AGTP Transparency Log Protocol

Introduction AGTP v07 recognizes log-anchored as one of three equivalent Trust Tier 1 verification paths defined in . This document specifies the log protocol that path depends on. Earlier draft material that referred to an inline AGTP Certificate Transparency Log (AGTP-CTL) in is superseded by this document. The next revision of will reference AGTP-LOG normatively rather than define its own log. AGTP-LOG inherits the verifiable data structure of and the receipt format of . This document does not redefine the cryptographic primitives or the underlying append-only log construction; it specifies how an AGTP governance platform operates a log over those primitives, what kinds of statements the log accepts, how verifiers discover the log, and how AGTP-LOG receipts are bound to the Agent Identity Document. The key requirements language follows and .

AGTP-LOG as Audit Infrastructure AGTP-LOG is the audit infrastructure for AGTP-based agent operations. Entries committed to the log constitute the post-hoc record of agent identity events: creation, lifecycle transitions, and revocation. These records carry the structural properties that distinguish protocol-layer audit from application-layer audit logging: Audited party cannot forge own trail. Statements are signed by the governance platform that issued the Agent Genesis, not by the agent. An agent does not control the log operator's signing key and therefore cannot forge, alter, or omit its own audit records. This is a structural property of the architecture, not a policy constraint that requires enforcement. Audit records are append-only and tamper-evident. The verifiable data structure of guarantees that committed statements cannot be retroactively altered without breaking the cryptographic consistency of the log. A log operator that publishes inconsistent tree heads is detectable by monitors observing the log. Audit records carry cryptographic provenance. Receipts per are independently verifiable: a party holding a Canonical Agent-ID and the corresponding receipt can confirm the audit record exists in the log without trusting any single party's assertion that it does. Audit records are bound to wire-level identity. The agtp-subject field of every statement is a Canonical Agent-ID that ties the audit record to the protocol-level identity used in every AGTP request. The audit trail and the operational identity are the same identity, not separately maintained representations that must be correlated after the fact.

Scope: Post-Hoc Audit AGTP-LOG addresses post-hoc audit: the recording of what has happened, after it has happened, in a form that can be verified later. This is the audit problem regulatory frameworks and compliance systems typically address. Pre-commitment intent declaration — recording what an agent declares it is about to do, before action evaluation, with ordering guarantees that prevent ex-post fabrication of intent — is a distinct concern with different threat-model properties. AGTP-LOG does not address pre-commitment intent declaration. The AGTP framework treats pre-commitment intent declaration as adjacent work; see .

Regulatory Context Audit infrastructure for agent operations is increasingly subject to regulatory requirements. The EU AI Act Article 12 requires automatic recording of events for high-risk AI systems with cryptographically verifiable provenance. Similar frameworks are emerging in other jurisdictions, and industry-specific regulations (financial services, healthcare, aviation, government) add their own requirements for agent attribution and audit trails. AGTP-LOG provides the protocol-layer infrastructure these regulatory frameworks require: tamper-evident records of agent identity events, signed by accountable governance platforms, verifiable by independent third parties, bound to the wire-level identity used in agent operations. AGTP-LOG does not itself implement any specific regulatory framework; it provides the audit primitives that compliance systems built on AGTP can use to satisfy regulatory requirements.

Related Audit Work Multiple parallel efforts in the agent infrastructure space address adjacent audit concerns. AGTP-LOG positions explicitly relative to: Pre-commitment intent declaration: defines intent declaration committed to a tamper-evident log before policy evaluation executes. The ordering guarantee (declaration < evaluation < execution) is structurally different from AGTP-LOG's post-hoc recording. AGTP-LOG and pre-commitment intent declaration are complementary: both can operate against the same governance platform, recording different categories of agent events. HTTP-based audit data models: Work in progress in the IETF (e.g., ) proposes audit data models layered over HTTP and existing token formats. AGTP-LOG's architectural commitment is different: audit is a structural property of the protocol substrate, not a data model retrofitted onto a substrate that was not designed for accountability. Both approaches may coexist for the agent traffic each substrate carries. Transparency standards (SCITT, RFC 9162): AGTP-LOG reuses these verifiable data structures and receipt formats. AGTP-LOG is a profile and deployment pattern for SCITT-aligned audit infrastructure specific to AGTP agent identity events.

