) or an ACK.¶

2. Upon receipt, the responder sends its own KeyShareEntry in a ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_response) message. While an extended key update is in progress, the responder MUST NOT initiate further key updates. The responder MAY defer sending a response if system load or resource constraints prevent immediate processing. In such cases, the responder MUST acknowledge receipt of the key_update_request with an ACK and, once sufficient resources become available, retransmit the key_update_response until it is acknowledged by the initiator.¶

3. On receipt of ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_response) the initiator derives a secret key based on the exchanged key shares. This message also serves as an implicit acknowledgment of the initiator’s ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_request), so no separate ACK is required.¶

4. The initiator transmits an ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) message. This message is subject to DTLS retransmission until acknowledged.¶

5. Upon receiving ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update), the responder MUST update its receive keys and epoch value.¶

6. The responder acknowledges the received message by sending its own ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update).¶

7. After the initiator receives the responder’s ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update), the initiator MUST update its send key and epoch value. With the receipt of that message, the initiator MUST also update its receive keys.¶

8. The initiator MUST acknowledge the responder’s ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) with an ACK message.¶

9. On receipt of the ACK message, the responder updates its send key and epoch value. If this ACK is not received, the responder re-transmits its ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) until ACK is received. The key update is complete once this ACK is processed by the responder.¶

The handshake framing uses a single HandshakeType for this message (see Figure 4).¶

       enum {
           client_hello(1),
           server_hello(2),
           new_session_ticket(4),
           end_of_early_data(5),
           encrypted_extensions(8),
           request_connection_id(9),
           new_connection_id(10),
           certificate(11),
           certificate_request(13),
           certificate_verify(15),
           finished(20),
           key_update(24),
           extended_key_update(TBD),  /* new */
           message_hash(254),
           (255)
       } HandshakeType;

       struct {
           HandshakeType msg_type;    /* handshake type */
           uint24 length;             /* bytes in message */
           uint16 message_seq;        /* DTLS-required field */
           uint24 fragment_offset;    /* DTLS-required field */
           uint24 fragment_length;    /* DTLS-required field */
           select (msg_type) {
               case client_hello:          ClientHello;
               case server_hello:          ServerHello;
               case end_of_early_data:     EndOfEarlyData;
               case encrypted_extensions:  EncryptedExtensions;
               case certificate_request:   CertificateRequest;
               case certificate:           Certificate;
               case certificate_verify:    CertificateVerify;
               case finished:              Finished;
               case new_session_ticket:    NewSessionTicket;
               case key_update:            KeyUpdate;
               case extended_key_update:   ExtendedKeyUpdate;
               case request_connection_id: RequestConnectionId;
               case new_connection_id:     NewConnectionId;
           } body;
       } DTLSHandshake;

Client                            Server
(Initiator)                       (Responder)

  /---------------------------------------\
 |           Initial Handshake             |
  \---------------------------------------/

[C: tx=3, rx=3]                   [S: tx=3, rx=3]
[Application Data]               -------->
[C: tx=3, rx=3]                   [S: tx=3, rx=3]

[C: tx=3, rx=3]                   [S: tx=3, rx=3]
                                  <--------   [Application Data]
[C: tx=3, rx=3]                   [S: tx=3, rx=3]

  /---------------------------------------\
 |           Some time later ...           |
  \---------------------------------------/

[C: tx=3, rx=3]                   [S: tx=3, rx=3]
[EKU(key_update_request)]  -------->
                                  # no epoch change yet

                           <-------- [EKU(key_update_response)]
                                  # still old epochs

[EKU(new_key_update)]      -------->
# Sent under OLD epoch. Client does NOT bump yet.

# Step 6: responder bumps RECEIVE epoch on NKU-in:
# (rx:=rx+1; tx still old)
[C: tx=3, rx=3]                   [S: tx=3, rx=4]

                           <-------- [EKU(new_key_update)]
# Responder’s NKU is tagged with OLD tx (3).

# Epoch switch point:
# Step 8: initiator bumps BOTH tx and rx on NKU-in:
[C: tx=4, rx=4]                   [S: tx=3, rx=4]

[ACK] (tag=new)            -------->

# Step 10: responder bumps SEND epoch on ACK-in:
[C: tx=4, rx=4]                   [S: tx=4, rx=4]

                           <--------   [Application Data]
[C: tx=4, rx=4]                   [S: tx=4, rx=4]

[Application Data]         -------->
[C: tx=4, rx=4]                   [S: tx=4, rx=4]

+--------------------+----------------+--------------+
| Message            | Client tx/rx   | Server tx/rx |
+--------------------+----------------+--------------+
| APP ------------>  | 3/3 -> 3/3     | 3/3 -> 3/3   |
| <------------ APP  | 3/3 -> 3/3     | 3/3 -> 3/3   |
| req -------------> | 3/3 -> 3/3     | 3/3 -> 3/3   |
| <------------ resp | 3/3 -> 3/3     | 3/3 -> 3/3   |
| NKU  ------------> | 3/3 -> 3/3     | 3/3 -> 3/4   | <- step 6
| <------------- NKU | 3/3 -> 4/4     | 3/4 -> 3/4   | <- step 8
| ACK -------------> | 4/4 -> 4/4     | 3/4 -> 4/4   | <- step 10
| <------------- APP | 4/4 -> 4/4     | 4/4 -> 4/4   |
| APP -------------> | 4/4 -> 4/4     | 4/4 -> 4/4   |
+--------------------+----------------+--------------+

7. Updating Traffic Secrets

When the extended key update message exchange is completed both peers have successfully updated their application traffic secrets. The key derivation function described in this document is used to perform this update.¶

The design of the key derivation function for computing the next generation of application_traffic_secret is motivated by the desire to include¶

• a secret derived from the (EC)DHE exchange (or from the hybrid key exchange / PQ-KEM exchange),¶

• a secret that allows the new key exchange to be cryptographically bound to the previously established secret,¶

• the concatenation of the ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_request) and the ExtendedKeyUpdate(key_update_response) messages, which contain the key shares, binding the encapsulated shared secret ciphertext to IKM in case of hybrid key exchange, providing MAL-BIND-K-CT security (see [CDM23]), and¶

• new label strings to distinguish it from the key derivation used in TLS 1.3.¶

The following diagram shows the key derivation hierarchy.¶

       Main Secret N
             |
             v
       Derive-Secret(., "key derived", "")
             |
             v
 (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Main Secret N+1
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c ap traffic2",
             |                EKU(key_update_request) ||
             |                EKU(key_update_response))
             |                = client_application_traffic_secret_N+1
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s ap traffic2",
             |                EKU(key_update_request) ||
             |                EKU(key_update_response))
             |                = server_application_traffic_secret_N+1
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "exp main2",
             |                EKU(key_update_request) ||
             |                EKU(key_update_response))
             |                = exporter_main_secret_N+1
             |
             +-----> Derive-Secret(., "res main2",
             |                EKU(key_update_request) ||
             |                EKU(key_update_response))
                              = resumption_main_secret_N+1

During the initial handshake, the Main Secret is generated (see Section 7.1 of [TLS]). Since the Main Secret is discarded during the key derivation procedure, a derived value is stored. This stored value then serves as the input salt to the first key update procedure that incorporates the ephemeral (EC)DHE- established value as input keying material (IKM) to produce main_secret_{N+1}. The derived value from this new master secret serves as input salt to the subsequent key update procedure, which also incorporates a fresh ephemeral (EC)DHE value as IKM. This process is repeated for each additional key update procedure.¶

The traffic keys are re-derived from client_application_traffic_secret_N+1 and server_application_traffic_secret_N+1, as described in Section 7.3 of [TLS].¶

Once client_/server_application_traffic_secret_N+1 and its associated traffic keys have been computed, implementations SHOULD delete client_/server_application_traffic_secret_N and its associated traffic keys as soon as possible. Note: The client_/server_application_traffic_secret_N and its associated traffic keys can only be deleted after receiving the ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update) message.¶

When using this extension, it is important to consider its interaction with ticket-based session resumption. If resumption occurs without a new (EC)DH exchange that provides forward secrecy, an attacker could potentially revert the security context to an earlier state, thereby negating the benefits of the extended key update. To preserve the security guarantees provided by key updates, endpoints MUST either invalidate any session tickets issued prior to the key update or ensure that resumption always involves a fresh (EC)DH exchange.¶

If session tickets cannot be stored securely, developers SHOULD consider disabling ticket-based resumption in their deployments. While this approach may impact performance, it provides improved security properties.¶

8. Post-Quantum Cryptography Considerations

Hybrid key exchange refers to the simultaneous use of multiple key exchange algorithms, with the resulting shared secret derived by combining the outputs of each. The goal of this approach is to maintain security even if all but one of the component algorithms are later found to be vulnerable.¶

The transition to post-quantum cryptography has motivated the adoption of hybrid key exchanges in TLS, as described in [TLS-HYBRID]. Specific hybrid groups have been registered in [TLS-ECDHE-MLKEM]. When hybrid key exchange is used, the key_exchange field of each KeyShareEntry in the initial handshake is formed by concatenating the key_exchange fields of the constituent algorithms. This same approach is reused during the Extended Key Update, when new key shares are exchanged.¶