Terminology

AGTP Agent Identity Taxonomy AGTP identity is composed of three distinct elements. This taxonomy was formalized concurrent with the v07 revision of and is normatively adopted throughout the AGTP draft family.

Agent Genesis:: The permanent, signed governance-layer document produced at ACTIVATE time that establishes an agent's identity. The Agent Genesis is the origin record from which all other identity artifacts derive. It is issued by the governance platform, signed with the governance platform's key, and archived on revocation. An Agent Genesis is never reissued; the identity it establishes is permanent for the life of the agent.
Canonical Agent-ID:: A 256-bit cryptographic hash of the Agent Genesis, used as the agent's identifier in all AGTP protocol operations. The Canonical Agent-ID is the value carried in the Agent-ID header on every request, the key in the registry, and the subject of transparency log entries. The Canonical Agent-ID is derived from the Agent Genesis; it is not an independent value.
Agent Certificate:: An optional X.509 v3 credential defined in that binds the Canonical Agent-ID to TLS mutual authentication for transport- layer verification and O(1) scope enforcement at Scope-Enforcement Points. Agent Certificates are renewable and revocable, with a recommended 90-day validity period. The Agent Certificate is a derived credential, not an identity substrate; it references the Agent Genesis via the activation-certificate-id extension.

The relationship among these three elements:

Log-Specific Terminology

Log:: An append-only, tamper-evident record of AGTP-LOG statements operated by a governance platform. The log implements the verifiable data structure of and issues SCITT receipts per .
Log Operator:: The party that operates a log. In this revision the log operator is normatively the governance platform that issued the Agent Genesis statements committed to the log. Future revisions MAY permit log operation to be delegated to a separate entity.
Statement:: A single AGTP-LOG entry: a signed assertion by a log operator about an agent identity event. Each statement has an event type, subject, payload, issuer, and signature. See .
Receipt:: A COSE_Sign1 envelope per issued by a log against a statement, attesting that the statement has been committed to the log. The receipt is the consumable proof for verifiers. See .
Inclusion Proof:: A cryptographic proof per demonstrating that a given statement is present at a specific position in the log's tree structure. Embedded within a receipt or retrievable independently via the log protocol.
Consistency Proof:: A cryptographic proof per demonstrating that two signed tree heads at different sizes are consistent (the smaller tree is a prefix of the larger). Used by monitors to detect split-view attacks.
Signed Tree Head (STH):: The log operator's signed assertion of the current tree size and root hash per Section 4.10.
Witness:: A third party that countersigns the log's signed tree heads to attest that it has observed the log in a consistent state. The witness role is defined informally here and normatively specified in a future revision; see .
Monitor:: A party that polls the log's STHs and consistency proofs to detect split-view attacks or operator misbehavior. The monitor role is defined informally here and normatively specified in a future revision; see .
Verifier:: A consumer of an AGTP-LOG receipt that confirms a given Agent Genesis is committed to a log. Any party holding a Canonical Agent-ID and a log_uri can act as a verifier.