The specification in [TLS-MLKEM] registers the lattice-based ML-KEM algorithm and its variants, such as ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024. The KEM encapsulation key or KEM ciphertext is represented as a 'KeyShareEntry' field. This same approach is reused during the Extended Key Update, when new key shares are exchanged.¶

9. SSLKEYLOGFILE Update

As a successful extended key update exchange invalidates previous secrets, SSLKEYLOGFILE [TLS-KEYLOGFILE] needs to be populated with new entries. As a result, two additional secret labels are utilized in the SSLKEYLOGFILE:¶

1. CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_N+1: identifies the client_application_traffic_secret_N+1 in the key schedule¶

2. SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_N+1: identifies the server_application_traffic_secret_N+1 in the key schedule¶

3. EXPORTER_SECRET_N+1: identifies the exporter_main_secret_N+1 in the key schedule¶

Similar to other entries in the SSLKEYLOGFILE, the label is followed by the 32-byte value of the Random field from the ClientHello message that established the TLS connection, and the corresponding secret encoded in hexadecimal.¶

SSLKEYLOGFILE entries for the extended key update MUST NOT be produced if SSLKEYLOGFILE was not used for other secrets in the handshake.¶

Note that each successful Extended Key Update invalidates all previous SSLKEYLOGFILE secrets including past iterations of CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_, SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_ and EXPORTER_SECRET_.¶

10. Exporter

Protocols such as DTLS-SRTP and DTLS-over-SCTP rely on TLS or DTLS for key establishment, but reuse portions of the derived keying material for their own specific purposes.These protocols use the TLS exporter defined in Section 7.5 of [TLS].¶

Once the Extended Key Update mechanism is complete, such protocols would need to use the newly derived key to generate Exported Keying Material (EKM) to protect packets. The "sk" derived in the Section 7 will be used as the "Secret" in the exporter function, defined in Section 7.5 of [TLS], to generate EKM, ensuring that the exported keying material is aligned with the updated security context.¶

When the exporter master secret is updated following a successful Extended Key Update, the TLS/DTLS implementation will have to notify the application that a new exporter secret is available.¶

To prevent desynchronization, the application will have to retain both the previous and the newly derived exporter secrets for a short period. For TLS, the previous exporter secret would be discarded once data derived from the new exporter has been successfully processed. For DTLS, the previous exporter secret needs to be retained until the retention timer expires, to allow for processing of packets that may arrive out of order. The retention policy for exporter secrets is application-specific. For example, in DTLS-SRTP, the application might retain the previous exporter secret until its replay window no longer accepts packets protected with keys derived from that secret, as described in Section 3.3.2 of [RFC3711].¶

11. Security Considerations

This section discusses additional security and operational aspects introduced by the Extended Key Update mechanism. All security considerations of TLS 1.3 [TLS] and DTLS.13 [DTLS] continue to apply.¶

12. IANA Considerations

13. References

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the members of the "TSVWG DTLS for SCTP Requirements Design Team" for their discussion. The members, in no particular order, were:¶

• Marcelo Ricardo Leitner¶

• Zaheduzzaman Sarker¶

• Magnus Westerlund¶

• John Mattsson¶

• Claudio Porfiri¶

• Xin Long¶

• Michael Tüxen¶

• Hannes Tschofenig¶

• K Tirumaleswar Reddy¶

• Bertrand Rault¶

Additionally, we would like to thank the chairs of the Transport and Services Working Group (tsvwg) Gorry Fairhurst and Marten Seemann as well as the responsible area director Martin Duke.¶

Finally, we would like to thank Martin Thomson, Ilari Liusvaara, Benjamin Kaduk, Scott Fluhrer, Dennis Jackson, David Benjamin, Matthijs van Duin, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Joe Birr-Pixton, Eric Rescorla, and Thom Wiggers for their review comments.¶

Appendix B. State Machines

The sections below describe the state machines for the extended key update operation for TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3.¶

For editorial reasons we abbreviate the protocol message types:¶

• Req - ExtendedKeyUpdate(request)¶

• Resp - ExtendedKeyUpdate(response)¶

• NKU - ExtendedKeyUpdate(new_key_update)¶

• ACK - Acknowledgement message from Section 7 of [DTLS]¶

• APP - application data payloads¶

In the (D)TLS 1.3 state machines discussed below, SEND keys are the keys used by a peer to encrypt outbound records and RECEIVE keys are the keys used to decrypt inbound records. They are derived from the current application traffic secrets as defined in (D)TLS 1.3, and are replaced with the new ones after each successful Extended Key Update.¶

Authors' Addresses