Log Scope A log MUST accept statements for at least the following five AGTP-LOG event types. The event type is recorded in the statement envelope (see ). Event Type Triggered By Subject agent-genesis-issued ACTIVATE method completion Canonical Agent-ID derived from the new Agent Genesis agent-genesis-revoked REVOKE method completion Canonical Agent-ID being retired agent-lifecycle-suspended SUSPEND method completion Canonical Agent-ID entering Suspended state agent-lifecycle-reinstated REINSTATE method completion Canonical Agent-ID returning to Active state agent-lifecycle-deprecated DEPRECATE method completion Canonical Agent-ID entering Deprecated state The above five event types form the initial AGTP-LOG event-type registry (see ). Future event types MAY be registered as new operational categories arise without requiring revision of this document. Implementations MAY log additional event types beyond the above five. Agent Certificate issuance and revocation events, defined in , are explicit candidates: a deployment that operates both AGTP-LOG and an Agent Certificate authority MAY log certificate-lifecycle events to the same log. Whether a deployment logs certificate events is a deployment decision; logging them is NOT required by this document. When logged, the event types MUST be registered in the AGTP-LOG event-type registry; ad-hoc event-type strings MUST NOT be admitted. Statements MUST NOT carry secret material. The Agent Genesis is public by design; the Canonical Agent-ID is derived from a public hash; lifecycle states are operational facts. A log operator that finds itself wanting to commit a secret to the log is misusing the protocol.

Log Architecture

Per-Platform Logs (Default) Each AGTP governance platform MUST operate a log if it issues Agent Genesis statements with verification_path: log-anchored. The governance platform is the log operator. Statements committed to the log are signed by the governance platform's key as recorded in the Agent Genesis issuer field. A governance platform operating a log advertises the log's URI in the log_uri field of every Agent Genesis it produces under the log-anchored path. See . Per-platform logs follow the SCITT issuer-local convention: each issuer commits its own statements to its own log, signed with its own key, with receipts referencing that issuer's identity. This matches typical deployment patterns and minimizes operational coupling between governance platforms.

Federation via Cross-Witnessing When a deployment requires that statements from one governance platform be verifiable by participants who do not implicitly trust that platform's log operator, the platform MAY invite a witness to countersign its signed tree heads. The witness adds a second signature over the STH, attesting that the witness has observed the log in a consistent state at that tree size. The cross-witnessing model preserves per-platform log operation while introducing third-party attestation. A verifier presented with an Agent Genesis from platform A and the corresponding receipt MAY require the STH to be countersigned by a witness whose key the verifier trusts before accepting the inclusion proof. The witness protocol, witness selection, witness key publication, and the schema of countersigned STHs are deferred to a future revision per .

Entry Format Every statement is a SCITT-aligned signed envelope per . The envelope is a COSE_Sign1 structure per containing the following protected and unprotected header parameters and payload. The protected header MUST carry: Parameter CBOR Label Value alg 1 Signing algorithm. MUST be ES256 (-7), ES384 (-35), ES512 (-36), or EdDSA (-8). kid 4 Key identifier of the log operator's signing key (governance platform key). cty 3 Content type. MUST be application/agtp-log-statement+cbor. agtp-event-type TBD One of the event-type strings registered in the AGTP-LOG event-type registry. agtp-subject TBD Canonical Agent-ID, encoded as a 32-byte CBOR byte string. agtp-issuer TBD URI of the governance platform issuing this statement. agtp-issued-at TBD Statement issuance time as an RFC 3339 timestamp. The unprotected header MAY carry implementation-specific parameters; verifiers MUST ignore unprotected parameters not recognized. The payload MUST be a CBOR-encoded map whose contents depend on the event type: For agent-genesis-issued:

, ; the canonical CBOR-encoded ; Agent Genesis document "log-position": , ; assigned by log operator ; on entry commit "previous-tree-size": ; tree size before this entry } ]]> For agent-genesis-revoked, agent-lifecycle-suspended, agent-lifecycle-reinstated, and agent-lifecycle-deprecated:

, ; matches event-type "reason": , ; operator-supplied reason "previous-state": , ; lifecycle state prior to event "new-state": , ; lifecycle state after event "log-position": , "previous-tree-size": } ]]> The CBOR encoding MUST be deterministic per Section 4.2 (Canonical CBOR). The signature is computed over the COSE_Sign1 Sig_structure per Section 4.4. A statement is accepted into the log only after the log operator has verified: The signature is valid against the log operator's published key. The agtp-issuer URI matches the log operator's identity. The agtp-subject is a well-formed 32-byte Canonical Agent-ID. The agtp-event-type is registered in the AGTP-LOG event-type registry. The payload structure conforms to the schema for the declared event type. For agent-genesis-issued, the hash of the embedded Agent Genesis matches the agtp-subject byte for byte. Statements failing any of these checks MUST NOT be appended to the log. The log operator MUST record the rejection in its operational logs but MUST NOT commit the rejected statement to the verifiable tree.

Receipt Format A receipt is a COSE_Sign1 envelope per attesting that a statement has been committed to the log. Receipts are the consumable proof for AGTP verifiers. The receipt's content type is application/scitt-receipt+cose per . The receipt's payload references the statement's position in the log and embeds an inclusion proof against a signed tree head. The protected header MUST carry: Parameter CBOR Label Value alg 1 Signing algorithm; same constraint as statement signing. kid 4 Key identifier of the log operator's signing key. cty 3 Content type. MUST be application/scitt-receipt+cose. verifiable-data-structure TBD MUST be RFC9162_SHA256 per . agtp-statement-position TBD The log position (zero-indexed) of the committed statement. agtp-statement-hash TBD SHA-256 hash of the canonical CBOR-encoded statement. agtp-signed-tree-head TBD The STH the inclusion proof attests against. The payload MUST be a CBOR-encoded map carrying the inclusion proof:

, ; STH tree size "leaf-index": , ; position of statement "audit-path": [, , ...] ; Merkle audit path per RFC 9162 } ]]> Receipts MUST be retrievable by any party that holds the Canonical Agent-ID and the log_uri. The receipt MUST NOT contain the statement itself; verifiers requiring the statement MUST retrieve it separately. This separation keeps receipts small enough to embed in the Agent Genesis (log_inclusion_proof field) without bloating the Agent Identity Document. The receipt for an agent-genesis-issued event MUST be embedded in the Agent Genesis's log_inclusion_proof field at the moment the Agent Genesis is finalized. The governance platform commits the statement to the log, retrieves the resulting receipt, embeds the receipt in the Agent Genesis, and only then signs the Agent Genesis and computes the Canonical Agent-ID. This ordering ensures the Canonical Agent-ID hashes a document containing its own inclusion proof.

Log Protocol The log operator exposes four operations to clients. All operations MUST be available over HTTPS at paths relative to the log's base URI (the log_uri value advertised in the Agent Genesis). Implementations SHOULD also expose these operations over AGTP at the same logical paths once AGTP transport bindings are stable.

Submit Statement POST {log_uri}/statements Request body: a single COSE_Sign1 statement per . Content-Type application/agtp-log-statement+cose. Response on success: HTTP 201 with the resulting receipt per . Content-Type application/scitt-receipt+cose. Response on signature failure: HTTP 400 with body indicating which validation step failed (signature, issuer match, subject format, event type, payload schema, or genesis hash mismatch). Submission is normatively restricted to the log operator itself: external parties MUST NOT be able to submit statements directly. The log operator validates and signs internally, then commits. This preserves the log's role as an attestation of the operator's own governance decisions.

Retrieve Receipt GET {log_uri}/receipts/{statement-hash} Path parameter: hex-encoded SHA-256 hash of the canonical CBOR statement. Response on success: HTTP 200 with the receipt per . Response on miss: HTTP 404 with body indicating whether the hash is unknown to this log or refers to a statement that has not yet been committed.

Retrieve Inclusion Proof GET {log_uri}/proofs/inclusion?leaf-index={index}&tree-size={size} Query parameters: leaf-index: the position of the statement (zero-indexed) tree-size: the STH tree size against which the proof is computed Response on success: HTTP 200 with a CBOR-encoded inclusion proof per Section 4.11. The proof is the audit path; the caller is responsible for verifying it against the STH at the requested tree size. This operation duplicates information already in receipts; it exists for clients that hold a position and need a fresh proof against a different STH than the one originally bound in the receipt.

Retrieve Consistency Proof GET {log_uri}/proofs/consistency?first-tree-size={n}&second-tree-size={m} Query parameters: first-tree-size: the smaller tree size second-tree-size: the larger tree size Response on success: HTTP 200 with a CBOR-encoded consistency proof per Section 4.12. The proof attests that the tree at size n is a prefix of the tree at size m. Used by monitors to detect split-view attacks. A monitor that observes two different signed tree heads from the same log operator at the same tree size MUST treat that as evidence of operator misbehavior.

Retrieve Signed Tree Head GET {log_uri}/sth Response on success: HTTP 200 with the current STH per Section 4.10. The response is a CBOR-encoded structure carrying tree size, root hash, timestamp, and the log operator's signature over those fields. The STH is the anchor for all inclusion and consistency proofs issued by the log. Verifiers MUST retrieve and cache the STH before validating any proof.

Discovery A verifier holding a Canonical Agent-ID locates the log containing the relevant inclusion proof via the log_uri field of the Agent Genesis. This document proposes log_uri as a new field to be added to the Agent Identity Document schema defined in ; adoption of the field is anticipated in a future revision of , coordinated with the publication of this document. The log_uri field, once adopted, carries an absolute HTTPS URI pointing to the base of the log's protocol surface. All log protocol operations defined in this document are exposed at paths relative to this URI. A verifier that has retrieved an Agent Genesis (whether via canonical Agent-ID resolution per , via the AGTP DISCOVER method, or via any other means) MUST: Read the log_uri field. Validate that the URI uses the https:// scheme. Open a TLS connection to the log endpoint. Retrieve the STH, verify its signature against the governance platform's published key. Retrieve the inclusion proof for the Agent Genesis (either by parsing the embedded log_inclusion_proof receipt or by requesting a fresh proof from the log). Verify the inclusion proof against the STH. If the log_uri field is absent from an Agent Genesis whose verification_path is log-anchored, the Agent Genesis is malformed and the verifier MUST reject the agent identity. If the log_uri is present but the log is unreachable at verification time, the verifier MAY fall back to the cached inclusion proof embedded in the Agent Genesis's log_inclusion_proof field if such a cached proof exists and remains valid against the verifier's last-known good STH. Until the log_uri field is adopted into , implementations MAY convey the log URI through other means: as an out-of-band configuration value keyed on the governance platform's issuer URL, or as a well-known location relative to issuer (e.g., {issuer}/log). These mechanisms are deployment-specific and MUST NOT be relied on for cross-platform interoperability. The normative discovery mechanism is the log_uri field once adopted. A well-known URI discovery mechanism (e.g., /.well-known/agtp-log) is not specified in this revision. AGTP v07 does not currently define any well-known URI conventions, and introducing one solely for AGTP-LOG discovery is premature. Future revisions of AGTP-LOG MAY define a well-known discovery path if the broader AGTP family adopts well-known URI conventions.

Integration with AGTP The log_inclusion_proof field defined in the Agent Identity Document of v07 references the inclusion proof produced by this log. A verifier retrieves the proof, validates it against the log's signed tree head, and confirms the Agent Genesis is committed to the log. The verification_path: log-anchored value defined in indicates that the agent's Trust Tier 1 verification depends on a log-committed Agent Genesis. Verifiers consuming such an agent MUST perform the inclusion-proof verification described in before granting Authority-Scope decisions on the agent's behalf. The log_uri field is proposed by this document as an addition to the Agent Identity Document defined in . Its adoption is anticipated in a future revision of , coordinated with the publication of this document. Until adoption, deployments MAY convey log location through the alternative mechanisms described in .

Security Considerations

Audited Party Forgery A common threat model for audit systems is the audited party forging, altering, or omitting their own audit records. AGTP-LOG addresses this structurally rather than through policy controls. Statements in AGTP-LOG are signed by the governance platform that operates the log, not by the agent the statements concern. The agent does not control the log operator's signing key. An agent cannot: Forge a statement attributing actions to a different agent identity (statements bind to agtp-subject and are signed by the log operator) Omit an event from its own audit trail (commit decisions are made by the log operator, not by the agent) Alter a committed statement after the fact (the verifiable data structure of prevents retroactive modification without breaking tree consistency) Replace its audit history with a forged sequence (statements are identified by position in an append-only log; replacing history is detectable by monitors observing the log) The threat shifts to compromising the governance platform itself () rather than compromising the agent. This is a higher bar architecturally: the governance platform's signing key is a long-lived infrastructure credential typically protected with hardware security modules and key ceremonies, while agent credentials may be more numerous and shorter-lived. This structural property distinguishes AGTP-LOG from audit approaches where the audited party participates in writing the audit trail. In application-layer audit logging on HTTP-based substrates, an agent or its operator typically generates audit records about its own behavior; ensuring those records cannot be altered by the audited party requires additional cryptographic machinery layered on top of the substrate. In AGTP-LOG, the separation is built into the protocol architecture.

Log Operator Compromise The log operator is also the issuer of statements in the AGTP-LOG model in this revision. A compromised log operator could: Sign a fraudulent Agent Genesis for an Agent-ID it does not control, commit it to the log, and present the resulting receipt as proof of a non-existent agent's existence. Refuse to commit valid statements, denying agents legitimate Trust Tier 1 standing. Backdate statements by manipulating its internal clock prior to signing. Operate two parallel logs presenting different signed tree heads to different verifiers (a split-view attack). The first three threats are inherent to any single-issuer log model and are partially mitigated by the witness mechanism (deferred to a future revision) and by external monitors that detect inconsistency. The split-view attack is specifically detectable via the consistency proof operation: a monitor that observes a second STH at the same tree size as a previously-observed STH from the same operator MUST treat the divergence as evidence of compromise. Deployments that require defense against log operator compromise SHOULD require witness countersignatures on STHs (when a future revision specifies the witness protocol) and SHOULD subscribe to independent monitors that surface inconsistency evidence.

Witness Collusion In a future revision incorporating witnesses, two or more witnesses colluding with a malicious log operator could countersign inconsistent STHs. This threat is structurally identical to log operator compromise from the verifier's perspective: the verifier trusts the witness set, and a colluding witness set is no better than a colluding operator. Mitigations are deferred to a future revision along with the witness protocol itself.

Private Key Handling The log operator's signing key is the root of all trust in AGTP-LOG. Operators MUST protect this key with controls appropriate to a long-lived signing identity: hardware security modules, key ceremonies for key generation and rotation, and documented operational procedures for key recovery. Key rotation procedures and the binding of historical STHs to retired keys are not specified in this revision; see .

Statement Privacy Statements in AGTP-LOG are public by design. The Agent Genesis itself is published as the canonical identity record of an agent; the lifecycle events that follow it are operational facts. AGTP-LOG is not a confidential audit log. Operators MUST NOT commit statements containing secrets, operational credentials, or other sensitive material. The validation gates in are insufficient to filter privacy violations; preventing privacy leaks in statement payloads is the operator's responsibility.

Replay and Statement Substitution A statement signed by a valid log operator and committed to a log is durable: the log operator cannot retroactively replace it without breaking the consistency property of the tree. However, duplicate submissions of the same logical statement at different positions are not prevented by the protocol; the log operator SHOULD deduplicate statements before commit, using the canonical CBOR encoding as the deduplication key.

Threat Model Reference The full Trust Tier 1 threat model is specified in Section 7 and . AGTP-LOG is one of three equivalent verification paths; the threat model considers attacks against the log-anchored path within the broader context of dns-anchored and hybrid alternatives.

Future Registry Considerations The AGTP family includes several constructs (status codes, header fields, identity document fields, method names, media types) whose long-term stewardship will require coordinated management once the ecosystem matures. Several of these constructs are AGTP-specific and have no current home in existing standards-body registries. The appropriate venue for AGTP registry stewardship — IANA, an AGTP governance forum, a foundation, or some combination — is an open question for the broader AGTP family and is not decided in this document. This section enumerates the registry-shaped artifacts AGTP-LOG defines, so that whichever stewardship model the AGTP family eventually adopts has a clear inventory of what AGTP-LOG contributes. No commitment to any specific registry venue is made by this document.

AGTP-LOG Event Types The five event types defined in this revision form an extensible event-type set: Event Type Reference agent-genesis-issued This document, agent-genesis-revoked This document, agent-lifecycle-suspended This document, agent-lifecycle-reinstated This document, agent-lifecycle-deprecated This document, New event types MUST be defined in a published specification that describes the triggering condition, subject, payload schema, and the validation rules a log operator applies before commit. Implementers introducing event types prior to a formal registry process SHOULD prefix experimental types with x- to avoid namespace collisions with future registered types.

Media Types This document defines two media types for AGTP-LOG message serialization:

application/agtp-log-statement+cose: AGTP-LOG statement envelope (COSE_Sign1 per ).
application/agtp-log-statement+cbor: AGTP-LOG statement payload (CBOR, deterministic encoding per Section 4.2). Used as the payload of the COSE_Sign1 envelope.

The SCITT receipt media type application/scitt-receipt+cose is defined in and reused without redefinition.

COSE Header Parameters The following protected-header parameter names are introduced by this document. CBOR label assignments are not made by this document; implementations prior to a formal registry process SHOULD use string-form labels in the protected header rather than numeric labels, and MUST document their string-to-numeric mapping for downstream tooling. Parameter Name Use agtp-event-type Event type string for the AGTP-LOG statement. agtp-subject Canonical Agent-ID (32 bytes) the statement concerns. agtp-issuer Governance platform URI signing the statement. agtp-issued-at Issuance timestamp per RFC 3339. verifiable-data-structure Receipt parameter; MUST be RFC9162_SHA256. agtp-statement-position Log position of the statement the receipt covers. agtp-statement-hash SHA-256 of the canonical statement encoding. agtp-signed-tree-head The STH the receipt attests against.

Identity Document Field The log_uri field defined in is proposed as an addition to the Agent Identity Document defined in . Its adoption is anticipated in a future revision of and will be reflected in whichever field-management mechanism the AGTP family adopts for the Agent Identity Document schema.

Open Items The following items are explicitly out of scope for this revision and are anticipated in future revisions: Witness protocol. Witness selection, key publication, countersigned STH schema, witness inclusion in receipts, and the failure modes when witness signatures are inconsistent. Monitor role. Formal monitor specification: polling cadence, consistency-proof retention, split-view reporting protocol, and monitor discoverability. Federation across governance platforms. Cross-platform agent identity resolution when multiple governance platforms operate independent logs and an agent originates from one but is invoked via another. This revision assumes per-platform isolation. Key rotation. Procedures for rotating the log operator's signing key, binding historical STHs to retired keys, and ensuring older inclusion proofs remain verifiable across key rotations. Log operator delegation. Whether and how a governance platform may delegate log operation to a separate entity while preserving the issuer-equals-operator property. Statement deduplication. A normative deduplication algorithm that is robust to byte-level variations in CBOR encoding (the protocol currently relies on deterministic encoding to make this tractable). Discovery via well-known URI. Specification of a well-known discovery endpoint per once the broader AGTP family adopts well-known URI conventions. CBOR label assignments for AGTP-LOG header parameters. The table in marks these as TBD pending the outcome of AGTP family registry stewardship decisions. Until numeric labels are assigned, implementations SHOULD use the string-form parameter names and document their string-to-numeric mapping for downstream tooling. Registry stewardship venue. Whether AGTP-LOG registries (event types, media types, header parameters, identity document fields) are stewarded through IANA, an AGTP governance forum, or another mechanism is an open question for the AGTP family. This document enumerates the registry-shaped artifacts it contributes without committing to a venue.

Contributors Feedback from Scott Courtney (GoDaddy / ANS) on SCITT alignment and production deployment considerations informed this draft. The event-type registry structure follows the SCITT philosophy of deterministic CBOR statement envelopes with externally-managed event-type names, allowing the AGTP ecosystem to add new event categories without spec revisions.